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ABSTRACT

In recent years, economists have shown concern with a number
of aspects of the relationship between debt management and monetary
policy.

After the famous Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March,

19511 the central bank undertook a series of steps which eventually
led to the emergence of the "even keel" policy, an open market operat
ing strategy which replaced the policy of lending direct support to
Treasury financings.

The purpose of this research project has been to

provide a detailed and comprehensive analysis of "even keel" policy
over an extended period.
In light of this objective, an extensive historical analysis
of the evolution of the "even keel" strategy was conducted.

This

analysis focused special attention on the changing role of the central
bank with respect to the strategies it has employed during Treasury
financing operations.

It was concluded that the "even keel" policy

became an operational concept with the adoption of the "bills only"
guidelines on March 4-5, 1953.

At this time, the Trading Desk was in

structed to refrain, during Treasury financing periods, from any pur
chases of "rights," "when-issued" securities, or outstanding securities
of comparable maturity to those being offered in exchange.

In addition,

the System, during Treasury financings, extended repurchase agreements
to non-bank dealers and avoided any actions indicative of a shift in the
stance of monetary policy.

The inauguration of "operation twist" in
vli

1961 did. not alter the "even keel" strategy as it was practiced under
the "bills only" guidelines.
The research also included a detailed empirical analysis of
the "even keel" policy during the January, 1960-August, 1968, period.
The empirical analysis first concentrated on the relationship between
central bank policy and Treasury operations.

Special emphasis was

placed upon determining under what circumstances the System maintained
an "even keel" in the money market.

It was found that the central bank

usually pursued an "even keel" strategy during both advanced and regu
lar refundings, regardless of the volume of the offer or the type of
security involved in the financing.

The System has normally "even

keeled" cash refundings and cash offers involving coupon issues, but
rarely such operations in Treasury bills.

The seasonal pattern of

"even keel" directives was explained by the timing of major refundings
and the level of adjusted Treasury operating balances.
Secondly, the empirical analysis concentrated upon a statis
tical evaluation of a number of alternative definitions of "even keel"
policy.

Employing one-way analysis of variance techniques, it was

found that the "even keel" strategy was implemented through the use of
repurchase agreements with non-bank dealers.

However, these reserve

injections were not sufficient to either ease or stabilize money market
conditions during "even keel" periods, as reflected in the behavior of
marginal reserves and short-term interest rates.

Strong evidence was

found that the "even keel" strategy did entail the avoidance of overt
shifts in credit policy during Treasury financing periods.

viii

The System

has normally limited the Implementation of Its quantitative credit
control weapons to those Intervals between major Treasury operations.

lx

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this introductory chapter is twofold.

It

first enumerates the major issues and questions concerning the
Federal Reserve’s "even keel" policy which are examined in detail in
the analysis.

Secondly, this section presents the organizational

outline followed in the study, while simultaneously previewing some
of the major conclusions reached in the historical and empirical
analysis.

The Major Issues

The term "even keel" has come to he associated in recent
years with that Federal Reserve System policy which has been imple
mented during Treasury financing periods.

The "even keel" strategy

evolved gradually in the years following the Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord as a replacement for the central bank policy of direct support
purchases.

As its name implies and as later analysis shows, the "even

keel” strategy is an attempt by the central bank authorities to main
tain a steady course in credit control policy during Treasury financ
ing periods.

The major rationale for the "even keel" strategy has

been the necessity of the central bank to undertake actions aimed at
smoothing the marketing process of Treasury financing operations.

1
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The recent literature dealing with Federal Reserve "even
keel" policy has raised a number of major issues and questions to
which this analysis has addressed itself.

The historical and empiri

cal analysis which follows attempts to clarify a number of issues
which are discussed below.
The first question to be examined is how the "even keel"
policy evolved.

Why was the "even keel" strategy deemed the appro

priate policy to pursue during Treasury financings?

When was the

"even keel" strategy established and how has this policy been altered
as major innovations in monetary policy have occurred?
purpose of the "even keel" strategy?

What is the

How is this strategy implemented?

A second issue examined in this study concerns the question
of when the "even keel" policy is employed.

That is, under what con

ditions does the central bank maintain an "even keel" posture in the
money market?

What type of Treasury operations call forth an "even

keel" directive?

Does the size of the securities offered in the

Treasury operation influence the decision of the System as to whether
or not to issue an "even keel" directive?
The final and major issue to be examined in the analysis con
cerns the definition of "even keel" policy, as well as the implications
of this strategy for credit control policy.

Does the "even keel"

policy entail explicit support of Treasury operations?

Does the imple

mentation of an "even keel" policy result in a one-way shift toward
ease?

Is the stability of money market conditions the primary goal of

this policy?

Does the maintenance of an "even keel" affect the timing

of monetary policy actions?

Does the "even keel" policy preempt

3
shifts in the stance of credit policy?

This study attempts to

clarify these issues and questions within the organizational frame
work detailed below.

The Study Plan

Chapter II traces the historical evolution of "even keel"
policy within the framework of the changing relationship between debt
management and monetary policy.

It emphasizes the gradual adaptation

of central bank policy to the changing environment of the 1950's.
The shift from a pegged to a free government securities market was
examined in order to determine when the "even keel" policy emerged as
an operational concept.

Special consideration is given to the

Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, the transition to free markets, and
the "bills only" policy.

The analysis concludes that the "even keel"

strategy became operational on March 4-5, 1953> with the adoption of
the "bills only" guidelines.

By this date, both the general guide

lines for open market operations and the operating techniques utilized
by the Trading Desk during Treasury financings, which later came to be
associated with the maintenance of an "even keel," had been establish
ed.
The major objective of Chapter III was to provide the reader
with a more detailed picture of the "even keel" strategy during the
1960-1968 period.

This section focuses on the major innovations in

System open market policy and Trading Desk operating techniques that
are of special relevance to "even keel" policy.

It was found that the

inauguration of "operation twist" did not alter the major characteristics

of the "even keel" strategy as it was practiced under the "bills
only" guidelines.
This section of the analysis also discusses some of the alter
native definitions of "even keel" policy found in the literature.

In

addition, an explanation of the basic rationale which underlies this
strategy, as well as a discussion of the time span covered by "even
keel" directives, is offered.

Finally, Appendix A details the pro

cedure followed in Identifying "even keel" directives, as well as
offering an exhibition and explanation of some typical current
economic policy directives.
The quantitative analysis is initiated in Chapter IV which
deals with various relationships between "even keel" policy and
Treasury operations during the 1960-1968 period.

This section of the

analysis attempts to identify the major determinants of "even keel"
policy, that is, under what circumstances has the central bank pursued
an "even keel" policy.

The major factors evaluated include the type

of financing technique employed, the volume of the offer, and the type
of securities involved in the Treasury operation.

Of these factors,

the type of financing technique employed in a particular operation
seems to have the most influence on central bank policy.

In addition

to a discussion of the procedure employed in dating "even keel"
periods, this section also attempts to explain the frequency and
seasonal pattern displayed by "even keel" directives during the 1960-

1968 period.

Money market conditions, Treasury financing activity,

and Treasury operating balances were the factors that explained both
the yearly and monthly frequency patterns of "even keel" policy.

Chapter V empirically tests the alternative definitions of
"even keel" policy.

After a detailed discussion of the statistical

testing procedure employed in the analysis» the implementation of
"even keel" policy is examined.

It was found that the "even keel"

strategy was implemented primarily through the extensive use of re
purchase agreements during the 1960-1968 period.

A detailed explana

tion of three distinct definitions of "even keel" policy, categorized
as falling within either the "support" or "neutrality" school,
follows.

Each of these definitions is tested in terras of the behavior

of marginal reserves and short-term interest rates.

The results of

these tests support most strongly the "neutrality" school interpreta
tion of "even keel" policy which views that strategy in terms of the
avoidance of overt monetary policy actions during Treasury financing
periods.
Chapter VI reviews and summarizes the entire analysis.

This

section synthesizes the results of the empirical tests and presents
the author’s definition of "even keel" policy based upon the quantita
tive analysis of this Federal Reserve open market operating strategy
during the 1960-1968 period.

This chapter concludes with a discussion

of some of the major implications of the "even keel" strategy for
monetary policy.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL
RESERVE "EVEN KEEL" POLICY

The Major Modifications in Monetary
and Debt Management Policies

The "even keel" policy of the Federal Reserve System has been
a pragmatic and gradual evolution of an open market operating tech
nique, a refinement emerging from an atmosphere of changing views as
to the proper integration of monetary theory and debt management
policy.*

In order to fully comprehend and appreciate the significance

"Tor the purposes of this paper, a clear distinction is made
between debt management and monetary and fiscal policy. Debt manage
ment consists of all actions of the Federal government which directly
influence the composition and terms of the publicly held Federal debt,
whether initiated by the Treasury or the Federal Reserve System.
Fiscal policy entails the manipulation of tax receipts and government
expenditures, whether discretionary or automatic, by the Federal
government. Fiscal policy actions ultimately determine the level of
Federal government debt outstanding. Monetary policy encompasses
those actions taken by the Federal Reserve System which affect the
money supply, bank credit, and the reserve positions of member banks.
The major tools employed by the System are variations in the reserve
requirement ratio, manipulation of the discount rate, and the purchase
and sale of government securities in the open market. The net amount
of debt bought and sold by the central bank in the conduct of its open
market operations is a matter of monetary policy as opposed to debt
management. This definition of debt management does not include socalled non-interest bearing "debt," either in the form of currency held
outside the Federal government or non-Federal government deposits at
the Federal Reserve banks.
Similar definitions have been employed. See, for example,
Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Managements Its Relationship to Monetary Policy,
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and implications of "erven keel" policy as practiced by the System
during the January, I960, through August, 1968, period, it is neces
sary to trace its development in an historical context.

The follow

ing pages will delineate the major modifications in monetary and debt
management policies since 19^6, with the intention of emphasizing the
rationale for the emergence of this Federal Reserve operating
strategy.

A.

The Pre-Accord Pegging

The necessity of financing the huge deficit incurred as a
result of World War II forced the Federal Reserve System to lend
direct support to Treasury efforts to market debt instruments used to
finance that deficit.

In the postwar period, the System continued its

wartime policy of pegging the yields on government securities, fearing
that investors would not willingly hold the large war debt and antici
pating that debt markets were highly susceptible to destabilizing
speculative fluctuations.

In some quarters it was feared that in

stability of security prices would destroy public confidence in the
government's credit and undermine investment incentives.

The System,

(continued) 1951-1962," in Readings in Money, National Income,
and Stabilization Policy, ed, by Warren L, Smith and Ronald L. Teigen
(Homewood, Illinois* Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 1965)» p. 4-l6| and U.S.,
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Debt Management in the United
States, by Warren L. Smith, Joint Economic Committee, Study Paper No.
19 (Washington, D.C.t Government Printing Office, I960). By way of
contrast, a broader definition which includes non-interest bearing
"debt" has been suggested by James Tobin, "An Essay on Principles of
Debt Management," Fiscal and Debt Management Policies (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.* Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963)» PP. 1^3-218.
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in light of these considerations, committed Itself to a policy of
maintaining a fixed pattern of yields on government securities.
From 19*1-6 to 1951* "the Federal Reserve, serving as the resid
ual buyer of Treasury securities, became the ultimate underwriter of
the Federal government’s debt.

All Treasury financings were guaranteed

success as the System stood committed to purchase in unlimited amounts
those securities not absorbed by the private sector in order to insure
the maintenance of yield levels.

This pegging policy, initially con

sidered appropriate in light of the unusual wartime conditions, was
pursued long after the necessity for direct support had probably
vanished.
The emergence of inflationary pressure in the postwar economy
caused consternation among both academic economists and Federal Reserve
officials as to the propriety of this pegging policy.

The pegging

policy adopted by the System was criticized for a number of reasons.
The subordination of the central bank to the Treasury led to conse
quences that were unacceptable in light of inflationary developments.
With monetary management relegated to insuring the liquidity of the
public debt through the stabilization of security prices, all debt
instruments, regardless of their nominal maturities, were rendered
virtually as liquid as the shortest-term instrument.

In addition, the

entire government debt became a composite of debt instruments, all of
which were only slightly less liquid than money.

Finally, with respect

to the money supply, the availability of money was regulated hy the
spending and investment decisions of government bondholders.

The

Gilford C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management (New
York* The Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and the
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 59.

System was rendered impotent to maintain the effective regulatory
Influence upon the monetary aggregates requisite to the pursuit of
countercyclical objectives.

The conflict between Federal Reserve

officials, concerned with controlling inflationary pressures, and
Treasury authorities, who regarded the minimization of interest rate
cost, rather than countercyclical debt management, as their'primary
goal, reached an apex with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.
The initiation of hostilities brought, on one hand, a boom in
speculative activity which raised market rates and again meant that
support of government securities at prior rates would lead to an
expansion in the money stock that the System could not control; and,
on the other, a possibility of large government deficits, which made
the Treasury exceedingly sensitive to the state of the market for
government securities.

Although neither possibility was realized,

the fear of the former ty System officials led them to seek the
authority necessary to regulate both the money supply and credit
availability.^
B.

The Accord

As a result of a series of discussions between Treasury and
Federal Reserve officials, the now-famous Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord was reached.

The wording of the official Joint statement,

issued on March J*, 1951» nay be worthwhile to recallt

3

Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of
the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J.* Princeton University
Press, 1963), p . 623.

10
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have
reached full accord with respect to debt management
and monetary policies to be pursued In furthering their
common purpose to assure the successful financing of
the Government's requirements andB at the same time,
to minimize monetization of the public debt.^
The agreement became feasible, especially at this time, as there were
no maturities of Treasury securities scheduled for the first five
calendar months of 1951.
In monetary history the Accord was a landmark.

The two

agencies agreed, under the wording of the official joint statement,
that the central bank continue to recognize a responsibility to assure
that the main objective of debt management would be achieved, i.e.,
that the government's cash requirements would be financed.

But the

agreement also clearly acknowledged the necessity for an independent
central monetary authority, one free to regulate the money supply and
credit availability, at its own initiative, in order to pursue economic
stabilization.

The Accord ended the period which was characterized by

the subordination of Federal Reserve credit control objectives to
Treasury interest rate goals.

The agreement effectively converted the

public debt from an extension of the money supply into a body of
financial assets of varying degrees of liquidity.-’
The Accord marked the triumph of those who advocated placing
the power to regulate monetary aggregates in the hands of System
officials.

The Accord was the first step toward a flexible monetary

William McChesney Martin, Jr., "The Transition to Free
Markets," Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. XXXIX (April, 1953)* PP. 330.
-’Gaines, Debt Management, pp. 62-66.
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policy Implemented through the Initiative of the central hank.

In

addition, this agreement was the first tentative warning to the
monetary authorities that the System had to fashion a positive policy
with respect to the appropriate conduct to he followed during Treasury
financing periods.

The Accord was the first step in the establishment

of an independent central hank.

The evolution of the "even keel"

strategy, as the proper program to utilize during Treasury financings,
took some time.

C,

The Transition to Free Markets

With the announcement of the Accord on March 4, 1951» the
Federal Open Market Committee (F.O.M.C.) moved toward the freeing of
the government securities market.

At the F.O.M.C, meeting held on

May 17, 1951* an ad hoc subcommittee (hence referred to as the Craft
Subcommittee) was authorized to study the effects of System operations
upon the functioning of the government securities market.

In the

22-month period which elapsed between the appointment of the Craft
Subcommittee and the adoption of its recommendations on March 4-5,
1953* the behavior of the System and Treasury authorities might best
be described as a pragmatic conversion to a free government securities
market.^
The transition to an autonomous market was a gradual process
characterized by close Treasury-Federal Reserve cooperation.

The

policy pursued by the System through the remainder of 1951 placed

Ira 0. Scott, Jr., Government Securities Market (New Yorki
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), PP. 160-161.

12
primary emphasis on the maintenance of price-yield stability of short
term government securities.

Specifically, System officials agreed
rt

not to raise the discount rate above 1-3A percent during 1951.

The

conduct of open market operations, up until the Treasury refunding of
December, 1952, entailed the lending of direct support to Treasury
financings.

This support took the form of central bank purchases of

"rights" to new issues, new issues on a "when issued" basis, and outg

standing securities in the market comparable to the new issues.
Despite central bank underwriting, the majority of Treasury offerings
through the end of 1952 consisted of short-term securities.

The

Treasury conducted the bulk of its financing needs through the medium
of 1-7/8 percent certificates.^

The Treasury refrained from issuing

securities of more than one year to maturity until February, 1953, so
as not to interfere with continuing portfolio adjustments to the new
and reduced liquidity characteristics of intermediate and longer-term
government issues.^®
During this transition period, the actions of the Federal
Reserve with respect to direct support operations and the Treasury
practice of confining financing operations to certificates, are
explicable in light of the objectives of the two agencies as expressed
by Secretary of the Treasury John W, Snyder.

Secretary Snyder sum

marized those objectives as followst
n

Gaines, Debt Management, p. 66.
®Beard, "Debt Management," pp. ^17-^18.
q
Gaines, Debt Management, p. 69.

10Ibld., p. 66.

13
Throughout the period since the close of World War
II the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System were
agreed upon the fundamental objective of maintaining
a high level of production, employment, and Income
with as great price stability as possible under the
varying conditions which existed in the economy.
The related objectives which were Involved as the
postwar period proceeded were a matter of agreement
between the two agencies. They included* (l) main
tenance of confidence In the credit of the Government;
(2) maintenance of a sound market for the securities
of the United States Government; (3) restraint, during
much of the period, of overall credit expansion; (4)
increase in the ownership of Government securities by
nonbank investors and reductions in the holdings of
the banking system; (5) adjustment from time to time
in the wartime pattern of interest rates, as this
became appropriate.H
The result of the emphasis on maintaining "confidence in the
Government's credit" and a "sound" securities market was the continua
tion of a trend toward shortening the maturity structure of the debt.
The Report of the Craft Subcommittee underscored the limitations
placed upon the central bank in effectuating credit control policy
while the System was committed to a policy of direct support.

The

ability of the System to restrict credit expansion was effectively
curtailed by the necessity of making sizable and frequent support pur
chases.

In addition, it was felt that support operations did estab-

llsh a pegged market, at least during the Treasury financing period.

12

The importance of these arguments has been questioned and the commit
ment of the System to temporary pegging may have resulted in a

^Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Thirty-Ninth
Annual Report, 1952 (Washington, D.C.t Federal Reserve System, 1953 )*
P. 12.
12
Beard, "Debt Management," p. 418.

14psychological market phenomenon which ultimately led to a smoother
transition to free markets.

13

Due to the criticisms of direct support operations, officials
of the two agencies experimented with various methods of minimizing
or eliminating official intervention in the government securities
market.

In connection with a small refunding operation, the System

decided in December, 1952, to refrain from purchasing maturing secu
rities, or "rights" as they were called.

In February, 1953« when the

Treasury refinanced a large maturity with an attractive offer, no sup
port purchases were made by the central bank.

The success of both

financings demonstrated the feasibility of reliance on freely
fluctuating markets rather than on official intervention.

14-

The curtailment of System direct support of Treasury financ
ings marked the second step in the evolution of the "even keel" policy.
Up until December, 1952, the Federal Reserve maintained essentially
the same policy of direct support operations as was practiced prior to
the Accord.

The strategy of direct support purchases was gradually

13
It has been argued that the transition to a free government
securities market was aided by a probably mistaken notion on the part
of market participants, that there was still a minimum price support
level (at 96 on 2-1/2 percent long-term securities) below which the
Federal Reserve authorities would not allow the market price to fall.
Although there was no officially stated minimum support price, the
barrier was not broken until December, 1952. The belief in this
phantom support price by market participants probably did lend some
support to the relatively moderate degree of price-yield fluctuation
that occurred during the transition period. See, for a similar
analysis, Gaines, Debt Management, p. 67.
14Martin, "Transition to Free Markets," p. 333.
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abandoned

as the transition to free markets was completed.

With the

abandonment of this policy, the necessity of developing a substitute
operating technique became apparent.

The recommendations of the

Craft Subcommittee proposed a positive policy to replace the direct
support program.

However, it was some time before the System adopted

a positive solution to the problem.

D.

The "Bills Only" Policy

The "bills only" or "bills preferable" policy was the govern
ing rule employed by the System for the conduct of open market
operations during the 1953-1960 period.

The acceptance of this

operational doctrine completed the evolution initiated by the March,
1951» Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord in establishing an independent
central monetary authority whose operations were to be executed in the
environment of a free government securities market.

The Craft Sub

committee Report, submitted to the F.O.M.C. on November 12, 1952» laid
the groundwork for the unanimous adoption of the "bills only" policy
in March, 1953.15

The reader might find it useful to consult the Craft Sub
committee, Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Government
Securities Market of the Federal Open Market Committee, Robert H.
Craft, technical consultant to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee, Appendix C,
November 12, 1952. This section has most recently been reprinted
intact in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency,
The Federal Reserve System After Fifty Years, Hearings, before the
Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the Committee on Banking and
Currency, House, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 196*1’ (Washington, D.C.t Govern'
ment Printing Office, 1962). The Craft Subcommittee Report was first
published in U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
United States Monetary Policy! Recent Thinking and Experience, Hear
ings, before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization (Flanders
Committee) of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 83rd Cong.,
2d sess., 195^ (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 195*0.
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The findings of the Graft Subcommittee with respect to the
effect of System open market operations on the government securities
market were concerned primarily with the operational efficiency of the
market.
mance.

The recommendations were aimed at Improving market perfor
The relevant passage in the Graft Subcommittee Report was*
The Subcommittee finds that a disconcerting degree
of uncertainty exists (in the Government securities
market) . . ,, an uncertainty that is detrimental to
the development of depth, breadth, and resiliency of
the market. In the judgment of the Subcommittee,
this uncertainty can be eliminated by an assurance
from the Federal Open Market Committee that hence
forth it will intervene in the market, not to impose
on the market any particular pattern of prices and
yields but solely to effectuate the objectives of
monetary and credit policy, and that it will confine
such intervention to transactions in very short-term
securities, preferably bills.1®
Thus, the Craft Subcommittee characterized an efficiently

functioning market as one possessing "depth, breadth, and resiliency.'1?
These traits were defined in terms of the orders on dealers' books.
The market is said to possess "depth" when there are orders, either
Federal Reserve System, Federal Open Market Committee,
Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, March k-5, 1953* in Clay
J. Anderson, A Half-Century of federal Reserve Policymaking, 191k196^ (Philadelphia* Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1965),
ppTllk. 115.
17
Besides these more technical criteria, it is generally agreed
that an adequate functioning government securities market would have
the capacity to accommodate Treasury financings, Federal Reserve open
market operations, and private investment transactions. Such a
market would be characterized by continuity in trading at prices
which reflect supply and demand and would not exhibit the sustained
sharp price movements that might reflect investor or dealer unwill
ingness to maintain an active, functioning market. For this view,
see Louise Freeman Ahearn, "Government Securities Market Performance
in the Wake of Official Operations in Coupon Issues Day-to-Day Perfor
mance, " a staff study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal
Reserve Study of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington,
D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 1969)* P. k, 1

17
actual orders or orders that can be readily uncovered, both above and
below the market.

The market has •’breadth” when these orders are in

volume and come from widely divergent investor groups.

It is

"resilient" when new orders pour promptly into the market to take
advantage of sharp and unexpected fluctuations in prices.

18

The solu

tion proposed to counteract the uncertainty in the market, stated
that the F.O.M.C, should conduct open market operations solely to ef
fectuate monetary and credit control objectives.

In addition, the

Craft Subcommittee recommended that these transactions be confined to
the short-term end of the market.

The philosophy underlying these

proposals was that the System should minimize the degree of interven
tion it exercised in the market.
While laying down these guidelines for the normal conduct of
open market operations, the Craft Subcommittee also made more specific
recommendations with respect to the operating techniques to be employed
by the Trading Desk during Treasury financing periods.

Specifically,

that the F.O.M.C, should direct the Account Manager toi
. . . agree to suspend during these periods (of 'suf
ficiently infrequent* Treasury financings) any open
market operations in which it normally might be
engaged . . , ,,” in particular, to "refrain from
any sales in the market beginning with the period of
the Treasury's preliminary announcement of the general
terms . . . ” and ”, , . t o prevent a rise in open
market Treasury bill rates from exceeding the highest
rates that had prevailed during the period between the

18
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment,
Growth, and Price Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee,
86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959 (Washington, D.C.* Government Printing
Office, 1959), P. 1801.
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preliminary announcement and the announcement of the
specific terms.^9
These passages from the Graft Subcommittee Report delineate the con
ception of not only the now-defunct "bills only" policy, but the first
official statement of a conscious attempt to outline the appropriate
open market strategy to be utilized by the Trading Desk during
Treasury financings.

This operating technique was designed to re

place the practice of making direct support purchases during Treasury
financings while at the same time preventing the appearance of "disorderly markets" during such operations.

20

Although these recommen

dations have been cited as direct causes of the curtailment of the
System's support purchases during the December, 1952, and February,
1953, refundings, they were not adopted intact by the F.O.M.C.

21

The official pronouncement marking the start of the "bills
only" policy was unanimously adopted at the F.O.M.C. meeting held in
March, 1953.

The statement detailed the following operational guide

lines t
(1) Under present conditions, operations for the
System Account should be confined to the short end
of the market (not including correction of "dis
orderly markets"))
(2) It is not now the policy of the Committee to
support any pattern of prices and yields in the
19
Craft Subcommittee, Report, in U.S., Congress, The Federal
Reserve System After Fifty Years, Hearings, p. 2052.
^^William P. Yohe and Louis C. Gasper, "The 'Even Keel*
Decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee," Financial Analysts
Journal (November-December, 1970), p. 1.
^^Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even Keel's The Reconciliation of
Monetary Policy and Debt Management" (an unpublished manuscript,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York), p. 4.
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government securities market, and Intervention In
the government securities market is solely to ef
fectuate the objectives of monetary and credit
policy (including correction of "disorderly
markets")|
(3) Pending further study and further action by
the Committee, it should refrain during a period
of Treasury financing from purchasing (l) any
maturing issues for which an exchange is being
offered, (2) "when-issued" securities, and (3;
outstanding issues of comparable maturity to
those being offered for exchange.^2
The three policies adopted in March were made, in effect, con
tinuing operating policies in September, 1953.

The F.O.M.C. approved

a motion that these policies be followed until suspended or modified
by further action of the Committee.

It adopted a fourth continuing

directive in December, 1953* "Transactions for the System Account in
the open market shall be entered into solely for the purpose of provid
ing or absorbing reserves (except in the correction of 'disorderly
markets'), and shall not include offsetting purchases and sales of
securities for the purpose of altering the maturity pattern of the
System's portfolio."

23

An analysis of these directives sheds light

upon the underlying philosophy of System authorities concerning the
conduct of open market operations.

In addition, they denote a major

step in the evolution of "even keel" policy.
The "bills only" policy, encompassing the associated prohibi
tion against both swaps and the direct System support of new offerings,
enumerated the general ground rules under which the F.O.M.C. would

^Federal Reserve System, Minutes, March 4-5, 1953* in Federal
Reserve System, Annual Report, 1953* P. Bb.
^■^Federal Reserve System, Minutes, December 15# 1953# in
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 118,
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operate until I960.

The major goals of the "hills only" policy in

cluded the establishment of an independent central bank and free
government securities market.

oh

System officials sought an open

market operating technique which would be consistent with a laissezfaire philosophy emphasizing minimal System intervention in the
government securities market, while at the same time it would promote
the more efficient functioning of that market.
The "bills only" policy emphasized the objective of minimal
intervention hy declaring that the sole purpose of open market
operations was to effectuate the objectives of monetary and credit
control.

The System specifically stated that it had no intention of

influencing the prices of particular securities or maintaining any
particular rate structure.

Further, what operations were necessary

for monetary and credit control policy were to be confined to the
short-term end of the market, preferably bills.

By confining opera

tions to the bill sector, the impact of central bank activity would
be kept as broad and impersonal as possible.

25

That is, the short

term market, which is characterized as being highly price elastic, can
more easily absorb System operations with a minimal degree of price
fluctuation.
These operational guidelines were to be adhered to, except in
the case of "disorderly markets,"

Emphasis shifted from defining and

2b
Ervin Miller, "Monetary Policies in the United States Since
1950« Some Implications of the Retreat to Orthodoxy," Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXVII (May* 1961),
P. 2lS.
^Beard, "Debt Management," p. b20.
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maintaining an orderly market to efforts directed at correcting only
disorderly conditions in the government securities market.

This

alteration in emphasis was consistent with, and reflective of, the
goal of minimal intervention.
The "bills only" policy had, as an important correlative
goal, the improvement in the performance of the markets made by govern
ment securities dealers.

Improvement in the government securities

market was generally pursued in terms of reducing the degree of un
certainty in the market.

To this end, the System decided in 1953 to

confine its operations to the short end of the market and to terminate
swapping transactions in the central bank's Treasury bill portfolio.
In addition to the rather specific objections to direct sup
port purchases, it was felt that System operations in other than the
shortest end of the market (except those necessary in the correction
of disorderly conditions) would interfere unduly with the operational
excellence of the market.

27

Central Bank operations in the intermedi

ate or long-term securities market, by increasing the degree of price
uncertainty faced by market participants, would reduce the "depth,
pO
breadth, and resiliency" of the market.

26

Martin, "Transition to Free Markets," p. 334.

27
Beard, "Debt Management," p. 420.
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The argument that the operational excellence of the market
would be impaired by official operations outside the short-term
securities market is as follows. System operations are normally
absent in the markets for intermediate and long-term issues. This
factor reduces the degree of uncertainty faced hy the market partici
pants with respect to price fluctuations. System operations are
normally transacted in the short-term market, a highly price elastic
market, which can more easily absorb official operations with a
minimal degree of price fluctuation.

22
The adoption of the fourth policy directive in December,
1953. did not reflect a change in the objectives for which open mar
ket operations were to be used, so much as an effort to prevent swap
transactions.

In November, 1953. some swap transactions had been

authorized to achieve a better maturity distribution of the System's
Treasury bill portfolio.

At the next meeting of the F.O.M.C. on

December 15, 1953. the directive prohibiting swaps was adopted.

The

majority of the Committee opposed swap transactions on the basis that
they would create confusion and uncertainty and thereby militate
against the better functioning of the government securities market.

29

Thus, during the 1953-1960 period, the F.O.M.C. was firmly
committed to an open market policy which emphasized minimal System
intervention in the government securities market, a policy commonly
28

(continued) Thus, given both the interest rate expectations
and level of System operations necessary for credit control purposes,
the pursuit of the "bills only" policy would generate the minimal
amount of price fluctuations, thus reducing the degree of uncertainty
faced by the underwriters and investors. Quite simply, the Investors
have one less participant to deal with in the intermediate and long
term markets.
Restricting operations to the short end of the market reduces
the degree of uncertainty in a free government securities market.
This argument, of course, has no validity in a pegged market where
no uncertainty exists, save the possible collapse of the government.
However, a pegged government securities market and an independent
central bank are mutually exclusive goals.
Probably the best arguments in defense of the "bills only"
policy appear in Winfield W. Riefler, "Open Market Operations in LongTerm Securities," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XLIV (November,
1958), pp. 1260-1274| and Ralph A. Young and Charles A. Yeager, "The
Economics of 'Bills Preferably,'" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
LXXIV (August, I960), pp. 341-373.

29
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 191^-196^, p. 118.

referred to as "bills only."

In a period of less than three years,

open market policy had shifted from one extreme to the other, from
intervening as necessary to maintain a pegged market, to fostering a
free market with a minimum of System intervention.

30

The Emergence of the "Even Keel" Strategy

The primary purpose of this section of the analysis is to
establish as accurately as possible the date on which "even keel"
policy emerged as the open market operating technique utilized during
Treasury financings.

The "even keel" policy evolved as a consequence

of the movement toward an independent central bank operating within a
free government securities market,

A review of the major alterations

which occurred in open market policy during the 1950's does reveal a
number of steps which eventually led to the inauguration of the "even
keel" strategy.
Although this historical analysis will review the major
changes in open market policy, special emphasis will be placed on the
variations in the open market operating techniques which were employed
during Treasury financing periods.

This emphasis is necessitated by

the fact that the "even keel" policy is the strategy pursued by the
System during Treasury operations.

Thus, the analysis attempts to

highlight the basic changes in System behavior during financing
periods in order to identify a date which marks the inception of "even
keel" policy.

Sometime 'between the period encompassing the Craft Subcommit
tee recommendations which were presented to the F.O.M.C. on November
12, 1952f and the Initial use of the term in the minutes of the
F.O.M.C. meeting held on December 12, 1957, "even keel" emerged as a
positive operating strategy.

Keeping in mind the fact that the "even

keel" policy replaced the direct support program, these two dates mark
the outer bounds of the period within which the "even keel" policy was
inaugurated.

The recommendations of the Craft Subcommittee have been

cited as the cause of the curtailment of System support purchases
during both the December, 1952, and February, 1953, Treasury refund
ings.

Thus, these proposals effectively denote the demise of the

direct support program.

On the other hand, the date of the initial

use of the terra "even keel" can be cited as the terminal point in
the interval within which "even keel" had become an operational con
cept.

The actual use of the term would imply and hopefully necessi

tate that the Account Manager could translate it into an operational
concept.

These two dates then mark solely the outer limits of the

period to be scrutinized.
The temptation of designating either of the above dates as
marking the commencement of "even keel" policy was avoided.

Rather,

a critical analysis of official F.O.M.C. statements was undertaken in
order to more accurately identify the inauguration of this open market strategy.

31

In order to sharply contrast the changes in System

31
In any evolutionary process, whether economic, political, or
biological in nature, it is difficult to identify a precise date which
accurately marks the birth of a new policy or life form. Any analysis
attempting this feat, however, must avoid two major pitfalls.
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behavior during Treasury financing periods, the historical analysis
starts during the period prior to the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord.
This investigation is executed primarily in terms of the changes in
the F.O.M.C. directives authorising transactions for the System Ac
count.

The analysis will trace the important developments in Federal

Reserve policy throughout three major periods* these intervals include
the pre-Accord days, the transition to free markets, and the post
"bills only" era.

A.

The Pre-Accord Period

In the period preceding the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord,
the System was committed to the objective of maintaining a fixed
price-yield pattern on government securities.

For the period follow

ing the close of World War II until the F.O.M.C. meeting held on
March 1-2, 1951* the maintenance of a pegged government securities

31

(continued) One error the historical researcher is apt to
make would be the designation of the date which marked the demise of
the original policy as the same date which denoted the birth of the
new policy.
Commonly, there exists an interval or gap between these
two moments, quite often an interlude within which neither policy is
operational. For example, the overthrow of the Czarist regime in
Russia did not coincide with the inauguration of communism, rather
these two steps were separated by the interval of Bolshevik rule.
Analagously, the Craft recommendations on November 12, 1952, marking
the curtailment of the direct support program, did not simultaneously
initiate the "even keel" strategy.
The second pitfall would involve identifying the labeling of
a new policy as denoting the inception of that policy in an opera
tional sense. It is conceivable that a new policy or strategy might
well be operational prior to the instant on which a name is adopted
for it, just as the birth of a child predates its christening. Thus,
the initial use of the term "even keel” does not simultaneously
identify the first moment on which that strategy was implemented by
the System. It is possible that those open market tactics, which on
December 12, 1957* were labeled as "even keel" policy, were already
an established Trading Desk operating technique.
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market was the primary goal which determined central bank operations.
This policy Is succinctly summarized in the F.O.M.C. directives to
the executive committee which enumerated the guidelines under which
the authority to effect transactions in the System Account was
granted.

A typical directive, such as the one issued at the F.O.M.C.

meeting held on January 31* 1951* read as follows*
The executive committee is directed, until otherwise
directed by the Federal Open Market Committee, to
arrange for such transactions for the System open
market account, either in the open market or directly
with the Treasury (including purchases, sales, exchanges,
replacement of maturing securities, and letting matu
rities run off without replacement), as may be necessary,
in the light of current and prospective economic con
ditions and the general credit situation of the country,
with a view to exercising restraint upon inflationary
developments, to maintaining orderly conditions in the
Government security market, to relating the supply of
funds in the market to the needs of commerce and
business, and to the practical administration of the
account; provided that the aggregate amount of securities
held in the accGunt at the close of this date other than
special short-term certificates of indebtedness purchased
from time to time for the temporary accommodation of
the Treasury shall not be increased or decreased by more
than 2 billion dollars.
The executive committee is further directed, until
otherwise directed hy the Federal Open Market Committee,
to arrange for the purchase for the System open market
account dlrect-from the Treasury of 3uch amounts of
special short-term certificates of~indebtedness as may
be necessary from time to time for the temporary accom
modation of the Treasury; provided that the total amount
of such certificates held in the account at any one time
shall not exceed 1 billion d o l l a r s . 32

federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1951, P. 95. The
author has taken the liberty of underlining sections of the directive.
These phrases are of particular importance with respect to the develop
ment of the "even keel" policy.
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This particular directive, with only minor alterations, was Issued
at successive F.O.M.C. meetings spanning November 27, 1950, through
December 8, 1952.
Avoiding excessive detail, System open market policy prior to
the Accord espoused a policy whose implementation required substantial
and continuous purchases of both long-term and short-term securities.
During periods between Treasury financings, the System made substan
tial purchases of long-term bonds which were being offered on the
market by institutional investors.

The purpose of these operations

was to prevent price declines in order to maintain orderly conditions
in the government securities market.

Federal Reserve purchases during

December, 1950, and January, 1951# were particularly large and re
sulted in a 7 billion dollar increase in the volume of commercial bank
loans since August, 1950.

33

Direct support purchases during Treasury refundings was a
common System operating procedure.

In light of the objective of main

taining orderly markets, substantial support purchases, particularly
for the maturing issues, were undertaken, with the express purpose of
lending aid to Treasury refundings.

Throughout the period, purchases

of both short-term and long-term securities were consistently made
during financing periods in order to enable the Treasury to success
fully market its new issues.
Consternation with respect to the propriety of the support
program reached a crescendo by early 1951.

The dilemma of maintaining

a pegged market in the face of inflationary developments led to

33Ibld., p. 96.

discussions between monetary and fiscal authorities.

The announcement

of the Accord delineated the start of the second major period in the
analysis of the evolution of "even keel" policy.

B.

The Transition to Free Markets Period

At the F.O.M.C. meeting on March 1-2, 1951» the Committee
unanimously approved the public announcement of the Accord.

The

official statement read as follows*
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have
reached full accord with respect to debt management
and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering
their common purpose to assure the successful financing
of the Government'8 requirements,and, at the same time,
to minimize monetization of the public debt.
This statement reflects the mutual agreement between the two agencies,
that the main objectives to be sought were the maintenance of a broad
and healthy market for Treasury securities and the restraint of
further inflationary expansion of bank credit."^

Although no substan

tial changes occurred in the form or wording of the F.O.M.C. direc
tives up through and including December 8, 1952, System policy under
went some important alterations.

These changes can be traced via

statements made in the summary of the discussion leading to the F.O.M.C,
directives.
The major innovation in open market policy was the curtailment
of continuous direct support purchases.

The System gradually discon

tinued purchases of short-term and long-term securities during the
periods between Treasury financing operations.

The pending task of

refunding the large volume of short-term securities maturing or
callable in the near future presented an immediate problem.

The

solution adopted called for the System to immediately reduce or dis
continue purchases of short-term securities, allowing the short-term
market to adjust to a position at which banks could depend on borrow
ing from the Federal Reserve in order to make the necessary adjust
ments in their reserves.

By the end of March, 1951* the short-term

market operated without System support purchases.

The freeing of the

short-term market was accomplished with the aid of the System main
taining a 1-3fh percent ceiling on the discount rate throughout the
remainder of 1951.
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The large volume of long-term bonds overhanging the market
and being offered for sale daily in March, 1951» presented the other
immediate problem.

The solution adopted involved a Treasury offer to

exchange them for a nonmarketable 2 - 3 A percent, 29-year bond, which
was redeemable at the holder's option before maturity only by con
version into a 5-year marketable Treasury note.

The System agreed to

make a limited volume of open market purchases after the announcement
of the exchange.

With the objective of maintaining orderly conditions

in the market, the System purchased substantial amounts of long-term
restricted 2-1/2 percent Treasury bonds.

The purchases, initially at

fixed support prices, within a period of a few days were rapidly re
duced in volume and carried out on the basis of a scale-down of prices.
By the closing of the books on April 6, 1951* the fixed support

30
policy for long-term bonds was abandoned.
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Thus, within one month

of the Accord, both the short-term and long-term government securities
markets operated without continuous open market purchases.
During the transition to free markets, the nature of System
open market operations during Treasury financing periods also under
went a major adaptation.

Direct support operations involving System

purchases of "rights" to new issues, new issues on a "when-issued"
basis, and outstanding securities in the market comparable to the new
issues were slowly abandoned.

By the end of 1952, Treasury financings

were carried out without direct support purchases.

In accommodating

the Treasury, the System came to rely increasingly on the use of re
purchase agreements.

A brief review of these developments is illu

minating in the analysis of "even keel" policy.
In the period between March, 1951» and October, 1951»
Treasury financing operations were substantial in both the short-term
and long-term markets.

Between May and October alone, over 18 billion

dollars of maturing notes and bonds had been refunded in four financ
ing operations, and 2 billion dollars of new money had been raised by
means of increases in the weekly Treasury bill offerings.

In June and

September, substantial purchases were made by the System to aid the
Treasury.

The Federal Reserve purchases of both short-term and long

term securities were reduced to amounts (often substantial) needed at
times to aid Treasury refunding operations plus occasional small

37Ibid.
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amounts for orderly market purposes, which purchases were largely
offset by sales or redemptions at other times.

38

The F.O.M.C. meeting on October 4, 1951* reiterated the
general stance of System policy which had been adopted by the Commit
tee on May 17, 1951.

The same directive was adopted with a view to

the pursuit of a "neutral" policy by the System which would permit
market forces of supply and demand to operate with a minimum of
Federal Reserve intervention.

39

At this meeting, the Committee also

repeated its authorization for each Federal Reserve Bank to enter into
repurchase agreements with non-bank dealers in government securities.
Such agreements were to cover only short-term Treasury obligations,
be for periods of 15 days or less, be made at rates close to the
average issuing rate on the most recent issue of 3-month Treasury
bills, and be for the purpose of aiding temporary money market adjust
ments.

It was apparent that this instrument would become increasingly

important as one of the mechanisms available to the System in execut
ing open market policy.

It was emphasized that repurchase agreements

would be used in the interest of orderly conditions in the government
securities market.

It was felt that this instrument would enable

dealers to absorb as much of the buying and selling in the market as
possible and to carry the necessary inventory of securities to provide
a market, leaving the System as only a residual buyer.

kn

Between October 4, 1951* and November 12, 1952, there was
little change in System policy.
38Ibid., p. 106.
39Ibid.. p. 107.

U-0

Ibid., pp. 107-108.

Although little support was given to

the Treasury's exchange offering, for which the subscription books
were opened on December 3* 1951* the System generally made purchases
i}.i
to aid the Treasury in its refundings.
Large Treasury financings
in June, August, and September, 1952, brought forth substantial
System purchases.

l\2

Although increased emphasis was placed on the

repurchase agreement mechanism, the System still aided the Treasury
via direct purchases of government securities during financing
periods.

Up to this point, "even keel" policy was nonexistent.
On November 12, 1952, the recommendations of the Craft Sub

committee were presented to the F.O.M.C,

Those proposals and their

partial adoption represent a major evolutionary step in analysis of
"even keel" policy.

The Craft Subcommittee proposed a set of

operational guidelines for the conduct of open market transactions
during Treasury refundings, as well as the interim periods between
such dates.

As previously noted, the recommendations were aimed at

improving the efficiency of the government securities market.
The F.O.M.C. adopted partially the suggestions of the Craft
Subcommittee at the meeting held on March 4-5, 1953.

In addition to

a change in the directive, the F.O.M.C. also adopted three policies
with respect to operations for the System Account.

These developments

mark the inauguration of the "bills only" policy.

Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1952, p, 91.
42
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C.

The "Bills Only" Policy

The proposals of the Craft Subcommittee for open market
operations between Treasury financing periods were adopted intact by
the F.O.M.C.

The new operating procedure was reflected by a change

in the wording of the F.O.M.C. directive to the Account Manager.
The change provided that the System should arrange for transactions
in the System open market account, with a view, among other things,
"to correcting a disorderly situation in the Government securities
market," rather than as previously, "to maintaining orderly conditions
in the Government security market," J

The F.O.M.C. further adopted

the following policiest
(1) Under present conditions, operations for the
System Account should be confined to the short end
of the market (not Including correction of "disorderly
markets")|
(2) It is not now the policy of the Committee to
support any pattern of prices and yields in the
Government securities market, and intervention in
the Government securities market is solely to ef
fectuate the objectives of monetary and credit policy
(including the correction of "disorderly markets"),^
Thus, it can be seen from the official statements of record that the
inauguration of the "bills only" policy represented the official
F.O.M.C. adoption of the view that open market operations should be
implemented with the objective of minimizing System intervention In
the government securities market.
The Craft Subcommittee’s recommendations with respect to the
appropriate open market operating techniques to be employed during
^^Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1953» PP. 86-87.
J1J1

Ibid., p. 88.
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Treasury financings were only partially adopted by the F.O.M.C.
The Craft Subcommittee recommended that the F.O.M.C.t
. . . agree to suspend during these periods (of
"sufficiently infrequent" Treasury financings) any
open market operations in which it normally might
be engaged , . .," in particular, to "refrain from
any sales in the market beginning with the period
of the Treasury's preliminary announcement of the
general terms . . . " and ". . . t o prevent a rise
in open market Treasury bill rates from exceeding
the highest rates that had prevailed during the
period between th
- • •
an£
the announcement
It was felt that this policy would replace the direct support program
previously utilized during financing periods while, at the same time,
it would prevent the appearance of "disorderly markets."

Although

this recommendation has been cited as being responsible for the cur
tailment of direct support purchases during the December, 1952, and
February, 1953» financings, it was not officially adopted by the
F.O.M.C
At the F.O.M.C. meeting on March 4-5, 1953» the Committee
adopted the following policy regarding the conduct of open market
operations during Treasury financings.

The policy officially adopted

stated that*
45

Craft Subcommittee, Report, in U.S., Congress, The Federal
Reserve System After Fifty Years, Hearings, p. 2052. It should be
carefully noted that the proposal of the Craft Subcommittee was more
specific in nature than the policy actually adopted by the F.O.M.C. on
March 4-5, 1953. The recommendation specified a policy in terms of
the desired behavior of a single money market indicator, the Treasury
bill rate. The policy adopted, on the other hand, contained no
reference to any particular money market variable. The author does
not imply, however, that the Craft Subcommittee proposal was superior
to the policy actually adopted by the F.O.M.C.
46
Thunberg, "'Even Keel'* The Reconciliation," p. 4.
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(3) Pending further study and action by the Com
mittee, it should refrain during a period of Treasury
financing from purchasing (l) any maturity issues for
which an exchange is being offered, (2) "when-issued"
securities, and (3) outstanding issues of comparable
maturity to those being offered for exchange.47
It is the contention of the author that this policy, though negative
in one sense, can be interpreted as being the new set of guidelines
which the System adopted to govern the conduct of the Trading Desk
lift
during financing periods.
Thus, the official adoption of this
policy delineates the birth of the "even keel" strategy.

It is the

conclusion of this analysis that, even though the strategy was not
christened until December 12, 1957* "even keel" policy became opera-—
tional on March 4-5, 1953.**^
Although this conclusion is not universally accepted, it can
be defended on a number of grounds,^

First, direct support purchases

bo
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1953* P. 88.
48
This policy is negative only in the sense that the guide
lines adopted at this meeting specified what the F.O.M.C. should not
do during financing periods. The policy was stated in terms of what
type of open market operations were inappropriate, and thus prohibited,
during periods when the Treasury was an active participant in the
market. This is not to imply that just because the program was stated
negatively that it did not have operational significance. On the
contrary, the policy adopted did specify certain operating procedures
which were not to be employed by the Desk.
49
The period between the recommendations of the Craft Subcom
mittee and the inauguration of the "bills only" policy on March 4-5,
1953* has been treated as the interlude between the demise of the
direct support program and the birth of the "even keel" strategy which
replaced it. Although open to question, it is felt that inauguration
of a new policy requires the official sanction of the full Committee.
^°The conclusions of Yohe and Gasper disagree with the author's
analysis. They point out that in 1957 a Subcommittee on Treasury
Relations was established within the F.O.M.C. Although frequent
mention was made in the Minutes of the F.O.M.C. of this Subcommittee's
deliberations, a report is neither referred to or included in the
Minutes, Yohe and Gasper contend the "even keel" as an explicit
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to aid Treasury financings were not practiced by the System after
the December, 1952, refunding, except in correcting "disorderly con
ditions" in the government securities m a r k e t . T h e System deviated
from its policy of minimal intervention on only two occasions in the
CO
1953-1960 period.
Secondly, repurchase agreements with non-bank
dealers had come to be recognized after October
important policy instrument.

1951* as an

"Defensive" open market operations, in

the form of the extension of repurchase agreements to non-bank dealers
during large Treasury financings, had been used to smooth the money
market impact of such operations.

53

The System, in addition, had

(continued) operating strategy was worked out in that
Subcommittee. They further conclude that there is some evidence that
"even keel" policy began to evolve as early as 1955# See, specifi
cally, Yohe and Gasper, "The 'Even Keel* Decisions," p. 2.
51
A disorderly market has been defined as a "situation in
which selling feeds on itself, that is, a situation in which a fall
in prices, instead of eliciting an increase in the amount of securi
ties demanded and a decrease in the amount supplied, elicits the re
verse, a falling away of bids and a rise in both the number and the
size of offerings." The quotation is taken from a statement submitted
by the Board of Governors to the Joint Economic Committee. See U.S.,
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment, Growth, and Price
Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong.,
1st sess., 195v (Washington, D.C.* Government Printing Office, 1959)»
pp. 1278-1279.
52
The System purchased 168 million dollars of "when-issued"
certificates in November and December, 1955» in order to facilitate
the Treasury refunding during a period of money market stringency.
Chairman Martin justified intervention because "disorderly conditions"
seriously threatened the market. The System purchased a large amount
of securities involved in the Treasury refunding during July and
August, 1958, in order to facilitate that financing. In this instance
the justification for these purchases was that "disorderly conditions"
had actually emerged in the market. See Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The
Reconciliation," p. 5.
"*^For a discussion of "defensive" open market operations as
related to Treasury financings, see Robert V. Roosa, Federal Reserve
Operations in the Money and Government Securities Markets (New Yorks
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1956), pp. 83-87.

specifically avoided overt shifts in monetary policy because of
financing operations, especially in terms of citing Treasury activity
as a factor which militated against a tightened stance in credit
policy.

Thus, by March 4-5, 1953» those general policies and specific

operating procedures which in subsequent years have come to be as
sociated with the "even keel" strategy were already employed by the
System,

The fact that no Treasury refunding failed during the 1953-

1957 period is considered sufficient evidence that the System did
pursue a policy which, if it did not specifically aid the Treasury,
at least did not hinder the Treasury.

Thus, this study concludes

that "even keel" policy became operational with the inception of the
"bills only" policy.

Summary and Conclusion

This analysis has attempted to delineate the major innovations
which have occurred in monetary policy with respect to the effect of
these developments on the evolution of "even keel" policy.

Special

emphasis was placed upon the changing relationship between System open
market operations and Treasury financings.

The major conclusion of

the author’s research is that the "even keel" strategy developed as
part of the general evolution of System open market policy.

This

study has identified March 4-5, 1953* a-s being the date upon which
"even keel" became an operational phenomenon.

Although disagreement

is possible, it is hoped that the method of analysis was proper.
What is of crucial importance in the analysis is the purpose
for which it was undertaken.

The object of this study was to impart

38
to the reader a general understanding of what "even keel" policy
entails In the context of reviewing the changing environment of which
it was a product.

In light of this analysis, it may be concluded

that:
"Even keel" is to Federal Reserve support of
Treasury financings as "bills only" is to the
conduct of open market operations! they are
operating techniques "lease inconsistent with
ention" in the Government

5b

Yohe and Gasper, "The 'Even Keel' Decisions," p. 1,

CHAPTER III

FEDERAL RESERVE "EVEN KEEL"
POLICY IN THE SIXTIES
This chapter attempts to provide the reader with a broad
understanding of "even keel" policy during the I960's.

In order to

accomplish this task, this section focuses upon three related topics.
First, an historical analysis of the major developments in monetary
policy is presented.

Emphasis is placed upon those evolutionary

changes which occurred in both System open market policy and Trading
Desk operating techniques that are of special relevance to "even keel"
policy.

Secondly, a discussion of some alternative definitions of the

"even keel" policy which have appeared in the literature is offered.
And, finally, an explanation of the basic rationale which underlies
this strategy, as well as a discussion of the time span covered hy
"even keel" operations, is presented.

"Operation Twist" and "Even Keel" Policy

The major change in Federal Reserve open market policy during
this period consisted of the replacement of the "bills only" guidelines
by the "operation twist" or "nudge" policy.

The emergence of "operation

twist" was the inevitable consequence of the economic and financial
developments which forced the monetary authorities to recognize the
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limitations imposed upon their ability to pursue a countercyclical
credit policy within the framework of confining open market operations
exclusively to the short-term end of the government securities market.
Criticism of the "bills only" policy grew as changes in both internal
and external conditions dictated.^

"Operation twist" represented not

only a basic change in System policy, but also led to alterations in
the open market operating techniques employed by the System,
The economic environment of the late 1950's and early 1960's
brought Federal Reserve officials face to face, once again, with the
dilemma of monetary policy objectives which called for conflicting
System actions.

Although the 1960-1961 recession was a relatively mild

one, it was especially disturbing to the monetary authorities because
the economy had never fully recovered from the 1957-1958 recession.
Up until the F.O.M.G. meeting on March 1, i960, the System had pursued
an open market policy, first adopted on May 26, 1959» which emphasized
the restraint of inflationary credit expansion.

The F.O.M.C, policy

directive issued on January 26, i960, in Clause b, instructed the
Account Manager to conduct open market operations with a view to

^ o r a brief survey of the vast literature critical of the
"bills only" policy, see Joseph Aschheim, Techniques of Monetary
Control (Baltimore! Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p p . 53-82; Deane
Carson, "Recent Open Market Committee Policy and Technique," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIX (August, 1955)» PP. 321-343; Dudley
G. Luckett, "’Bills Only'i A Critical Appraisal," Review of Economics
and Statistics, Vol. XLII (August, I960), pp. 301-306; U.S., Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, Debt Management in the United States, by
Warren L. Smith, Joint Economic Committee, Study Faper No. 19
(Washington, D.C.a Government Printing Office, i960), pp. 118-134;
and Sidney Weintraub, "The Theory of Open Market Operations! A Comment,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLI (August, 1959)* PP. 308-

312.

kl
" . . . restraining inflationary credit expansion in order to foster
sustainable economic growth and expanding employment opportunities
. . .

a policy consistent with the prevailing economic conditions.

2

However, as the internal situation deteriorated, the System was forced
to alter its policy.
As I960 progressed, aggregate demand, production, and employ
ment fell.

Simultaneously, both the level and rate of unemployment

increased, while the consumer and wholesale price indexes remained
stable.

3

In light of these classic recessionary developments. System

officials recognized the need to rearrange the priority list of mone
tary policy objectives.

As time passed, the pursuit of the goals of

full resource utilization and sustained economic growth supplanted the
now-nonexistent inflationary problem

as the chief concern of the

System.

These objectives clearly called for an easing of credit

policy.

However, another problem developed which complicated the task

of the Federal Reserve,
The recession developed against a backdrop of a substantial
balance of payments deficit.

The deficit averaged over 3 billion

dollars annually between 1958 and I960, a condition which was consid
erably aggravated during i960 and 1961 by large outflows of short-term

2

Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Forty-Seventh
Annual Report, i960 (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, i960),
P. 35.

3

Clay J . Anderson, A Half-Century of Federal Reserve Policy
making, 191^-1964 (Philadelphia! Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
1965)7 PP. 129-130.
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capital.

4

The authorities felt that the international differentials

in short-term interest rates that developed during I960 were the major
cause of the capital outflow.

The high priority placed upon inter

national considerations caused System officials to include improvement
in the balance of payments as the third major goal of credit policy.
This external objective called for a tightening in the stance of mone
tary policy.
Thus, the economic conditions which developed in the early
1960*s presented a major policy dilemma.^

In order to stimulate

4Ibid., p. 130.
^The extraordinary degree of importance attached to inter
national considerations by System officials is well-illustrated by the
following quotation1 "The hard facts of recent balance-of-payments
developments( in the context of the international role of the dollar,
have revised the basic framework for monetary policy in the United
States. As an objective of monetary policy, the defense of the inter
national value of the dollar has come to occupy a position alongside
the goal of stable domestic growth." See Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Annual Report, 1961, p. 7,
^Although outside the immediate concern of this analysis, the
reader should be made aware of certain qualifications to the dilemma,
as well as some alternative solutions which have been proposed to
reconcile the conflict between internal and external goals.
First of all, a policy dilemma exists only if the value judg
ment which ranks internal and external objectives as equally important
is accepted. If, for example, System officials had held the goal of
achieving balance of payments equilibrium in a position subordinate
to the objective of maintaining full employment and stable growth,
then no dilemma would have existed. Had this value judgment been ac
cepted, the monetary authorities would have been required to pursue
an expansive credit policy. On the other hand, a restrictive policy
would have been implemented had System officials ranked internal goals
below international considerations.
Secondly, a number of alternative reconciliations have been
proposed by authors who accept the System's equal ranking of external
and internal goals. The solutions are based upon an integration of a
number of policies to be used in order to achieve the reconciliation
of multiple objectives. Their proponents generally adhere to the
premise that the successful achievement of multiple policy goals re
quires the implementation of, at least, an equal number of policy

h3
internal recovery, the System was required to pursue an easy monetary
policy to supply an ample amount of reserves to encourage credit ex
pansion,

The external deficit required, conversely, that the System

maintain a tight credit policy to limit the availability of funds in
order to obtain a realignment of international short-term interest
rates.

In order to cope with the economic conditions, the Federal

Reserve System pursued three courses of action.

These entailed alter

ations in Clause b of the economic policy directive, changes in the
operating techniques employed by the Desk and, finally, the curtail
ment of the "bills only" policy guidelines.
The System made adaptations in its open market operations in
the form of alternations in Clause b on seven separate occasions
n
between January 26, I960, and December 19, 1961.
The rather

(continued) weapons. In contrast, it should be noted that
"operation twist" involved the application of a single policy weapon,
open market operations, to several policy goals. A survey of the
relevant literature would briefly include, for example, J. E, Meade,
The Balance of Payments (Londont Oxford University Press, 1951)•
pp. 157-162| Robert A. Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and
Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability," International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. IX (March, 1962), pp. 70-79* Jan
Tinbergen, The Theory of Economic Policy (Amsterdam* North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 39-hOj and Leland B. Yeager, Inter
national Monetary Relations* Theory, History, and Policy (New York*
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 19o6), pp. 87-113.
7
The changes that occurred in Clause b of the F.O.M.C, direc
tive to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reflect the change in the
stance of monetary policy. Clause b essentially Instructs the Account
Manager in the manner in which open market operations are to be carried
out in light of external and internal economic conditions. During
I960, Clause b was altered at the F.O.M.C. meetings held on March 1,
March 2h, August 16, and October 2h. Clause b was reworded in 1961 at
the meetings held on April 18, June 6, and August 22. See Federal
Reserve System, Annual Report, I960, pp. hi,
61, and 67* and
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, pp. 55# 62, and 73.
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restrictive monetary policy reflected in the previously quoted direc
tive issued on January 26, I960, was substantially modified on March
1, I960.

The revision authorized on that date directed that open

market operations should be conducted with a view to ", . . fostering
sustainable growth in economic activity and employment, while guarding
against excessive credit expansion . .
a policy shift toward less
Q
restraint.
This trend toward an increasingly expansive monetary
policy was reinforced at the F.O.M.C, meetings held on March 24 and
August 16, i960. The changes which occurred in Clause b up to this
point had been authorized by the Committee in light of the deteriora
tion in the internal economic conditions and the need for the System
to pursue a policy to promote domestic recovery.

At the F.O.M.C.

meeting held on October 25, I960, the System officially mentioned the
balance of payments problem.

At that meeting, Clause b was revised to

read that open market operations should be conducted with a view to
". . . encouraging monetary expansion for the purpose of fostering
sustainable growth in economic activity and employment while taking

9

into consideration current international developments . . . ."

Throughout the remainder of I960 and 1961, the directive, though
altered in light of the gradual domestic recovery, continued to con
tain explicit references to both internal and external policy targets.
Thus, the System did adapt to changed circumstances by altering the
stance of its policy.

However, the major monetary experiment of the

period, the inauguration of "operation twist," emerged as a result of

^Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, I960, p. 41.

9Ibld., p. 67.

1*5
a series of pragmatic adjustments made in the open market operating
techniques employed by the Desk,
The general form of the F.O.M.C. policy directive to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York remained essentially unchanged until
a new format was adopted by the Committee on December 19, 1961.

A

typical directive prior to this date instructed the Bankj
(1) To make such purchases, sales, or exchanges
(including replacement of maturity securities, and
allowing maturities to run off without replacement)
for the System Open Market Account in the open market
or, in the case of maturing securities, by direct
exchange with the Treasury, as may be necessary in
the light of current and prospective economic conditions
and the general credit situation of the country, with
a view (a) to relating the supply of funds in the mar
ket to the needs of commerce and business, (b) to
restraining inflationary credit expansion in order to
foster sustainable economic growth and expanding
employment opportunities, and (c) to the practical
administration of the Account| provided that the
aggregate amount of securities held in the System
Account (including commitments for the purchase or
sale of securities for the Account) at the close of
this date, other than special short-term certificates
of indebtedness purchased from time to time for the
temporary accommodation of the Treasury, shall not be
increased or decreased by more than $1 billion)
(2) To purchase direct from the Treasury for the
account of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (with
discretion, in cases where it seems desirable, to
issue participations to one or more Federal Reserve
Banks) such amounts of special short-term certificates
of indebtedness as may be necessary from time to time
for the temporary accommodation of the Treasury; pro
vided that the total amount of such certificates held
at any one time by the Federal Reserve Banks shall
not exceed in the aggregate $500 million.10
The above directive, or one of essentially similar form, was reissued
at successive F.O.M.C. meetings up until December 19, 1961.

10Ibid., p. 35

During
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this period, the economic policy directive was authorized in conjunc
tion with the three "bills only" policy guidelines, which had been
adopted by the F.O.M.C. at meetings held between March 4-5» 1953t and
December 15, 1953.
These "bills only" guidelines emphasized that open market
operations, except in the case of "disorderly conditions," should
generally be confined to the short end of the market and that System
intervention in the market was solely to effectuate the objective of
monetary and credit policy, not to support any pattern of prices and
yields in the government securities market.

The "bills only" guide

lines also entailed the prohibitions against swap transactions, as
well as during Treasury financing periods prohibitions against pur
chases of (l) maturing issues for which an exchange was being offered,
(2) "when-issued" securities, or (3) outstanding issues of comparable
maturities to those being offered for exchange.

Although the actual

demise of the "bills only" policy directives did not take place until
December 19» 1961, a gradual shift in operating techniques emerged in
late I960.
Within the framework of the general form of the economic
policy directive and the "bills only" guidelines, a number of important
changes occurred.

The System altered Clause b, as previously enumer

ated, in order to adapt the stance of credit policy to the changed
economic circumstances.

In the latter part of i960, the Federal

Reserve, aiming simultaneously at the dual objectives of achieving
domestic recovery and external payments balance, undertook a series
of departures which eventually led to the abandonment of the "bills
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only" policy.

It had become apparent that the F.O.M.C. had to adopt

and pursue some objectives, however limited, with respect to Interest
rates, an aim that had been scrupulously avoided during the "bills
only" period.

Beginning in late I960, it had become an important

goal of the Committee to minimize further declines (or to foster some
rise) in short-term Interest rates, particularly the rate for 3-month
Treasury bills, which were widely held to be the major criteria of
international rate relationships.^
In October, i960, the F.O.M.C. faced a situation where seasonal
needs required that the System would have to supply a large amount of
reserves to maintain the desired degree of ease; however, at the same
time, the 3-month Treasury bill rates were considerably lower than
abroad.

12

It was recognized by the authorities that one way to

minimize the downward pressure on short-term rates was to spread
System purchases of securities to supply reserves over a wider range
of maturities, rather than concentrating purchases in the very sector
13
of the market where it was desired to keep rates up. J

Accordingly,

in the fall of I960, the System purchased short-term government secur
ities other than Treasury bills for the first time since July and
August, 1958.

Specifically, coupon issues maturing within 15 months

^^Robert L. Cooper, "Techniques of the Federal Reserve Trading
Desk in the 1960's Contrasted with the 'Bills Preferably' Period," a
staff study of the Report, of the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study
of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington, D.C.t Federal
Reserve System, 1969), p. 19.

12

Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 131.

13
Cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk," p. 19.

48
were purchased along with Treasury bills, in order to provide reservesj
and very short-term coupon issues, equivalent to Treasury bills in
maturity, were sold on occasion in dealing with downward pressures on
rates in that area.

14-

The F.O.M.C. departed further from the '’bills only" policy at
its meeting on February 7» 1961.

At that time, it authorized the

Account Manager to purchase up to 500 million dollars of government
securities with maturities of up to 10 years and to alter the maturity
composition of the System’s portfolio by selling short-term and buying
longer-term maturities.

Swap transactions, it was felt, might be de

sirable should sales of short-term securities be needed to affect
short-term rates at a time when the System did not want to absorb
reserves,^
The Committee agreed that it should make public its decision
to depart, at least temporarily, from the long-standing policy of con
fining operations to the short end of the market and refraining from
engaging in swap transactions.

Thus, on February 20, 1961, the date

of the initial operations in longer maturities, the Chairman of the
F.O.M.C. authorized the Account Manager to issue the following press
release:
The System Open Market Account is purchasing in the
open market U.S. Government notes and bonds of vary
ing maturities, some of which will exceed 5 years.
Price quotations and offerings are being requested
of all primary dealers in U.S. Government securities.

^Ibld., p. 19.
^Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, pp. 131132.
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Determination as to which offerings to purchase is
being governed by the prices that appear most advan
tageous, i.e., the lowest prices. Net amounts of
all transactions for System Account will be shown
as usual in the condition statements Issued every
Thursday.
During recent years transactions for the System
Account, except in correction of disorderly markets,
have been made in short-term U.S. Government securi
ties. Authority for transactions in securities of
longer maturity has been granted by the Open Market
Committee of the Federal Reserve System in the light
of conditions that have developed in the domestic
economy and in the U.S. balance of payments with
other countries. 6
The plan was to make moderate purchases in the 1 to 5-1/2
year maturity sector first and later in 5-1/2 and 10 year maturities.
The System officials stressed that the purpose of conducting operations
in coupon issues was not to maintain or peg any particular price-yield
level on either short-term or long-term securities.

Rather, supplying

reserves ty purchases outside the short-term area would relieve the
direct downward pressure on short-term rates, thus reducing or revers
ing the outflow of short-term capital.

In addition, to the extent that

purchases outside the short-term end of the market softened intermedi
ate or long-term rates or prevented them from rising as much as other
wise, the flow of funds into the capital and mortgage markets would be
17
encouraged. '
Thus, the major objective of operations in coupon issues was
not the maintenance of any pattern of rate levels, but, instead, the
purpose of those operations was to influence the flow of funds in both
^Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, p. 43.

17
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 132.
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the long and short ends of the market.

This view of the purpose of

coupon operations is summarized in the words of the Board of Governors,
who statedt
. . , purchasing of securities in the intermediateand longer-term areas, as contrasted with the short
term area, offered the possibility of supplying re
serves without creating direct pressure on short-term
rates. Also, such purchases, by having a moderating
influence on long-term Interest rates relative to
short-term rates, might have the effect of facilitat
ing the flow of funds through the capital and mortgage
markets, thereby encouraging the progress of recovery.
Accordingly, the combination of domestic and inter
national circumstances confronting the Committee
seemed to call for a high degree of flexibility in
open market operations.
At the meeting held on March 28, 1961, the F.O.M.C. authorized
the Account Manager to conduct operations in securities with maturities
in excess of 10 years, in amounts not to exceed 500 million dollars.
One reason cited for this authorization was that the increased flexi
bility in open market operations would afford the System a better op
portunity to evaluate the effects of its operations in coupon issues.
This special authorization to operate in longer-term securities was
renewed at each F.O.M.C. meeting until December.

19

Although the "bills only" policy had, for all practical pur
poses, been dead since the initial operations in coupon issues on
February 20, 1961, the F.O.M.C. did not vote to terminate the three
continuing policy directives until December 19* 1961.

The reasons for

taking this step have been enumerated in the official record.

In view

18
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, p. 40,
19
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 133.

of the external deficit, the System felt that greater flexibility
might be needed in the future to adapt operating techniques to chang
ing economic conditions.
action.

This Has the primary reason given for the

A second factor cited was that the "bills only" directives,

which were designed to clarify the role of open market operations and
thereby assist in the transformation from a pegged to a free market,
had served their purpose.
pleted.

The transition had been successfully com

Finally, when the three continuing directives had been

adopted, the Executive Committee met only four times a year.

After

the Executive Committee was abolished in mid-1955» the authorities
felt that the continuing directives were now no longer necessary.

20

On December 19, 1961, the F.O.M.C. issued a new continuing
authority directive to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to replace
the three "bills only" guidelines.

Since this date, the general

format of the F.O.M.C.*s directive to the Account Manager has consisted
of both the continuing authority directive and the current economic
policy directive.

The continuing authority directive, reviewed each

March at the first meeting of the new F.O.M.C., is subject to revision
by the F.O.M.C, at any time.

It outlines the general policy guidelines

which govern the conduct of open market operations.

The continuing

authority directive, first issued on December 19* 196l, has been re
issued in substantially the same form ever since.

It read as followst

1. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes and
directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the
extent necessary to carry out the current economic
policy directive adopted at the most recent meeting
of the Committeei

(a) To buy or sell U.S. Government securities
In the open market for the System Open Market Account
at market prices and, for such Account, to exchange
maturing U.S. Government seourlties with the Treasury
or allow them to mature without replacementt provided
that the aggregate amount of such securities held in
such Account (including forward commitments, but not
including such special short-term certificates of
indebtedness as may be purchased from the Treasury
under paragraph 2 hereof) shall not be increased or
decreased by more than $1 billion during any period
between meetings of the Committees
(b) To buy or sell prime bankers' acceptances
in the open market for the account of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York at market discount rates;
provided that the aggregate amount of bankers' ac
ceptances held at any one time shall not exceed $75
million or 10 per cent of the total of bankers' ac
ceptances outstanding as shown in the most recent
acceptance survey conducted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York;
(c) To buy U.S. Government securities with
maturities of 2h months or less at the time of pur
chase, and prime bankers' acceptances, from non
bank dealers for the account of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York under agreements for repurchase of
such securities or acceptances in 15 calendar days
or less, at rates not less than (a) the discount
rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the
time such agreement is entered into, or (b) the
average issuing rate on the most recent issue of
3-month Treasury bills, whichever is the lower.
2. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes
and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
purchase directly from the Treasury for the account
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (with dis
cretion, in cases where it seems desirable, to
issue participations to one or more Federal Reserve
Banks) such amounts of special short-term certifi
cates of indebtedness as may be necessary from time
to time for the temporary accommodation of the
Treasury; provided that the total amount of such
certificates held at any one time by the Federal
Reserve Banks shall not exceed $500 million.21

21
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, pp. 89-
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The current economic policy directive is discussed in Appendix A, which
also details the methodology employed in this analysis for identifying
"even keel" directives.
Thus, it can be seen that "operation twist" emerged as a result
of an evolution in operating techniques aimed at adapting open market
operations to the changing economic environment of the early I960's.
"Operation twist" was an official attempt at manipulation of the
interest structure.
was clear.

System policy with respect to short-term rates

The minimization of downward pressure on short-term inter

est rates, but not the establishment of a particular floor, was con
sidered appropriate.

The short-term interest rate policy was designed

to keep domestic rates competitive with those abroad in order to stem
the outflow of short-term funds.

Downward pressure on long-term rates,

at least relative to short-term rates, was sanctioned to promote
domestic recovery.

22

The author's interpretation, that the major target of "opera
tion twist" was to influence the flow of funds rather than to maintain
any interest rate levels, is confirmed by the policy statement made by
Chairman Martin in a speech given on April 11, 1961, to the Reserve
City Bankers in Boca Raton, Florida.

Noting the public's fixation with

the rate aspects of the new policy, he said that the System's objective
was actually to Influence flows of funds in international and domestic

22

Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Management! Its Relationship to Mone
tary Policy, 1951-1962," in Readings in Money, National Income, and
Stabilization Policy, ed. by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L, Teigen
(Homewood, Illinois! Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965)* P. ^24,

markets!

, . in respect to short-term rates, whether the outflow

of funds to foreign centers is being stemmedi and in respect to long
term rates, whether the flow of capital into productive investment
activities is being facilitated."^
The impact of "operation twist" on the interest rate structure
falls outside the scope of this paper.

However, it is important to

understand the relationship between "even keel" policy and the philos
ophy which governed open market operations during the 1960's.

The

demise of the "bills only" policy and the birth of "operation twist"
. is a reflection of the partial abandonment of the laissez-faire doc
trine endorsed by the System during the March, 1953» to February,
I960, period.

Even though the System now officially advocated opera

tions outside the short end of the market, a review of the historical
record clearly shows that it was not the intention of the monetary
authorities to reinstate the inflexible policies which it employed
prior to 1953.

Conversely, "operation twist" was designed to impart

a greater degree of flexibility to monetary policy.

The inauguration

of "operation twist" did not mark the return to a doctrine which
espoused the strict regulation of the government securities market.
Although the initiation of System operations in both the inter
mediate and long-term markets did represent an important innovation in
monetary policy, "operation twist" cannot be interpreted as a complete
abandonment of the laissez-faire doctrine.

This view of "operation

twist" is supported by an examination of the main objectives of the
policy, as well as its implementation during the I960's.

The purpose

of this section is to review briefly a number of facets of "operation
23cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk,” p. 21.

twist" in order to point out the significance of this policy with
respect to open market operations during both the intervals between
Treasury financing operations* as well as during periods when the
Treasury was an active participant in the government securities mar
ket.
"Operation twist" specifically altered open market operations
in that it authorized the Trading Desk to conduct transactions out
side the bill sector and to carry out swap transactions.

However,

the main objectives of such transactions during the interlude between
Treasury operations did not entail the maintenance of a particular
price-yield level.

Operations in longer-term securities were under

taken primarily to correct the balance of payments deficit.

Net

acquisitions of coupon issues were relatively larger in the early

1960's , when the need to avoid downward pressure on short-term yields
was greatest.

In addition, operations in coupon issues were not de

signed to take the place of operations in bills.

Although the net

purchases (purchase less sales) of coupon issues grew in relative
importance during the 196I-I965 period as compared with the 19561960 interval, still about 65 percent of total net purchases were
carried out in the bill sector.

24

In addition to these major characteristics of "operation twist,
a number of new operating techniques were developed which provide
further evidence to support the interpretation that the new policy

24
Edward G, Ettin, "The Financial and Economic Environment of
the 1960’s in Relation to the U.S. Government Securities Market," a
staff study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study
of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington, D.C.i Federal
Reserve System, 1969), pp. 20-26.

represented only a partial abandonment of the laissez-faire doctrine.
The methods of approach to the market during the early stages of ex
panding operations beyond Treasury bills were necessarily experimental
and were limited by the inherent peculiarities of coupon issues as
contrasted with Treasury bills.

In general, it was found that the

market for coupon issues was normally quite thin and frequently one
sided, and that the prices of securities were much more responsive to
official operations than were rates for Treasury bills.

Accordingly,

the Desk quickly abandoned the use of the "go-around" technique for
the purchase of coupon issues.

Instead, the Desk purchased the

majority of intermediate and long-term securities by responding to
offers made at the dealers' initiative.

In addition, in buying coupon

issues for the System, the Desk consistently tried to exert as little
immediate influence on prices as possible and generally did not enter
the market unless conditions would permit coupon purchases without
undue price effects.

In order to minimize direct price effects, the

System confined purchases to those periods when there was a readily
available supply of securities and rarely purchased securities for
itself at rising prices.

Finally, the Desk consciously attempted to

leave some supply of securities in the market after its buying to
avoid preempting all of the securities available in the market at a
25
given time. v
In conclusion, during the interludes between Treasury financ
ings, both the major objectives of "operation twist," as well as the
operating techniques employed by the Desk in its implementation,

^Cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk," pp. 22-26.
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support the view that this policy represented only a partial abandon
ment of the laissez-faire doctrine.

System intervention in the long

term market was undertaken on a limited basis in order to deal pri
marily with the balance of payments problem.

When operations in

coupon issues were deemed appropriate, such operations were conducted
with techniques designed to minimize the market impact of official
transactions.

Thus, operations in coupon issues were undertaken with

a view to minimizing System intervention in the market between Treasury
operations.
"Operation twist” did not represent a major alteration in
System policy with respect to Treasury financing operations.

The

System authorized the Desk to purchase directly from the Treasury
limited amounts of short-term certificates of indebtedness for the
temporary accommodation of the Treasury, a practice which had been
followed during the 1953-1960 period.

Specifically, during periods

of Treasury financings, the System followed essentially the same policy
employed during the "bills only" period.

The Desk continued to avoid

any outright trading for the System in issues involved in Treasury
financings or issues of comparable maturity.

The System had no inten

tion of supporting any particular pattern of prices and yields,
especially in the intermediate and long-term areas where new financing
operations were being undertaken.

26

The Federal Reserve System did not

adopt "operation twist" in order to reinstate the System in the role of
the ultimate underwriter of the Federal government debt.

"Operation

twist" did not entail any System commitment to support Treasury

26Ibld., pp. 21-22.
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refundings by purchases of "rights” to new issues( "when-issued”
securities, or issues of comparable maturity to those being offered
in exchange.

27

In retrospect, the major innovation in monetary policy during
the 1960's did not substantially alter "even keel" policy as it was
practiced under the "bills only” policy.

The maintenance of an "even

keel" policy during Treasury financing periods has never entailed
direct System support of Treasury refundings.

The remainder of this

chapter attempts to clarify, in a somewhat more positive methodological
approach, more precisely what the "even keel" strategy does entail.

27
At this point, the reader should be reminded that the Trad
ing Desk conducts its open market operations for either the System
Account, Treasury Investment Accounts, or the Foreign Account. The
latter need not detain us, but the others must.
Those operations undertaken by the Desk for the System Account
constitute the majority of all transactions. The purpose of these open
market operations is to influence reserve levels of member banks, in
order to implement the credit policy deemed appropriate by the Federal
Open Market Committee. The Desk avoided outright trading for the
System Account in issues involved in Treasury financings or issues
of comparable maturity under both the "bills only" and "operation
twist" policies.
The Desk also conducts operations for the Treasury Investment
Accounts. In conducting such open market operations, the Desk acts as
an agent of the Treasury, carrying out those transactions desired by
Treasury authorities. The Desk, in handling the buying orders for the
Treasury Investment Accounts, quite often finds itself supporting
Treasury financings. Much of the buying for this account was under
taken in direct support of Treasury financings and frequently involved
an attempt to exercise a constructive influence on the tone of the
market, even to the extent of holding price levels temporarily. The
Desk, in conducting operations for this account, often purchased both
"rights" or "when-issued" securities. Although such purchases do
entail direct support of Treasury operations, it should be clear that
the support is provided by the Treasury, not by the central bank.
Such operations were undertaken both before and after the inauguration
of "operation twist." See Cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk,"
PP. 15-18* 27-28.
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"Even Keel" Policy Defined

The rest of this chapter will discuss some alternative defini
tions found in the literature, in addition to reviewing the rationale
for an "even keel" directive and commenting briefly on the time span
of an "even keel" period.

Later analysis will quantitatively test

these alternative definitions.
Although the literature specifically concerned with Federal
Reserve "even keel" policy is relatively scant, close inspection of
it reveals several interpretations of the meaning of the "even keel"
strategy.

28 A representative sampling of definitions would include

the following*
(l)

Federal Reserve Chairman Martin (1959)*

. . . during, immediately before, and immediately
after dates when the Treasury is engaged in a debt
28
The most complete and comprehensive treatments of the subject
available to the author would include the following works. See, in
particular, Stephen H. Axilrod, "An Empirical View of ’Even Keel,'"
(an unpublished manuscript, Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors,
April 22, 1969); Warren J. Gustus, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management,
and Even Keel," Business Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia (January, 1969)* PP. l-^l Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i
The Reconciliation of Monetary Policy and Debt Management," (an un
published manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of New York); William P.
Yohe and Louis C. Gasper, "The 'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal
Open Market Committee," Financial Analysts Journal (NovemberDecember, 1970), pp. 1-12* William P. Yohe and Louis C. Gasper, "The
'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee," (an un
published manuscript, Duke University, Durham, N.C., 1969).
Two other manuscripts exist, but could not be made available
to the author for various legitimate reasons. These two manuscripts
are, Stephen H. Axilrod and Joseph H. Bums, "The Behavior of Interest
Rates, Bank Credit, and Marginal Reserve Measures During 'Even Keel,'
1965 - mid-1967," (an unpublished confidential memorandum, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York)| and Norman N. Bowsher, "'Even Keel* as a
Constraint on Monetary Action," (an unpublished manuscript, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 6, 1967).

6o
operation . , ,, overt System actions . . . have not
been taken. Maintenance of an "even keel" . . . has
helped to prevent any interference with Treasury
financing as a result of changes in monetary condi
tions. It has also contributed to market conditions
that facilitated the pricing of new Treasury offer
ings .29
(2)

Tilford C. Gaines (1962)?

. . .
keel"
major
basic
tions
(3)

the Federal Reserve System pursues an "even
policy for a few weeks before and after each
Treasury financing in order not to alter either
supply-demand relationships or investor expecta
during the financing period,30

First National City Bank of New York (1967)*

The "even keel" policy assumes that the marketing of
a Treasury issue tends to raise market rates, unless
offset by Federal Reserve purchases of securities or
other reserve-supplying operations. "Even keeling"
is supposed to perform a type of temporary underwriting
functions The reserve base of the banking system is
enlarged to enable the money markets to digest the
Treasury offerings with a minimum disturbance to
interest rates.3*
The vagueness of what it means for the Account Manager to
maintain an "even keel" during a Treasury financing operation is ap
parent in these statements.

To add to the confusion, the term is also

sometimes used to connote money market stabilizing operations during
periods of year-end seasonal pressures, which will not be specifically

29
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment, Growth,
and Price Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th
Cong., 1st sess., 1959 (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office,
1959), P. 1785.
30
Tilford C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management
(New Yorks The Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 26U.
31

Monthly Economic Letter, September, 1967* P. 99.

6l
covered In this study.

32

An evaluation of these definitions will be

undertaken in order to raise some important questions, to be answered
later, with respect to a more quantitative explanation of "even keel”
policy,
A review of the various definitions of "even keel" policy
indicates that two basically different schools of thought exist with
respect to the appropriate relationship between the conduct of monetary
policy and the financing operations of the Treasury.

The first inter

pretation to be discussed stresses the concept that "even keel" opera
tions entail an open market operating strategy aimed at facilitating
or aiding Treasury operations.

The other school of thought interprets

"even keel" policy as a conscious effort by the monetary authorities
to implement monetary policy with a view to avoid hindering Treasury
operations.

In the discussion which follows these two interpretations

can be loosely labeled the "support" and "neutrality" schools.

33

The interpretations of "even keel" policy which the author
places in the "support" school view the "even keel" strategy as a form
of System aid for Treasury financings.

The Trading Desk conducts its

open market operations during Treasury financing periods with a view
to facilitating the marketing of a new issue hy performing an underwriting
32
Yohe and Gasper, "The *Even Keel' Decisions," p. 2,
33
The reader should note immediately the inherent danger of
these two labels. As will become clear, the specific definitions
categorized under the "support" school do not define "even keel" policy
as consisting of the type of direct System support purchases which
characterized Federal Reserve policy prior to the Accord. Nor do those
classified within the "neutrality" school view "even keel" operations
as being conducted without regard to Treasury financings. The labels
are employed as a convenient method of distinguishing between two
separate interpretations of "even keel" policy, the difference between
which should become clear as the analysis proceeds.
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function.

This interpretation explains that "even keel" policy con

sists of a form of temporary underwriting for Treasury operations.
Specifically, the System through the use of open market operations
would undertake reserve-supplying operations with the purpose of en
larging the reserve base of the banking system to allow the money
markets to digest the Treasury offerings with minimal interest rate
disturbance.

Such an interpretation basically views the "even keel"

strategy in terms of a one-way shift toward ease during Treasury
financings.

34

This definition can be empirically tested.

It could be sup

ported if, during "even keel" periods, the volume of repurchase agree
ments or net purchases were significantly higher than during concur
rent periods not characterized by an "even keel."

In addition,

further justification of this view could be attained if the behavior
displayed by selected money market indicators showed that the degree
of pressure in the money market eased during financing periods.
The majority of the different definitions encountered in the
literature can be loosely classified within the "neutrality" school.
The appropriate relationship between monetary policy and debt manage
ment operations espoused by this school is the maintenance of a limited
degree of independence.

That is, while Federal Reserve System policy

is such that the authorities do not feel that their money-creating
power should be employed to lend direct support to Treasury financings,

34
For a closer look at this interpretation of "even keel"
policy, see, for example, Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'"
p. 2; Monthly Economic Letter, p. 99* and Thunberg, "'Even Keel'* The
Reconciliation," pp. 11-12.
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System officials do recognize that concurrent monetary policy may well
affect Treasury operations.

The money market is felt to be quite

sensitive to Treasury offers due to the sheer magnitude of the financ
ings, the involvement of the U.S. government’s credit, and the key
role played by government securities in the process of liquidity and
portfolio adjustment.

35

Bearing in mind that there exists a connec

tion between the stance of monetary policy and the success of
Treasury operations, most authors view "even keel" policy as, if not
a form of central bank support or aid to financings then, at least a
conscious effort on the part of the System to undertake no actions
that would contribute to a Treasury offer encountering poor acceptance
in the government securities market.

36

Two different interpretations

of "even keel" policy, based upon this general "neutrality" concept,
are discussed below.
One common definition of "even keel" policy which has been
encountered frequently in the literature is that the maintenance of
an "even keel" in the money market during a Treasury financing period

■^Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.

36

The definition of a successful Treasury operation is an il
lusive concept. As a general rule, a successful debt management
operation must accomplish the financing of the deficit on terms (price,
maturity, etc.) reasonable to both the Treasury authorities and in
vestors. A quantitative measure of success in a time series analysis
is limited by the changing financial and economic environment within
which successive Treasury offerings take place. In addition, the
quantitative measures employed vary with respect to the alternative
types of financing techniques used by the Treasury. Some quantitative
measures are explained and defended by the author in the following
chapter and, should the reader feel the necessity of consulting that
discussion, he should refer to Chapter IV.
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calls for the avoidance of any overt System policy actions.

That is,

any overt policy action that might be interpreted by the money market
participants as indicative of a shift in the stance of credit policy
is to be avoided during a Treasury financing period.

37

This particu

lar view is most commonly couched in terms of the necessity of not an
nouncing new policy decisions (as contained in announcements from the
Board of Governors or as specified in the second paragraph of the
current economic policy directive of the F.O.M.C.) that would impede
the orderly marketing of Treasury securities and significantly increase
risks of market disruption from sharp changes in market attitudes in
the course of a financing.

38

Specifically, "even keel" policy is felt

to influence the timing of policy actions, confining the System to
undertaking any overt policy action -during the intervals between
Treasury financings.

It is felt that any tightening of credit policy

during the financing period would seriously impair the success of an
offering through altering basic supply and demand relationships, as
well as the expectations of the money market participants.

39

This interpretation of "even keel" policy can be tested by
reviewing the historical record.
37
This view
a number of works.
'Even Keel,"' p. 1;
and U.S., Congress,
P. 1785.

This definition would be supported

or interpretation of "even keel" policy appears in
See, for example, Axilrod, "Empirical View of
Thunberg, "'Even Keel'j The Reconciliation," p. 1;
Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Hearings,

•^Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.
39
It should be noted that "even keel" policy might also be in
terpreted as influencing the timing of not only tightening, but also
easing actions. For example, a discount rate reduction in the middle
of a Treasury financing period may be avoided because it might encour
age undue speculative activity in the government securities market.
See Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,"' fn, 1, p. 1.
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if it were found that the majority of changes, especially increases,
in both the discount rate and the required reserve ratio occurred
during those intervals not designated as "even keel" periods.

In ad

dition, if by a review of the Record of Policy Action - the Federal
Open Market Committee in the Annual Report it can be found that the
necessity of maintaining an "even keel" policy has preempted shifts in
monetary policy, then this interpretation would be further validated.
Finally, a second definition within the "neutrality" school
has been identified by the author.

This particular interpretation has

been indirectly suggested by the work of others, as well as by the
review of the current economic policy directives.

40

This interpreta

tion views "even keel" policy as an open market operating technique
40

In a number of works, which were concerned with the imple
mentation of the dynamic facets of short-run monetary policy as op
posed to the "even keel" strategy per se, a number of authors suggested
that the Federal Reserve System concentrated on a number of money
market indicators as the primary targets at which open market opera
tions were directed. For a discussion of the so-called intermediate
targets of credit policy, see Leonall C. Andersen, "Money Market
Conditions as a Guide for Monetary Management," in Monetary Economics
Readings, ed. by Alan D. Entine (Belmont, Calif.t Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 226-245» Leonall C. Andersen and Jules
M. Levine, "Implementation of Federal Reserve Open Market Policy in
1964," Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (June, 1965),
PP. 2-5? Leonall C, Andersen and Jules M, Levine, "A Test of Money
Market Conditions as a Means of Short-Run Monetary Management,"
National Banking Review, Vol. IV (September, 1966), pp. 41-51? Clay
J. Anderson, "Money Market Indicators," in Monetary Economics Readings,
ed. by Alan D. Entine (Belmont, Calif.t Wadsworth Publishing Company,
1968), pp. 211-216? Paul Meek, Discount Policy and Open Market
Operations? Fundamental Reappraisal of the Discount Mechanism
(Washington, D.C.i Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1968)?
and Robert R. Wyand, II, "Money Market Conditions— What Are They?"
Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (September,
1965),pp. 1-4.
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used in the implementation of short-run monetary policy.

The his

torical record clearly shows that the operating instructions given to
the Account Manager in the second paragraph of the P.O.M.G. current
economic policy directive have been couched in terms of a desired
degree of pressure in money market conditions or money market tone.
During "even keel" periods, the Account Manager is invariably directed
to maintain the existing degree of pressure in the money market.
Thus, this would indicate that the "even keel" strategy would
call for open market operations directed at maintaining steady con
ditions in the money market.

This definition can be readily tested

by an analysis of the behavior of a number of money market indicators
during both "even keel" and alternate periods.

The primary indicators

to be studied would include net open market purchases, repurchase
agreements, short-term interest rates, and marginal reserve measures.
This definition would be supported if the behavior of these policy
targets was such that one could conclude that the maintenance of an
"even keel" entailed System operations aimed at stabilizing money mar
ket indicators.
A more detailed discussion of these alternate definitions will
follow.

At the outset, it should be emphasized that these definitions

of "even keel" policy are not mutually exclusive concepts.

It is pos

sible that a given "even keel" period may be characterized hy more
than one definition with an equal degree of accuracy or, on the other
hand, different "even keel" periods may best be described by the same
definition.

Before proceeding to the quantitative analysis of the

alternative definitions of "even keel" policy offered here, an evalu
ation of the rationale for an "even keel" directive must be presented.
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The Rationale for "Even Keel"

The rationale most commonly cited in defense of the central
bank maintaining an "even keel" posture during Treasury financing
periods ultimately rests on one major premise.

This premise is that

the implementation of credit control policy by the Federal Reserve
System can have an important effect upon Treasury debt management
operations.

System officials recognize that monetary policy cannot

be conducted without considering policy actions with respect to their
effect on concurrent Treasury financing operations.
The rationale justifying the "even keel"tstrategy recognizes
three basic facets of Treasury financing operations which must be taken
into account by central bank officials in conducting monetary policy.
They arei
(1) Treasury deficits must be financed and re
funding operations completed.
(2) Such financings should be undertaken on terms
that are acceptable to private investors1 that is,
the Treasury must "meet the test of the market."
(3) Direct Federal Reserve support of Treasury
financings should be avoided.^
The Federal Reserve System maintains an "even keel" position
in order to sustain the orderly marketing of Treasury securities.
Because

of the massive size of most Treasury financing operationsand

the sensitivity of the money market

to Treasury activity and thepolicy

actions of the monetary authorities, it is felt that reasonably stable
conditions must be maintained in the money and credit markets if the
financings are to be successful.

Therefore, it is the policy of the

Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The Reconciliation," pp. 1-2.
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System to avoid those policy actions which tend to create uncertain
ties or upset the money market during Treasury financing periods.

ly

The "even keel” strategy is aimed at smoothing the process of market
ing large Treasury issues.
The purpose of maintaining orderly money market conditions
during the financing period is to avoid upsetting the expectations of
the government securities dealers.

The government securities dealers

operate on a slender equity to funds ratio.

The "even keel" strategy

aims at enhancing the ability of the dealers to "make a market" in the
new Treasury offerings by minimizing the degree of uncertainty faced
by the market participants.

It provides the underwriters with a short

period of time during which basic market supply and demand forces
rather than monetary policy are the main factors affecting investor
expectations.

"Even keel" policy allows the securities dealers suf

ficient time to contact customers, with no more than a normal market
1*3
risk upon their temporary holdings.
Thus, the major rationale
underlying "even keel" policy is that the conduct of monetary policy
during Treasury financings must be such that it sustains the orderly
marketing of Treasury securities.

The rationale for "even keel" policy

can be further clarified by an examination of the time span of the
"even keel" period.

The Time Span of "Even Keel"

The time span covered by a specific "even keel" directive is
difficult to identify with precision.

The length of an "even keel"

*Ibid., p. 2.
1*3
Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,*" p. 2.
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period in calendar days varies somewhat due to a number of factors.
The type of financing technique employed by the Treasury, whether a
rights or cash financing, alters the duration of the "even keel"
period.

In addition to the type of financing technique, both the

volume of a particular offer and the types of securities offered in a
financing operation are factors taken into consideration by the Ac
count Manager in the implementation of an "even keel" strategy.

As

a general rule, cash financings, large volume offers, and Treasury
operations involving long-term securities call forth an extension of
the time span during which an "even keel" policy is maintained.

Other

factors, such as the reception the financing encounters in the money
market and changing economic conditions necessitating shifts in the
stance of credit policy, may also alter the time span of an "even
keel" period.
The "even keel" period, with few exceptions, encompasses the
entire Treasury financing period.

The interval encompassed by the

A rights financing would include both exchange offers and
advance refundings. An exchange offer entails an optional right grant
ed to holders of specified outstanding issues to exchange those securi
ties on the maturity date at face value for the new issues being of
fered. An advanced refunding operation entails an optional offer to
the holders of specified outstanding issues to exchange those securi
ties prior to the maturity date for the new issues being offered by
the Treasury. A cash financing Includes both cash offers and cash
refundings. A cash offer consists of the offer of a new security by
the Treasury with payments to be made in cash with no rights involved.
The Treasury also sells new issues through cash refundings or cash and
exchange offers. This method or financing technique entails the offer
of a new issue with payment to be made in either cash or maturing out
standing issues. A more thorough discussion of these financing tech
niques will be presented in the next chapter.
^ T h e length of the Treasury financing period varies with
respect to the method of financing employed. The Treasury financing
period for a rights financing may be defined as the time span extend
ing from the day after the announcement of the offer to the day the
books are closed. A cash financing involves a longer Treasury
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••even keel" period usually extends from a few days before the public
announcement of the terms of a financing operation to around approxi
mately the settlement or payment date— a span, generally, of about
three weeks in length.

46

Various empirical studies have employed

different basic "even keel" periods, but all agree that the "even
keel" period does encompass the Treasury financing period,

4?

A de

tailed account of the methodology utilized in this analysis for dating
"even keel" periods is elaborated in the next chapter.
The "even keel" period, which encompasses the Treasury financ
ing period, can conceptually be subdivided into three distinct inter
vals.

Each interval or subperiod gives rise to separate and distinct

reasons which call for the maintenance of an "even keel."

A discussion

of these intervals should clarify further the overall rationale which
justifies the "even keel" strategy.
The first interval covers the period which extends from a few
days prior to the announcement until the day of the announcement of

^(continued) financing period which extends from the day
after the announcement to the settlement or payment date. This date
usually follows the closing of the books by about one week. See, for
a thorough discussion of Treasury financing periods, Louise Freeman
Aheam, "Government Securities Market Performance in the Wake of Of
ficial Operations in Coupon Issues Day-to-Day Performance," a staff
study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the
U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve
Syst em, 1969).
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Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The Reconciliation," p. 1.
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The basic unit of time employed in dating "even keel" periods
has varied between three days to one week prior to the announcement of
terras until three days to one week after the settlement date. See,
for example, Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 4t and
Gustus, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management, and Even Keel," p. 8,
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the specific terms of the financing to the public.

This preannounce

ment interval brings together Treasury and System officials, as well
as money market participants, in discussion aimed at canvassing the
market.

Suggestions of both System officials and market participants

in the determination of the terms (volume, price, and maturity, etc.)
of the new issue.

The Treasury seeks those terms that will best meet

the financing requirements of the Treasury, as well as the "test of
the market."

The maintenance of an "even keel" during this period is

necessary to permit the Treasury officials to adequately gauge the
market as a prerequisite.of composing the terms of the financing.

Any

abrupt changes in monetary policy during this period would cause money
market repercussions, altering investor expectations, and thus compli
cating the task of gauging the market.

The result would probably be

terms that were either too easy from the Treasury's viewpoint, i.e.,
those that might increase the cost of the financing or shorten the
composition of the public debt or, on the other hand, terms too severe
to meet the "test of the market."
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The second interval encompasses the interlude between the
public announcement of the specific terms and the date the subscription
books are closed.

This particular period is most critical in the

determination of the degree of acceptance the offering will encounter
in the money market.

It is during this time that both bank and non

bank government securities dealers canvass customers to gauge the
market's appetite to determine their underwriting subscriptions for a
cash financing.

In a rights financing, the underwriters must locate
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Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The Reconciliation," p. 2.

the holders of rights and purchase the rights of those investors who
do not wish to exercise their exchange option.

Essentially during

this period, the investor must deolde whether or not to accept the
terms offered by the Treasury.

Obviously, any central bank actions

which could be interpreted as a tightening of credit policy would
seriously hinder the success of the financing operation.
The final interval of the "even keel" period encompasses the
time period starting on the day after the closing of the books and
extending a few days beyond the settlement or payment dates.

The

maintenance of the "even keel" strategy during this subperiod is
necessary to allow the underwriters sufficient time to distribute
their allotment of the new issue to the ultimate investors.

The pur

suit of an "even keel" during this period is crucial with respect to
the success of future Treasury financings.

Any shift in monetary

policy, reflected in an increase in interest rates (a reduction in
price) on the securities involved in the financing, would cause the
bank and non-bank securities dealers to suffer severe capital losses.
The large capital losses would probably lead the dealers to reduce
their propensity to participate in future Treasury financings.

Other

things equal, a reduction in the willingness of the securities dealers
to make a market for future issues would force the Treasury to compose
more lenient terms in future offerings or accept the alternative of
decreased sales. ^
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Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to provide the reader with a
general understanding of the "even keel” strategy during the 1960's.
This analysis has concentrated upon the relationship between "even
keel" policy and the major innovations in monetary policy, as well as
presenting a number of different interpretations of "even keel" policy.
In summarizing, a number of points should be reviewed.
First, the replacement of the "bills only" guidelines with
the "operation twist" policy did not alter the basic character of the
"even keel" strategy.

The operations in coupon issues authorized by

"operation twist" were not aimed at maintaining price-yield levels in
the government securities market.

The Trading Desk, during the 1960*s,

continued its policy of eschewing the purchase of "rights" to new
issues, securities on a "when-issued” basis, and issues of comparable
maturity to those securities being offered during Treasury financing
periods.
The discussion of the alternative definitions of "even keel"
policy resulted in the classification of those definitions within
either the "support" or "neutrality" schools.

This classification will

facilitate the empirical evaluation of "even keel" policy which follows.
Finally, the discussion of the rationale and time span of "even keel"
policy has established that the primary purpose of this policy is to
smooth the marketing process of Treasury financings.

What this means,

in terms of the behavior of selected money market variables, will be
examined later.

APPENDIX A

THE IDENTIFICATION OF "EVEN KEEL" DIRECTIVES
AND THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY DIRECTIVE
OF THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE

The purpose of this Appendix is twofold, The primary objective
is to detail the methodology employed by the author in identifying the
"even keel" directives of the F.O.M.C. during the January 1, i960 August 28, 1968, period.

In conjunction with this aim, it is necessary

to familiarize the reader with the nature of the current economic
policy directives which, during the December 19, 1961 - August 28,
1968, interval, formed the immediate guidelines for the conduct of
open market operations.

The Identification of "Even Keel" Directives

Monetary policy had been Implemented during the entire January
1, i960 - August 28, 1968, period through a series of economic direc
tives issued by the F.O.M.C. to the Account Manager at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.

However, within this period the F.O.M.C.

employed two general formats of instructions to the Account Manager.
Although basically similar in substance, the two formats necessitated
the utilization of a slightly different approach in identifying "even
keel" directives.
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The format of the instructions issued to the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York during the January 1, I960 - December 5» 1961, period
consisted of two distinct parts.

These two facets entailed instruc

tions for the conduct of open market operations on two separate levels.
The continuing authority directive, which throughout the entire period
consisted of the three "bills only" guidelines, enumerated the general
operating policies which the Desk was to employ in conducting trans
actions for the System Account.

The specific level of operating in

structions was embodied in the policy directive of the F.O.M.C.

This

policy directive, which was reviewed at each meeting of the F.O.M.C.,
as opposed to the continuing authority directive which came under re
view only on an annual basis, provided the major tool employed in
identifying "even keel" directives.
The policy directive appears in the Record of Policy Actions the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual Report of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, along with a brief summary of
the discussion leading to the directive.

The policy directive consist

ed of two paragraphs, the first of which contained Clause b, instruct
ing the Account Manager as to the appropriate targets to which open
market operations should be directed.
The identification of "even keel" directives during this period
was a fairly simple matter.

In such a directive it was found that

Clause b of the policy directive contained reference to either an actual
or forthcoming Treasury financing as a factor to be taken into account
in the conduct of open market operations.

An "even keel" directive

could also be readily identified from the summary of the discussion

leading to the policy directive.

In this case, the summary usually

denoted the desirability of maintaining an "even keel" in light of a
Treasury financing operation.

The "even keel" directives identified

by this process are listed in Table 1.
The format of the instructions issued by the F.O.M.C. to the
Account Manager during the December 19, 1961 - August 28, 1968, inter
val was slightly different.
distinct parts.

The instructions again consisted of two

The continuing authority directive which replaced the

"bills only" guidelines was reissued in substantially the same form
throughout the entire period.

The continuing policy directive which

underwent annual review instructs the Account Manager as to the general
guidelines to be employed in conducting open market operations.

The

specific operating instructions are embodied in the current economic
policy directives.
Since December 19* 1961, dynamic short-run monetary policy has
been implemented through the current economic policy directives of the
F.O.M.C.

This directive is reviewed and revised, usually at three-

week Intervals between F.O.M.C. meetings, in accord with the develop
ment in both internal and external economic conditions.

During the

December 19, 1961 - August 28, 1968, interval, scrutiny of the current
economic policy directive provided the primary basis for identifying
"even keel" directives.
The directive consists of two paragraphsi the first being a
statement of the broad economic goals to be achieved and an outline of
the economic conditions reviewed by the F.O.M.C. in determining the
tone of the directive, and the second, an enumeration of the intermedi
ate objectives to be attained by open market operations.

The
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TABLE 1
"EVEN KEEL" DIRECTIVES,
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Year

Dates of Directives^

I960

January 26, March 22, July 6, July 26,
September 13, October 4

1961

June 6, July 11, September 12, October 3#
October 24

1962

January 9, January 23, February 13, April 17,
July 31, August 21, September 11, October 23

1963

January 8, January 29, February 12, March 5,
March 26, April 16, August 20, September 10,
October 22

1964

January 7» January 28, March 24, April 14, May 5»
June 17, July 7» July 28, October 20, November
10, December 15

1965

January 12, April 13* May 11, July 13, August 10,
September 28, October 12, November 2, December l4

1966

January 11, February 8, April 12, May 10,
July 26, October 4, November 1

1967

January 10, February 7» May 2, June 20, July 18,
August 15# October 3s October 24

1968

February 6, April 30, July 16

T'he dates cited refer to the date of the F.O.M.C. meeting at which
the "even keel" directive was authorized. These dates do not indicate
the initial day of the "even keel" period.
These dates concur closely with the findings of others. See
Warren J. Gustus, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management, and Even Keel,"
Business Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
(January, 1969). pp. 1-4; and William P. Yohe and Louis C. Gasper,
"The 'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee"
(an unpublished manuscript, Duke University, Durham, N.C., 1969),
Appendix A, p. al),
SOURCEj

Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1960-1968.

intermediate objectives are stated in terras of the desired movements
in such variables as member bank reserves, bank credit, the money
supply, and interest rates.

The current economic policy directive and

a rather detailed summary of the discussion leading to it appear in
the Record of Policy Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in
the Annual Report.
The identification of "even keel" directives was again rather
simple.

The summary of the discussion, coupled with the current

economic policy directive, provided sufficient material to determine
whether or not the System was maintaining an "even keel" policy.
These two sources contained either specific references to maintaining
an "even keel" per se or to conducting open market operations in light
of an imminent or forthcoming Treasury financing operation.

Those

"even keel" directives which were identified since December 19, 1961,
are also listed in Table 1.

The Current Economic Policy Directive

As previously detailed, dynamic short-run monetary policy
since December 19, 1961, has been implemented through the current
economic policy directive.

This directive gives specific operating

instructions to the Account Manager in qualitative terms.

These in

structions compose the dynamic facet of Federal Reserve policy and in
dicate the guidelines to be followed by the Trading Desk in the day-today conduct of open market operations.

The first paragraph enumerates

the economic conditions reviewed by the F.O.M.C.
contains the operating instructions.

The second paragraph
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The operating Instructions are usually stated In terms of a
desired degree of pressure in the money market to be achieved by the
operations of the Trading Desk.

The degree of pressure desired by the

F.O.M.C. is specified in terms of either maintaining the existing de
gree of pressure or achieving either a firmer or easier degree of
money market pressure.

The choice is dependent upon whether the

F.O.M.C. feels that the economic environment justifies a shift in the
stance of monetary policy.

In addition to specifying the tone to be

maintained in the money market, the directive often refers to desired
movements in certain money market indicators such as aggregate or mar
ginal bank reserves, Treasury bill rates, bank credit as measured by
the bank credit proxy variable, and occasionally references to unsettled
conditions in the securities and foreign exchange markets.
In order to familiarize the reader with the form and content
of the current economic policy directive, a number of typical direc
tives are presented below.

A few words of explanation accompany the

directives to provide not only an interpretation of the meaning of the
directive in terms of the stance of monetary policy, but also to show
the ease with which an "even keel" directive can be identified.
The first directive to be discussed was Issued at the F.O.M.C.
meeting held on February 13, 1962.

It stated*

It continues to be the current policy of the
Committee to permit further bank credit and monetary
expansion so as to promote fuller utilization of the
economy's resources, together with monetary conditions
consistent with the needs of an expanding domestic
economy, taking into account this country's adverse
balance of payments as well as a possible Treasury
financing.
To implement this policy, operations for the
System Open Market Account during the next 3 weeks

shall be conducted with a view to maintaining a
supply of reserves adequate for further credit
expansion, while minimizing downward pressures on
short-term interest rates. In view of the possi
bility of a Treasury financing, emphasis shall be
placed on maintaining a steady money market.^The first paragraph indicates that the System continued unchanged, a
moderately expansive monetary policy.

Both the directive and the sum

mary of the discussion leading to it emphasized three major considera
tions that were reviewed by the F.O.M.C. in the unanimous decision to
continue monetary policy unchanged for the next three weeks.

It was

felt that the slight pause in domestic recovery was not serious enough
to call forth a shift toward greater ease.

However, the possibility of

a move toward lesser ease which external considerations might have
called for was militated against because of the pause in the domestic
recovery process.

The possibility of a Treasury advance refunding also

was a factor cited in favor of holding the posture of monetary policy
unchanged.
This current economic policy directive is a typical "even keel"
directive.

Note that both paragraphs mention the possibility of an

imminent Treasury financing operation.

The operation referred to was

an advance refunding operation which the Treasury announced on February
15, 1962.

The second paragraph emphasized, in light of possible

Treasury activity, the need to maintain a steady money market.

In

addition, it specified the F.O.M.C.'s desires with respect to the ap
propriate behavior of both aggregate reserves and short-term interest
rates.
^Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Forty-Ninth Annual
Report, 1962 (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 19&2), p. 5^.
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The second directive cited was Issued at the F.O.M.C. meeting
held on October 20, 1964.

It reads as follows*

It is the Federal Open Market Committee's current
policy to accommodate moderate growth in the reserve
base, bank credit, and the money supply for the purpose
of facilitating continued expansion of the economy,
while fostering improvement in the capital account of
U.S. international payments, and seeking to avoid the
emergence of inflationary pressures. This policy takes
into account the further expansion in economic activity,
tempered by a work stoppage at a major automobile
companyj relative stability in broad community price
averages* even though additional price increases have
occurred in some materials markets; and indications
that the vigorous money supply expansion of recent
months continued in the first half of October. It
also gives consideration to current estimates that the
deficit in the U.S. balance of payments in the third
quarter continued at a high rate, although not quite
as high as in the preceding quarter.
To implement this policy, and taking into account
the forthcoming Treasury financing, System open market
operations shall be conducted with a view to maintain
ing about the same conditions in the money market as
have prevailed in recent weeks, while accommodating
moderate expansion in aggregate bank reserves.^
The first paragraph and the summary of the discussion leading to the
directive indicated that the System continued unchanged its moderately
expansionary monetary policy.

The F.O.M.C. was concerned with facili

tating continued expansion on the domestic scene* however, increased
fears of inflationary developments were cited.

Although some disagree

ment existed within the Committee, they unanimously voted to continue
unchanged the present stance of monetary policy with the majority of
the Committee citing imminent Treasury activity as the deciding factor.
Again, the directive clearly calls for the maintenance of an
"even keel" in the money market.

The second paragraph specifically

^Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1964, pp. 108-109.
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mentions a forthcoming Treasury financing, referring specifically to
a 9.250 "billion dollar cash offer of an 18-month, h percent Treasury
note which the Treasury announced on October 28, 196^.

In addition

to emphasizing the need to maintain about the same conditions in the
money market, the directive also called for a moderate expansion in
aggregate bank reserves, as well as minimizing the downward pressure
on short-term interest rates.
The detailed directive issued by the F.O.M.C. at a meeting
held on July 26, 1966, is rather unique in a number of its facets.
reads as follows1
The economic and financial developments reviewed
at this meeting indicate that over-all domestic
economic activity appears to be expanding somewhat
more rapidly than in the second quarter despite
weakness in residential construction, with indus
trial prices rising further. Total credit demands
continue strong and financial markets, particularly
for mortgages, remain tight. Despite the statistical
improvement resulting largely from special transactions,
the balance of payments situation continues to reflect
a sizable underlying deficit. In this situation, it
is the Federal Open Market Committee's policy to resist
inflationary pressures and to strengthen efforts to
restore reasonable equilibrium in the country's balance
of payments, by restricting the growth in the reserve
base, bank credit, and the money supply.
To implement this policy, while taking into account
the forthcoming Treasury financing, System open market
operations until the next meeting of the Committee shall
be conducted with a view to maintaining about the cur
rent state of net reserve availability and related
money market conditions! provided, however, that if
required reserves expand more rapidly than expected
and if conditions associated with the Treasury financ
ing permit, operations shall be conducted with a view
to attaining some further gradual reduction in net
reserve availability and firming of money market con
ditions. 3

Reserve System, Annual Report, 1966, pp. 167-168,

It
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The first paragraph emphasizes the consternation of the authorities
over inflationary pressures.

The Committee agreed to continue un

changed the moderate contractionary stance monetary policy had assumed.
The objectives sought were the resistance of Inflationary pressure and
the restoration of reasonable external equilibrium.

It Is the opinion

of the author that these considerations would normally have led the
authorities to pursue a more restrictive policy had not the necessity
of maintaining an "even keel" intervened.
This particular directive has been designated by the author as
an example of an "even keel" strategy pre-empting a shift in monetary
policy.

The summary of the discussion leading to the directive showed

a general desire within the Committee to keep a tight rein on bank
credit expansion.

There was recognition, however, that the imminent

Treasury financing constituted an important reason for continuing
about the current state of net reserve availability and money market
conditions in accordance with the customary practice of maintaining an
"even keel" during Treasury financings.

Some members, citing infla

tionary movements in a number of indicators, expressed the view that a
good case could be made for gradual tightening at this time.

The

Treasury operation seems to have been a deciding factor in the decision
of the authorities not to tighten monetary policy.
The directive was designated as calling for an "even keel."
Mention of an imminent Treasury operation appears in the second para
graph.

The reference was to a 1^,893 billion dollar multiple exchange

offer involving a Treasury certificate of indebtedness and a Treasury
note.

The Treasury publicly announced the financing on July 27, 1966.
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The "even keel" directive called for the maintenance of about the
same level of net reserve availability and related money market con
ditions.

The directive is unique in that it is one of the earlier

uses of the proviso clause.

The proviso clause gives specific operat

ing instructions to the Account Manager to govern his conduct during
the interim period between F.O.M.C. meetings.

In this particular

case, the F.O.M.C. authorized the Account Manager to reduce net re
serves and firm money market conditions provided required reserves
expand more rapidly than expected.

It should be emphasized that the

authorization to tighten was conditional upon not only excessive re
quired reserve expansion, but was limited by the degree of the
Treasury’s financing success.

The Account Manager could tighten up

only if the success of the Treasury financing was assured.
The final directive discussed was issued on April 2, 1968.
read:
The Information reviewed at this meeting indicates
that over-all economic activity has expanded at a very
rapid pace in early 1968, with prices rising substan
tially, and that prospects are for a continuing rapid
advance in activity and persisting inflationary pres
sures in the period ahead. Since late fall, growth
rates of bank credit, the money supply, and time and
savings accounts at financial institutions have moderated
considerably. Speculative activity in gold and foreign
exchange markets which was intense in early March,
abated after the midmonth agreement on gold policy by
gold pool members and appears to have slackened further
following the Stockholm agreement regarding Special
Drawing Rights. The foreign trade surplus, however,
has remained at a sharply reduced level in recent
months and the imbalance in U.S. International payments
continues to be a matter of serious concern. Most
market interest rates have fluctuated widely, although
rising on balance, in reaction to international financial
developments, the firming of monetary policy, and un
certainties regarding military and fiscal prospects.
In this situation, it is the policy of the Federal Open

It
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Market Committee to foster financial conditions con
ducive to resistance of inflationary pressures and
attainment of reasonable equilibrium in the country's
balance of payments.
To implement this policy, System open market
operations until the next meeting of the Committee
shall be conducted with a view to attaining slightly
firmer conditions in the money market; provided, how
ever, that operations shall be modified if bank credit
appears to be deviating significantly from current
projections or if unusual liquidity pressures should
develop,^
The magnitude of inflationary pressure, the balance of payments deficit,
and the impending possibility of restrictive fiscal legislation were
the major factors taken into account by the Committee in the unanimous
adoption of a shift in policy.

The Committee voted to instruct the

Account Manager to increase the degree of pressure in the money market.
The lack of any Treasury operation is significant in that it was one
factor which permitted the shift toward a more restrictive credit
policy.

This directive was Included in order to contrast it with the

previous "even keel" directives.

Clearly, from both the directive and

summary of the discussion leading to it, this directive did not call
for an "even keel."

No mention was made of any Treasury financing, nor

did any Treasury activity occur at this time.

I

Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1968, p. 141.

CHAPTER IV
"EVEN KEEL" POLICY IN RELATION
TO TREASURY OPERATIONSi 1960-1968

The purpose of this section of the analysis is to review and
evaluate in detail a number of aspects of “oven keel" policy with
respect to Treasury financing operations during the 1960-1968 inter
val.^

Special emphasis is given to the relationship between "even

keel" directives and the type and volume of Treasury financings.

The

chapter also analyzes both the frequency and the seasonal pattern
exhibited by "even keel" operations and offers an explanation in terras
of both Treasury activity and money market conditions.

Finally, this

section discusses some of the major problems encountered in dating
"even keel" periods and presents the solutions adopted by the author.
The specific interval covered in the analysis extends from
January 1, i960, through August 28, 1968, January 1, I960, was chosen
as the point to initiate the study for two reasons. First of all, by
that time the "even keel" strategy had become a well-established oper
ating procedure, as evidenced by the preceding historical analysis.
The primary factor in designating this date as a starting point was
concerned with the availability of data. The weekly statistics on the
Federal Funds rate were not available prior to this date, mainly be
cause the Federal Funds market had not developed sufficiently to the
point where a market interest rate could be Identified. It should also
be noted that the December, 1959, Treasury financing operation which
involved the exchange offer of a Treasury note was taken into consider
ation by the author as it called forth an "even keel" directive which
spanned the January 1 to January 12, i960, period. Finally, August
28, 1968, was designated as the terminal point in the study because the
statistical definition of free reserves, one of the primary money mar
ket indicators analyzed, was changed on September 1*4-, 1968.
86
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"Even Keel" Policy and Treasury Operations

Although the Treasury is an active participant in the govern
ment securities market each month during the year, the Federal Reserve
System pursues an "even keel" strategy for only a fraction of all
Treasury financing operations.

Both the financing technique employed,

as well as the volume of a particular offer, are major determinants
of System policy, that is, whether the Trading Desk does or does not
maintain an "even keel" posture.

In addition,, other factors such as

the general condition of the money market as gauged by System officials
are taken into consideration in determining the policy of the central
bank.

The financing operations of the Treasury during the 1960-1968

period have been carefully reviewed and categorized on the basis of
the financing technique employed.

The four major classifications in

clude advance refundings, regular refundings, cash refundings, and
cash offers.

After an analysis of the empirical data available, a

rather clear behavior pattern emerges with respect to both the tech
nique and volume of Treasury financings and the actions of the Federal
Reserve System.
A . Advance Refundings

The advance refunding technique is a rather recent innovation

2
in Treasury financing, first utilized in June, i960.

An advance

2
The first advance refunding was announced to the public on
June 6, i960. The operation, a junior type, consisted of the limited
offer of a note and bond to be exchanged for a 2-1/2 percent bond
maturing on ll/l5/6l. Of the 11.177 billion dollars outstanding, the
exchange was limited to 4.500 billion dollars of which 4.215 billion
dollars were allotted. The first senior advanced refunding operation
was announced by the Treasury on September 9, I960. This financing
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refunding entails the offer of an optional right to the holders of
specified outstanding issues; the right to exchange their holdings for
new securities of longer maturity.

3

The primary rationale for employ

ing this new financing technique was the desire on the part of
Treasury officials to lengthen the maturity structure of the debt.

It

was felt if an exchange was offered before the outstanding securities
had come to serve a liquidity function in investors* portfolios, the
difficulty of floating a new long-term security would be minimized.
Specifically, it was reasoned that the maturing securities were held
mainly by short-term investors who were not interested in purchasing
long-term bonds.

Those investors who did wish to exchange for the new

long-term bonds would be required to purchase "rights" to the new is
sues or "when-issued" securities from dealers.

This transfer of own

ership involves a considerable amount of market churning.

The senior

advance refunding technique minimizes the changes in ownership and the
amount of new cash funds required to purchase the long-term bonds.

4

2
(continued) Involved the offer of three new bonds which were
eligible to be exchanged for four issues of 2-1/2 percent bonds matur
ing between 6/15/67 and 12/15/69. Out of the 12.473 billion dollars
outstanding eligible for exchange, 3.976 billion dollars were allotted.

3

Advance refundings are of three distinct types, depending on
the length of time to maturity of the outstanding issues involved in
the operation. Senior advance refundings involve securities with over
5 years left to maturity. The Treasury has also conducted junior and
pre-refunding operations. Junior advance refundings include outstand
ing Issues with 1-5 years to maturity and pre-refundings involve securi
ties maturing in less than 1 year. However, a particular advance re
funding may actually be a combination of any two of these types.
4
Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Management* Its Relationship to Monetary
Policy, 1951-1962," in Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabili
zation Policy, ed. by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen (Homewood,
Illinois* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 426.
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The advance refunding technique was adopted in i960 as a means to
minimize the immediate market impact of a long-term debt operation.^
During the 1960-1968 period, the Treasury undertook a total
of 15 advance refunding operations.

Of these, 10 operations consisted

of a single type; there being 2 senior refundings, 2 junior refundings,
and 6 pre-refundings.

The other 5 advance refundings involved a com

bination of components, consisting of 1 junior-senior refunding and b
junior-pre-refunding operations.

In addition, 4 of the 15 advance

refundings consisted of limited offers.

Reference to Table 2 provides

a concise chronological summary of these operations denoting the an
nouncement dates, the type of operation and securities offered, the
volume outstanding and exchanged, and the exchange ratio as well as
indicating the presence or absence of an "even keel" directive.
Examination of the table reveals that System policy has normally
called for the maintenance of an "even keel" policy during Treasury
advance refundings.

During the period, 12 of 15 advance refundings

were accompanied by an "even keel" directive.

The 3 advance refundings

that were not "even keeled" include 2 limited junior refundings and 1

A brief summary of the literature concerned with the advance
refunding technique would include the following articles! Thomas R.
Beard, U.S. Treasury Advance Refunding, June 1960-July 196*1(Washington, D.C.i Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1965),
Commission on Money and Credit, Report of the Commission, Money and
Credit! Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.i Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 111-11**-1 David I. Fand, "An
Analysis of Advance Refunding," (paper presented to the meeting of the
Econometric Society, Cleveland, Ohio, September 5» 1965J Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, "Advance Refunding! A Technique of Debt
Management," Monthly Review (December, 1962), pp. l69-175l Federal
Reserve Bank of Mchmond, "The Longer She Stands the Shorter She Grows,"
Monthly Review (April, l$>6l), pp. 7-12* and the U.S. Treasury Depart
ment, "Debt Management and Advance Refunding," September, I960.

TABLE 2
- SUMMARY TREASURY ADVANCE REFUNDINGS,
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Date of
Public
Announcement
6/06/60
9/09/60
3/15/61
9/07/61
2/15/62
9/05/62
2/20/63
9/04/63
1/08/64
?/08/64

Type of
Operation-*Junior (Limited)
Senior
Junior (Limited)
Senior
Junior-Senior
Pre-refunding
(Limited)
Pre-refunding
Junior
Pre-refunding
Junior
Pre-refunding
Junior (Limited)
Pre-refunding
Junior
Pre-refunding
Pre-refunding
Pre-refunding

Type of
Securities
Offered
Note, Bond
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Note, Bond

Volume
Outstanding
(billions)
$
11.177
12.473
19.436
7.616
18.739
26,619

Volume Issued
in Exchange
(billions)
$
4.215
3.979
6.044
3.758
5.198
7.860

Per Cent
Exchange
y?M
31.Z6
31.1$
49.4$
27.8$
29.6$

Even Keel
Directive
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

29,045

8.007

30.3$

Yes

Bonds

32.139

6,740

2X,Q$

Yes

Bonds

24.723

2,971

12.3$

Yes

Bonds

41.746

9.2?4

22,2$

Yes

Note, Bonds

Yes
9.74?
Bonds
33.077
29.3?&
9.806
Yes
Notes
34.3#
28.758
Yes
68,4$
Certificate,
10.138
14.893
Note
Yes
22.142
Pre-refunding
Notes
11.758
4/26/67
53.¥
No
Note
Pre-refunding
1/31/68
5.145
21.2$
24.331
lln a limited offer, the Treasury reserves the right to set a specified limit on the volume of subscriptions it Hill accept in exchange on a given outstanding issue.
12/30/64
1/26/66
7/27/66

SOURCE:

U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968.
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pre-refunding.

Perusal of the table shows that the Federal Reserve

System makes little distinction between the various types of opera
tions or securities offered or the size of the operations as measured
by the volume of securities outstanding.
The System has usually "even keeled" these Treasury financing
operations whether consisting of senior, junior, or pre-refunding
components, or a combination of them.

The central bank has also pur

sued an "even keel" whether the securities eligible for exchange were
certificates of indebtedness, notes, or bonds, or some combination of
the above.

The Trading Desk has not made any distinction with respect

to the amount of eligible securities.

The System has "even keeled"

operations as large as 41.746 billion dollars and as small as 7.6l6
billion dollars, whereas the System did not "even keel" an offer in
volving an amount eligible for exchange as large as 24,331 billion
dollars.

In addition, the presence or absence of an "even keel"

directive does not seem to influence the exchange ratio.^

Those

operations which were not accompanied by an "even keel" had exchange

The percentage of outstanding securities that are exchanged
for new securities can, with extensive qualification, be used to
measure the success of the financing. Those outstanding issues not
exchanged will at maturity have to be redeemed by the Treasury, How
ever, the Treasury is not forced to make an immediate payment as the
maturity date occurs some time after the advance refunding operation
is concluded. Thus the Treasury is not immediately forced to raise
cash as it would be In a regular refunding operation. Thus the
exchange ratio is not the reverse of the percent of attrition in a
regular refunding. In addition, the terms set by the Treasury in an
advance refunding are not necessarily aimed at achieving a 100 percent
exchange ratio. Treasury officials might clearly be aiming at dif
ferent exchange ratios in different advance refunding operations. This
implies that In two different operations, officials might equally well
be pleased with different exchange ratios.
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ratios of 3?. 8 percent, 31.1 percent, and 21.2 percent, well within
the average range of 35.3 percent for the "even keeled" advance re
fundings.
In conclusion, it can be expected that the Trading Desk will
pursue an "even keel" strategy during Treasury advance refundings.
The sole determinant of the "even keel" directive seems to be the
technique of financing, i.e., advance refunding.

The System clearly

deems as appropriate an "even keel" strategy during an advance refund
ing.
B,

Regular Refundings

A regular refunding operation or exchange offer is a financing
technique where the holders of outstanding issues are offered the
option of exchanging these securities at maturity for a like face
amount of a new issue.

7

In a regular refunding, as in an advance re

funding, no cash is involved, with payment for the new securities
being made in a like face amount of the maturing issue.

During the

1960-1968 period the exchange financing was the most common technique
utilized by the Treasury to refund maturing coupon issues.

A total of

20 such operations were undertaken by the Treasury.
A summary of the regular refundings appears in Table 3.

It

can be seen that the Federal Reserve System has usually "even keeled"

7

In addition to exchange offers, the Treasury has conducted
optional exchange offers. In an optional exchange operation, holders
of the maturing issue are given an exchange option between more than
one new security. While this financing technique reduces cash-ins of
maturing issues, it is subject to the disadvantage of partially trans
ferring control over the maturity structure of the debt to the public.

TABLE 3
REGULAR REFUNDINGS - EXCHANGE OR OPTIONAL EXCHANGE OFFERS
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Volume
Volume Issued
Percentage
Date of
Type of
in Exchange
Outstanding
Even Keel
Rate of
Securities
Public
(billions)
Attrition
(billions)
Offered
Directive
Announcement
4.00$
Yes
1/28/60
$
II.561
Certificate, Note
$
11.099
5.786
No
4/28/60
Certificate, Note
.98$
6.413
No
10.844
10/27/60
Note, Bond
4.90$
10.313
.144
No
80.00$
11/18/60
Bond
.750
11.804
Yes
7/13/61
Notes, Bond
6.34$
12.536
6,542
Yes
11/02/61
Note, Bonds
5.93$
6.963
.316
6?.40$
No
11/17/61
Bond
.970
Yes
Certificate, Note
2/01/62
11.312
3.58/*
11.731
11.003
Yes
4/26/62
Certificate, Note, Bond
11.683
5.83/
10.494
4.46$
Certificate, Note, Bond
10.980
Yes
10/25/62
No
.0?4
83,8(3$
11/15/62
Bonds
.458
2,48$
Yes
Certificate, Bond
9.465
9.230
1/30/63
Yes
8, v66
Certificate, Note
5=58$
4/24/63
9.495
No
6.600
Note
7/24/63
6.399
3.0*i$
Yes
Notes
8.013
4,3Wo
8.373
1/30/64
Yes
4/29/64
Note, Bond
10.614
10.085
4,99$
Yes
Note,
Bond
8.436
7.976
5.63$
4/28/65
Yes
7.268
3.21$
Note, Bond
7/28/65
7.035
Yes
4/27/66
Note
12,70$
8.135
9.317
16.30$
Yes
5/01/68
Note
8.047
6.749
.
“Attrition is the accepted measure of the market*s reception of an exchange offer. The percentage rate
is a ratio of the volume of the market securities which were not exchanged for the new issue over the
total volume of mature securities which were eligible for exchange,
_
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these operations.

In 1^ of 20 cases, the Treasury refunding operation

was accompanied by an "even keel" directive.

Of the 6 operations not

"even keeled," 3 consisted of extremely small exchanges involving the
conversion of F and G series savings bonds, the volume of outstanding
securities eligible for exchange being respectively, .750, .970, and
.^•58 billion dollars.

Thus, eliminating these 3 small operations,

the System "even keeled" 1^ of 17 refundings.
There is some evidence that the volume of a given operation
had some influence upon the central bank's decision to maintain an
"even keel" stance.

Specifically, in those operations involving an

offer consisting of Treasury certificates of indebtedness and either
notes or bonds, 6 of 7 operations coincided with an "even keel" direc
tive.

The average volume of those operations that were "even keeled"

was 10.819 billion dollars compared to 6,^13 billion dollars for the
other.

Closer scrutiny of these 7 financings reveals a consistently

critical volume of 9.000 billion dollars above which called forth an
"even keel" and below which did not.

In addition, the average rates

of attrition, the generally accepted measure of success in an exchange
financing, were *4-.32 percent for the 6 "even keeled" operations and
.98 percent for the financings which were not "even keeled."
In those operations which involved only notes and bonds, there
were a total of 13 financings.

Of these, 8 were "even keeled."

However, upon elimination of the 3 small bond offers in I960, 1961,
and 1962 involving exchanges for F and G series savings bonds, it was
found that 8 of 10 operations can be designated as having called forth
an "even keel" directive.

No critical volume was discerned, as for
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example, one offer of 6.963 billion dollars was "even keeled" and
another of 10.844 billion dollars was not.

The average rate of attri

tion on the "even keel" group was 7.4-5 percent; whereas, on the other
group which consisted of two offers, it was 3.97 percent.
The conclusions reached with respect to the relationship be
tween "even keel" policy and the 17 regular refundings (excluding the
3 offers involving the F and G series savings bonds) during the 1960-

1968 period were as follows.

For those operations involving certifi

cates of indebtedness, a critical volume of 9.000 billion dollars was
identified, but no critical volume was found for operations involving
just notes and bonds.

For both groups, contrary to expectation, the

rate of attrition was noticeably higher when the Federal Reserve
maintained an "even keel" posture.

In addition, the rate of attrition

was found to be substantially higher after 1966, a result partially
explained by the rising level of interest rates during this subperiod.
Finally, there seems to be no distinction between the probability of
an "even keel" directive occurring and the particular type of security
(certificate, note, or bond) involved in the financing.
It would probably be expected that the System would be more
apt to pursue an "even keel" strategy the longer the maturity of the
new issue.

It also might be expected that the attrition ratio would

be lower when an "even keel" accompanied a refunding operation.

The

fact that neither of these phenomena were observed might be explained
by the actual marketing process utilized in regular refunding opera
tions.

During the discussions that take place between Treasury

authorities, System officials, and other participants in the government
securities market prior to the public announcement of the terms of the

financing, the Federal Reserve authorities come to a judgment as to
the degree of receptivity that the tentative financing will receive
in the money market.

Should the market be judged to be in a recep

tive mood, Treasury officials might tend to sell longer-term issues.
At the same time, Federal Reserve officials might be less apt to pur
sue an "even keel" because money market conditions were such that the
financing would not be expected to encounter poor acceptance by in
vestors.

Thus, the lower rate of attrition observed during "non

even keel" periods would reflect the System’s expertise in gauging
the money market.

It must be emphasized, however, that even if the

purpose of the "even keel" strategy is to support or facilitate
Treasury operations and the rate of attrition is higher during "even
keel" periods, it cannot be concluded that the "even keel" policy has
been a failure.

In order to reach this conclusion, it would have to

be assumed that the rate of attrition on a particular financing would
have been lower had the System maintained an "even keel."

There ap

pears to be no quantitative method available to test such a hypothesis.
In conclusion, it seems apparent that the majority of all
advance and regular refundings have called forth "even keel" direc
tives during the 1960-1968 period.

There is further evidence that the

larger the volume of a regular refunding, the more likely is the
System to pursue an "even keel" strategy.

There is no evidence that

either an advance or regular refunding operation will be received
more readily by money market participants when the central bank main
tains an "even keel" policy.

Finally, no relationship can be found

between "even keel" policy and the type of security offered to the
public in either an advance refunding or exchange offer.

It now seems
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appropriate to examine the relationship between central bank policy
and Treasury financing operations which involve payment in cash.

C . Cash Refundings

The Treasury has consistently utilized the cash refunding or
cash and exchange financing technique throughout the I96O-I968 inter
val for the purpose of refunding maturing debt or raising new cash.
In a cash and exchange financing, payment for the accepted tenders
must be completed on a specified date, in either cash or immediately
available funds or in a like face amount of securities maturing on
that date.

In analyzing the probability of an "even keel" during cash

refunding operations, two major classifications with respect to the
type of securities offered by the Treasury were distinguished.

These

two categories consisted of cash refundings involving bills and coupon
issues. ■■-.. **'W’” ”*

-

...... .... ...

The subcategory of cash and exchange offers of bills included
the old series of one-year Treasury bills issued on a cash and exchange
basis during the 1960-1968 period.

The new cycle of 9-month and one-

year Treasury bills jointly offered since September-October of 1966
are included in the same group.

Finally included in this bill cate

gory were tax anticipation bills (TAB).

The TAB'S mature in less than

one year, just prior to the quarterly tax dates providing cash to
investors for tax obligations.

Prior to April, 1966, at which time

the Treasury specified that all Treasury bills, including TAB's, were
subject to payment in cash, immediately available funds or in a like
face amount of mature Treasury bills, two TAB's were offered on a cash
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payment basis.

The offers have been included in the cash refunding

category for convenience.
System policy with respect to the pursuit of an "even keel"
strategy during a cash refunding involving bills is quite clear.

As

is evident from the summary of such operations in Table 4, the Federal
Reserve System has rarely issued an "even keel" directive, except in
those financings involving TAB’s.
The System has generally not "even keeled" those operations
entailing the regular bill roll-over financings of the Treasury.
None of the 24 financings involving the new cycle of 9-month and oneyear Treasury bill offers were "even keeled."

Similarly, only 5 of

the 39 operations involving the older series of one-year bills coin
cided with an "even keel” directive.

Each of these 5 operations has

been designated as being "even keeled" on one of two bases.

Either

specific mention was made of the bill operation in the F.O.M.C. cur
rent economic policy directive or the summary of the discussion lead
ing to it or the financing period of the bill offer closely coincided
with another financing operation which was specifically designated as
being responsible for an "even keel" directive.

It seems safe to

conclude that the central bank seldom maintains an "even keel"

for

Treasury bill cash refundings.
Table 4 reveals that the System is more likely to "even keel"
TAB offers, especially as the volume of the financing increases.
During the 1960-1968 period, the Treasury carried out 31 cash refund
ings involving TAB's,
the central bank.

Of these, 17 out of 31 were "even keeled" by

Apparently, a critical volume was quite consistently

employed by the System in determining "erven keel” policy.

If the
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TABLE k
- SUMMARY CASH REFUNDINGS - CASH AND EXCHANGE OFFERS
INVOLVING TREASURY BILLS
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Type of Security
Offered

Number of
Offers

'Average Volume of
Offer (billions)

Average
Acceptance Ratio-

Denoted as Even Keeled
One-year Treasury
Bill - old series
Nine-month Treasury
Bill - new series
One-year Treasury
Bill - new series
Tax Anticipation^
Bills

5

$

1.500

2.09

1.880

2.3k

0
0
17

Denoted as, Not Even Keeled

1.500

2.15

2k

0
0
V\
•

One-year Treasury
Bill - old series
Nine-month Treasury
Bill - new series
One-year Treasury
Bill - new series
Tax Anticipation
Bills

2.47

2k

.960

1.99

3^

Ik

$

1.78

1.9^

^The acceptance ratio is a erode measure of market reception of an
offer. It was computed as the ratio of the volume of tenders received
over the volume of tenders accepted.
The figures exclude two offers where the volume of tenders received
were not available in computation of the average acceptance ratio.
The average volume of offer was computed by combining as one, offers
of multiple issues,
SOURCEj

U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 August 1968.
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offer was equal to or larger than 2.500 billion dollars, the System
pursued an "even keel" strategyt whereas, if the volume of the TAB
offer was less than 2.500 billion dollars, then no "even keel" oc
curred.

In both the new and old Treasury bill series, as well as

the TAB offer, there was little difference in the acceptance ratios
with respect to the presence or absence of an "even keel" directive.
A number of cash refundings were undertaken which involved
coupon issues, including offers of certificates of indebtedness,
notes, and bonds, or various combinations of the above.

Table 5 re

veals that the Federal Reserve System has in 10 of 13 such cash re
fundings pursued an "even keel" policy.

Those financings that were

"even keeled" ranged in size from 3.000 billion dollars to 12,200
billion dollars in volume, with the majority of operations ranging
within the 7.000 billion dollars to 10,000 billion dollars range.
The 3 offers which were not designated as "even keels" were 7.750,
6.900, and 2.170 billion dollars in volume.

Thus, little credibility

can be placed on selecting some critical volume as a determinant of
"even keel" directives.

Neither can any relationship be conclusively

established with respect to an "even keel" directive influencing the
money market's reception of a given cash refunding.
The only tenable conclusions advanced are that the System has
usually maintained an "even keel" posture during cash refunding opera
tions which involved certificates of indebtedness, notes, or bonds.
The System has not considered the "even keel" policy as appropriate
during regular roll-over operations which involved 9-month and oneyear Treasury bills.

Finally, the central bank has frequently "even

keeled" financings involving TAB's, especially when the volume of the

TABLE 5
- SUMMARY CASH REFUNDINGS - CASH AND EXCHANGE OFFERS
INVOLVING COUPON ISSUES
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968 .
Date of
Public
Announcement
7/2&/60

Type of
Volume
Volume of Total Volume of Accepted
Outstanding
Securities
Subscriptions
Subscriptions
Acceptance
Even Keel
Offered
(billions)
(billions)
(billions)
Ratio1
Directive
Certificate
2.22
Yes
$
7.750
$
7.S29
$ 17.389
Note
1,000
1.070
4,84
5.183
7.324
2/02/61
Note
6.900
19.000
No
2.59
Certificate
4/27/61
No
5.250
5.510
26.7002
Note
2.500
2.750
7/26/62
Certificate
6.500
6.852
2.94
20.155
Bond
1.500
3.86
Yes
6.743
1.743
Bond
1.00
.750
.315
.315
Note
7.600
10/23/63
20.690
Yes
2.59
7.977
7/29/64
Note
4.000
14.850
4.040
Yes
3.67
10/28/64
Note
21.900
9.250
Yes
2,38
9.519
2»254
Note
2.170
10.636
4.72
1/27/65
No
Note
9.700
1.24
9.748
10/27/65
Yes
12.067
10/27/66
Note
5.860
2.500
2,21
2.635
Yes
Note
.600
8,10
1.734
14.029
Note
5.500
5.586
1/25/67
19.915
3.57
Yes
Note
11.00
2.000
2,006
22.135
Note
7/26/67
9.600
15.660
Yes
1.58
9.913
Note
10.700
1.46
10/25/67
10.738
Yes
15.645
Note
3.000
3.366
3.02
10.285
Note
5.100
5.474
4.30
23.569
■^The acceptance ratio was computed as the ratio of the volume of subscriptions tendered over the volume of
subscriptions accepted, 2A separate breakdown of the volume of subscriptions received was not available
in this operation.
SOURCE* U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968.
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offering exceeded the critical value of 2,500 billion dollars.

Thus,

an "even keel" strategy can be expected in a cash refunding involving
either coupon issues or a large TAB offer,

D,

Cash Offers

The final type of Treasury financing technique to be examined
is the cash offer.

A cash financing involves the offer of a new

security with payment for that security to be made on a specified
date in either cash or immediately available funds.

This technique,

other factors equal, is usually considered to be the most disruptive
to the government securities market, that is, the Immediate market
impact entails the greatest degree of market churning as investors
are required to raise new cash in the market.

Although the cash

financing technique eliminates the problem of attrition inherent in
a regular refunding operation, there is the possibility that some in
vestors who might have been induced to roll-over their holdings in an
exchange refunding may leave the market because of the difficulty of
raising cash for payment.

During the 1960-1968 period, a wide range

of securities has been sold by this method to raise new cash.
Before analysing the cash financings of the Treasury in detail,
it might be expected that the Federal Reserve System would be more
likely to pursue an "even keel" policy during a cash financing as op
posed to the alternative financing techniques previously discussed.
In addition, it would also be expected that the larger the volume of
a cash offer, as well as the longer the maturity of the securities
offered, the greater would be the probability of an "even keel"
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directive.

The findings encountered In the following analysis gen

erally agree with these predictions.
The Treasury has employed the cash financing technique in a
number of operations involving Treasury bills.

There were 12 opera

tions involving cash offers of one-year Treasury bills.

None of

these operations, all of which consisted of a 1.000 billion dollar
magnitude, were "even keeled."
ing bill strip offers.

There were also 6 operations involv

Of these, only 1 operation, involving a large
g

offer of 1.800 billion dollars, was accompanied by an "even keel."
The average size of the bill strip offers was large when accompanied
by an "even keel" directive (1,800 billion dollars vs, 1,000 billion
dollars).

However, because of the small sample size, it is difficult

to say that the volume of the offer was a major determinant of central
bank policy.
During the 1960-1968 period, 11 cash operations involving
coupon issues were undertaken by the Treasury,

As is revealed in

Table 6, 8 of the 11 operations were accompanied by an "even keel"

Q
Great difficulty was encountered with respect to determining
whether two "even keel" directives were the result of two bill strip
offers. The "even keel" directive issued on June 6, 1961, by the
F.O.M.C. was identified as being directly attributed to the 1,800
billion dollar strip offer of that month. Specific mention was made
of this bill strip offer in the summary of the discussion leading to
the directive and no other Treasury activity was noted in the securi
ties market at this time. Thus, it was concluded that the System pur
sued an "even keel" for this particular bill strip offer.
The "even keel" directive of October 24, 1961, was judged not
to be related to the .800 billion dollar bill strip offer of November.
Although the summary of the discussion made no mention of the bill
strip offer, it did refer to a 6.963 billion dollar exchange offer.
The financing period of these two offers coincided closely. However,
it is the opinion of the author that the "even keel" directive was at
tributable solely to the exchange offer rather than the bill strip
offer.

TABLE 6
- SUMMARY GASH OFFERS OF COUPON ISSUES
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Date of
Public
Announcement
3/31/60

9/07/61
1/03/62
4/05/62
12/20/62
3/20/63
6/06/63
3/26/64
1/05/66
8/17/67
2/08/68

Type of
Securities
Offered
Bond
Bond
Note
Bond
Bond
Bond (Syndicate)
Bond (Syndicate)
Bond
Note
Certificate
Note
Note

Volume
Outstanding
(billions)
$

.500
2.000
2.000

1.250
1.000

.250
.300
1.250
1.000

1.500
2.500
4.000

Volume of Total
Subscriptions
(billions)
$

.470
2.211
5.684
1.718
6.827
.250

.300
16.300
10.227
10.133
6.004
9.874

Volume
Allotted
(billions)
$

.470
2.211

2.276
1.114
1.258

.250
.300
1.900
1,066
1.652
2.509
4.2?8

Acceptance
Ratio1

Even Keel
Directive

1.00
3.00
2.49
1.5**
5.44
1.00
1.00
8.58
10,20
6,12
2.40
2.30

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

^The acceptance ratio was computed as a ratio of the volume of total subscription over the volume of
subscriptions allotted.
SOURCE:

U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968.
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directive.

The variance between the size of the offerings reveals no

consistent relationship between volume and the probability of an
"even keel."

As evidenced by the acceptance ratio, "even keel"

policy seems to have little noticeable impact on the market's recep
tivity of a cash offer.
In review, it can be concluded that the probability of an
"even keel" directive in a cash offer is determined primarily by the
type of security issued in the financing.

An "even keel" can con

sistently be expected to occur in a cash financing when the security
offered is either a certificate of indebtedness, note, or bond.

Con

versely, it is quite rare for a cash offer of a one-year Treasury bill
or bill strip offer to be accompanied by an "even keel."

The Frequency and Seasonal Patterns
of "Even Keel" Directives

The methodology employed in this analysis in identifying "even
keel" directives is relatively simple and has already been discussed
in detail in Appendix A in the preceding chapter.

To review briefly,

the primary source consulted by the author was the Record of Policy
Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual Report of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,

Specifically,

scrutiny of either Clause b of the policy directive or the second
paragraph of the current economic policy directive, in conjunction
with the summary of the discussion leading to the directives, usually
proved sufficient to identify an "even keel" directive.
"even keel" directive reads

A typical
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To Implement this policy, and in view of the forth
coming Treasury financing, System open market opera
tions during the next 2 weeks shall be conducted with
a view to maintaining about the same degree of firm
ness in the money market that has prevailed in recent
weeks and to offsetting downward pressures on short-term
interest rates, while providing for continued moderate
reserve expansion,°
During the 1960-1968 period, 66 of 151 F.O.M.C. directives
were designated by the author as calling for an "even keel" policy.
This constitutes approximately *4-5.7 percent of all such directives.^
Thus, it should be recognized immediately that almost half of the
directives given to the Account Manager are couched in terms of main
taining an "even keel."

During the 1960-1968 period, an evaluation

of both the monthly and yearly patterns of "even keel" directives
yields some informative results.
Perusal of Table 7 shows that the frequent "even keel" years
fall within the interval encompassing 1962-1967, inclusively.

During

this six-year period, 52 of 103 or 50.5 percent of all F.O.M.C, direc
tives entailed an "even keel."

In each year during this time span in

excess of *4-0.0 percent of the direbtives were "even keel" directives,
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Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Fiftieth Annual
Report, 1963 (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 19<>3)» P. 63,
^This figure is closely comparable to the findings of other
authors. For example, Bosher finds *»8 percent of the F.O.M.C. direc
tives during the 1962-1968 period called for "even keels." During
the same period, Yohe and Gasper identified *4-2 of 86 directives or
*4-8,8 percent as "even keels." This author’s analysis designated *4-3
of 89 directives as being "even keels." See, William P. Yohe and
Louis C. Gasper, "The 'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal Open Market
Committee," Financial Analysts Journal (November-December, 1970), p.
3 and fn. 13, p. 11,

TABLE 7
"EVEN KEEL" DIRECTIVES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL F.O.M.C. DIRECTIVES,
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
I960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

January

1/2

0/2

2/2

2/2

2/2

1/1

1/1

1/1

February

0/1

0/1

1/1

0/1

0/1

1/1

March

1/2

0/2

0/2

1/1
2/2

1/2

0/2

April

0/1

0/1

1/1

1/1

1/1

May

0/2

0/1

0/2

0/2

June

0/1

1/2

0/2

July

2/2

1/1

August

0/1

September

Monthly

Total

0/1

10/14

71.4#

1/1

1/1

5/9

55.5#

0/2

0/1

0/2

4/17

23.5#

1/1

1/1

0/1

1/3

6/11

54.5#

1/2

1/2

1/1

1/2

o/l

4/15

26.6%

0/1

1/1

0/1

0/2

1/1

0/1

3/12

25.C#

1/2

0/2

2/2

1/1

1/1

1/1

10/13

76.9#

0/2

1/1

1/1

0/1

1/2

0/1

1/1

1/1
0/2

4/12

25.0#

1/1

1/1

1/1

l/l

0/2

1/2

0/1

0/1

5/10

50.c#

October

1/2

2/2

1/2

1/2

1/1

1/1

1/1

2/2

10/13

76.9#

November

0/2

0/1

0/1

0/2

1/2

1/2

1/2

0/2

3/13

23.1#

December

0/2

0/2

0/2

0/2

1/2

1/1

0/1

0/1

2/12

16.7#

Yearly

6/1?

5/18

8/19

9/19

11/19

9/17

7/15

8/15

3/12

66/151

43.7#

Total

35.3#

27.8#

42.15

47.3#

52.9#

46.5#

53.3#

25.0#

SOURCEj

57.9#

Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, I96O-I968.
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with 1964 exhibiting 11 of 19 identified as such.

Conversely, the

infrequent "even keel" years were 1961, with 27.8 percent, and 1968,
with 25.0 percent.

This pattern is largely attributable to the in-

act iveness of the Treasury in floating long-term securieties during
these years.

Economic conditions, especially the tightening of mone

tary policy, and rising short-term interest rates probably accounted
for the lack of Treasury activity in the first half of 1968, and thus
little necessity for the System to pursue an "even keel" strategy.
A symmetrical pattern emerges with respect to the monthly
distribution of "even keel" directives.

The frequent "even keel"

months include January, 7 1 . percent} April, 5^.5 percent} July,
76,9 percent} and October, 76.9 percent, those months being character
ized as normally representing the low points in Treasury operating
balances.

On the other hand, the infrequent "even keel" months in

clude March, 23.5 percent; June, 25.0 percent; August, 25.0 percent;
November, 23.1 percent; and December, 16.7 percent.

This pattern is

explained largely by the fact that March, June, and December, along
with September, are the quarterly tax receipt months, and thus account
for high Treasury operating balances.
Of much greater difficulty and analytical significance is the
methodology and the results obtained from the technique employed in
dating "even keel" periods as compared to identifying "even keel"
directives.

The basic "even keel" unit or period employed in this

study was the interval beginning three days prior to the Treasury's
announcement of the specific terms of the relevant financing operation
and ending three days after the payment or settlement date.

This basic

"even keel" unit was varied from time to time in accord with a number
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of alternative factors.

The primary sources consulted were the

Record of Policy Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in the
Annual Report and the Treasury Financing Operations in the Treasury
Bulletin. The first was employed primarily to identify an "even keel"
strategy and the second, to determine the dates of the Treasury
financing period.
The basic "even keel" period was altered due to a number of
variables, including the type and size of the Treasury operations,
shifts in the stance of monetary policy, and the dates of the F.O.M.C.
meetings.

Both the method of financing, as well as the volume of a

given Treasury operation, have an effect on the length of an "even
keel" period.

First of all, the financing technique directly in

fluences the length of the Treasury financing period.

Rights financ

ings terminate on the settlement date, whereas cash financings end
on the payment date.

As a general rule, the "even keel" period was

extended three days beyond either the settlement or payment date.
However, when either advance refundings or exchange offers were large
(in excess of 18 or 20 billion dollars) or when a particular financing
operation was specifically mentioned as receiving a poor market recep
tion, then the "even keel" period was often extended to a point five
days beyond the settlement date.

In both cash refundings and cash

offers, little difference in volume was encountered and thus the basic
"even keel" unit was not altered.
The actual dates of F.O.M.C. meetings influenced the dating
of "even keel" periods in two ways.

First, in the case of consecu

tive "even keel" directives, the "even keel" period had to be adjusted
to avoid the problem of overlapping.

For example, assume the F.O.M.C.
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Issued an "even keel" directive at successive meetings held on October
1 and October 23, with the summary of the discussion leading to the
directives referring to two Treasury exchange financings whose respec
tive announcements and settlement dates were October
and October 20 to November 15.

to October 24

In this case, the two "even keel"

periods would be designated as October 1 to October 22 and October
23 to November 18.

It was necessary to use the dates of the F.O.M.C.

meetings as the cut-off dates of the "even keel" period in order to
eliminate any overlapping which would have exaggerated the true number
of "even keel" days.

Secondly, assume an "even keel" directive was

issued on July 1 to assist in an advance refunding which was announced
to the public on June 30, with the settlement date specified as July
25.

Normally, the "erven keel" period would be identified as stretch

ing from June 27 to July 28.

However, if an F.O.M.C. meeting was held

on July 23 and at that meeting the instructions called for a change in
the stance of monetary policy, while either no mention was made of the
advance refunding or it was noted that the financing was being wellreceived by the public, then the "even keel" period would be dated as
June 27 to July 23.

Thus, both the dates of the F.O.M.C. meeting, as

well as shifts in policy, called for some adjustments to be made in
the basic "even keel” unit.
It should be noted, however., that the dates of the meetings
did not take precedence over the actual Treasury financing periods in
determining the length of an "even keel" period.

If an F.O.M.C.

meeting on April 12 called for the maintenance of an "even keel"
strategy with reference to a cash offer announced on April 8 with pay
ment to be consummated on April 26, then the "even keel" period would

Ill

run from April 5 to April 29.

The Treasury financing period was con

sidered the primary determinant of the length of an "even keel"
period, as the Account Manager has a significant amount of discretion
ary power to act in accord with the dictates of day-to-day money mar
ket conditions in between the specific instructions issued to him by
the F.O.M.C.
In conclusion, then, it Is the Treasury financing period as
enumerated in the Treasury Bulletin which usually determines the dates
of an "even keel" period.

Using the basic 3-day "even keel" unit,

adjusted when necessary as described, above, it was found that the
average "even keel" period extended ov8r a time span of approximately
22 days, with the longest one covering 31 days and the shortest, 8
days.

Most "even keel" directives are in force for the 3-week inter

lude between F.O.M.C. meetings, an interval which, as a rule, coin
cides closely with Treasury financing periods.
The frequency and seasonal distribution of "even keel"
business days is depicted in Table 8.
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The table clearly shows how

frequently the System pursues an "even keel" policy.

During the 1960-

1968 period, 999 of 2262 or *)4.2 percent of all business days were
identified as "even keel" days.

The general pattern which emerges

with respect to both the yearly and monthly distributions is similar
to the results depicted in Table 7, but some subtle differences should
be noted.

■^^Business days are defined as days the Federal Reserve Banks
are open. This includes all Mondays through Fridays, with the excep
tion of Christmas. There are between 260 and 262 business days in
each year and between 20 and 23 in each month.

TABLE 8
"EVEN KEEL" BUSINESS DATS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUSINESS DAYS,
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968

I960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Monthly

Total

January

13/211

0.22

17/23

20/23

19/23

19/21

21/21

9/22

3/23

121/199

■ 60.856

February

8 /21

0 .20

20/20

20/20

13/20

0/20

11/20

10/20

11/21

93/182

- 51.336

March

6/23

0/23

4/22

21/21

6/22

0/23

0/23

0/23

0/21

37/201

- 18.^6

April

14/21

0/20

16/21

22/22

22/22

9/22

4/21

4/20

2/22

93/191

- 48.756

May

0/22

0/23

6/23

11/23

14/21

17/21

13/22

12/23

14/23

87/201

- 43.7$

June

1/22

10/22

0/21

0/20

10/22

0/22

0/22

4/22

0/20

25/193

- 12.956

July

18/21

16/21

5/22

0/23

23/23

8/22

4/21

19/21

1/23

94/197

= 4?.?£

August

12/23

1/23

23/23

9/22

14/21

13/22

14/23

23/23

14/22

123/202

- 60.956

September

15/22

17/21

20/20

21/21

0/22

7/22

0/22

4/21

84/l?l

- 49,136

October

17/21

19/22

11/23

10/23

9/22

21/21

18/21

22/22

127/175

“ 72.5#

November

0/22

11/23

5/22

14/21

17/21

18/22

12/22

15/22

92/175

- 52.52

December

0/22

0/21

1/21

0/22

13/23

9/23

0/22

0/21

23/175

= 13.136

Yearly

104/261

Total

39.8$

74/261 128/261 148/261 160/262 121/261
31.258

49.1$

5 6 ,6$

61.]^

46.38

97/260 122/260
37.3$

46.8$

45/175

999/2262 - 44.2$

25.1%

-^-Includes December, 1959, "Even Keel" encompassing January 1-12.
SOURCE*
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Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1960-1968; and U.S., Treasury Department, Monthly
Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968 .
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First of all, the frequent "even keel" years Include the in
terval from 1962 to 1965 and 1967* inclusively.

In each of these

years, "even keels" were in force during more than 4-5.0 percent of
the total number of business days.

Again, 1964-, with 160 of 262 days

or 6l.l percent of all business days being identified as "even keels,"
is the year exhibiting the most frequent use of this strategy.

The

infrequent "even keel" years are, again, 1961, with 3 1 .2 percent, and

1968 , with 25.7 percent.

This yearly pattern is largely attributable

to the variable degree of market activity by the Treasury.

During

the frequent "even keel" years, the Treasury undertook a greater
number of financing operations; whereas, in the infrequent "even
keel" years, especially in 1968, the debt management operations of
the Treasury were curtailed.

Rising Interest rates and more restric

tive monetary policy, coupled with the interest rate ceiling on bonds,
made it difficult for the Treasury to meet the "test of the market."
Although the yearly patterns of "even keel" directives and
"even keel" business days are similar, the monthly distribution is
slightly different.

The monthly pattern that emerges can be explained

in terms of both the volume of Treasury operating balances and major
Treasury refunding operations.

Table 9 summarizes these two factors,

both of which seem to explain the majority of the author's observa
tions.

As before, January, 60.8 percent; April, 4-8.7 percent; July,

4-7.7 percentj and October, 72.5 percent, are designated as frequent
"even keel" months.

These particular months coincide closely with

low points in Treasury operating balances.

In addition, February,

51.1 percent; May, 4-3.7 percent; August, 60,9 percent; and November,
52.5 percent, must also be categorized as frequent "even keel" months.

TABLE 9
MAJOR TREASURY REFUNDINGS1 AND LOW POINTS IN
ADJUSTED TREASURY OPERATING BALANCES82
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
I960

1961

1962

January

L

L

L

February

R

R

R

R

A

A

A

March
April

L

L

L

May

R

R

R

June

A

July
August

1963

R

September

1965

1966

AL

AL

L

R

R

R

R

R

R

R

R

196?

L

A

RL

R

R

R

A

A

A

L

R

R

RL

RL

October

AL

L

L

L

L

L

L

L

November

R

R

R

R

R

RL

RL

RL

December

1968

R
L

R

196^

RL

L

■^-Maturing coupon issues in excess of 3 "billion dollars (R) and advance refundings (A).

2

End-of-month operating balances minus net cash borrowing that totals to less than 3.9 billion dollars (L).
Yohe and Gasper, "The ’Even Keel' Decisions," p. 5» Table 4; Beard, U.S. Treasury Advance Re
fundings, p. 2, Table 1.
+7TT

SOURCES*
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This can be explained primarily by the maturing coupon issues falling
within these months.

Finally, September with 72.5 percent is explain

ed by both the overlapping of August refunding operations, as well
as the September advance refundings during I96I-I963. The infrequent
"even keel" months are March, 18.4 percent? June, 12.9 percent? and
December, 13.1 percent, these being, along with September, the
quarterly tax payment dates.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with one major facet of "even keel"'
policy, the intimate relationship between this System strategy and
the financing operations of the Treasury.

This subject has been

analyzed in two partsi the first dealing with the relationship between
"even keel" policy and the type of Treasury financing, and the second,
with the frequency and seasonal pattern of "even keel" directives.
Some important conclusions must be reviewed.
During advance and regular refunding operations, the System
has generally maintained an "even keel" in the money market regard
less of the type of securities involved in the financing or the volume
of the operation as measured lay the amount of securities eligible for
exchange.

There was some evidence that the volume of regular refund

ings, involving certificates of indebtedness, had some influence on
whether the central bank issued an "even keel" directive.

During

Treasury financings involving both cash refundings and cash offers,
the System normally "even keeled" those operations involving coupon
issues regardless of the volume of the financing.

Although regular

bill roll-overs were seldom accompanied by an "even keel" directive,

cash refundings of TAB's were "even keeled" when the volume of the
operation exceeded 2.500 billion dollars.

Thus, the "even keel"

policy can be most commonly expected to be implemented during most
advance and regular refunding operations and during cash refundings
and cash offers involving coupon issues.
The frequency and seasonal pattern of "even keel" directives
can most readily be explained by Treasury operating balances.

The

frequent "even keel" months usually concur with low points in
Treasury operating balances, while infrequent "even keel" months
coincide with quarterly tax dates.

The yearly pattern can usually

be explained by the activity of the Treasury and conditions in the
money market.

CHAPTER V

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF "EVEN KEEL" POLICYj
JANUARY 6, I960 - AUGUST 28, 1968

The purpose of this section of the study is to empirically
test the alternative definitions of "even keel" policy which have
appeared in the literature.

First, an explanation of the statistical

testing procedures employed in the analysis is presented.

After

this, three alternative definitions of "even keel" policy are reviewed
and empirically tested..

Finally, the chapter concludes with a synthe

sis of the results, leading to a more precise definition of "even
keel" policy.
Statistical Procedure

The primary statistical test utilized in the evaluation of
the various definitions of the "even keel" strategy was an analysis
of variance for one-way design.

The program employed (BMD 0 IV) com

putes an analysis of variance table for one variable of classification,
with unequal group sample sizes.'*' A brief description of the analysis
^Health Sciences Computing Facility, School of Medicine,
U.C.L.A., Biomedical Computer Programs (Los Angeles, Calif.t U.C.L.A.,
1965 ), pp. U&6-k9b. For additional references on the analysis of
variance technique, consult Roger L, Burford, Statistlcsi A Computer
Approach (Columbus, Ohiot Charles N. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968 ),
pp. 257-265j Wilfrid J. Dixon and Frank J, Massey, Jr., Introduction
to Statistical Analysis (2nd ed. 1 New York* McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1957), pp. 1^5-152; and Taro Yamane, Statistics! An Introductory
Analysis (New Yorkt Harper and Row Publishers, 196?)» PP. 66 ^-667 .
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of variance test is necessary to understanding the results and con
clusions concerning the appropriate interpretation of the "even keel"
strategy.
The purpose of the one-way analysis of variance is to test
the null hypothesis about the equality of means of several universes.
The F-ratio tor H i

**

K

^ is computed as the ratio of the

between mean square to the within mean square.
F-ratio isi

S
f

.
v

The formula for the

_ 2

k

n (X - X) / k-1
0
—
:_________ - 12
S (X . - X ) /N-k

1=1 j=l

i3

i

where the equality t "/TF holds only when

the total sum of squares

is divided into two, and only two, parts.
This statistical procedure readily adapts itself to the evalu
ation of the various interpretations of "even keel" policy.
ining the behaviorpatterns displayed by a

By exam

number of money market

variables over the 1960-1968 period, it was possible to determine
more precisely what the "even keel" strategy entailed.

The purpose

of the one-way analysis of variance test was to determine whether
selected money market variables behaved differently during "even keel"
periods as opposed to other times when such "even keel" directives were
not in force.

By comparing the mean of a variable during "even keel"

weeks with the mean of that same variable during "non-even keel" weeks,
it was possible to quantitatively analyze the Federal Reserve's "even
keel" policy.
The selection of the appropriate money market indicators to be
examined was based upon the alternative definitions of "even keel"
policy tested, as well as theories concerning the implementation of
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short-run monetary policy.

The primary variables analyzed Included

repurchase agreements, net open market purchases, marginal reserve
measures, and short-term interest rates.
The analysis of variance program was run on both original
data and first difference data.

Analysis of the original data reveal

ed differences in the behavior patterns of the magnitude or level of
the variable.

First difference data was computed on the basis of the

formula

xt-i - xt “ IDXtI
where X = original value of the data and DX => the first difference
value of the variable.

Thus, the analysis of variance of first dif

ference data identified variations in the degree of fluctuations of
the variable during "even keel" and "non-even keel" weeks.

The data

input, original or first difference, was determined in accord with the
definition being tested.
Finally, the program was run on each money market variable
over a number of different time series.

It was felt that an analysis

of only the January 6, 1960-August 28, 1968, time period ignored the
possibility of various behavior patterns being displayed as a result
of differences in the stance of monetary policy.

The entire ^52-week

period was broken down into 6 subperiods as shown in Table 10, based
on the annual growth rate of the money supply.

The growth rate of the

money supply was used as a proxy variable for the stance of monetary
policy, i.e., whether it was neutral, expansive, or restrictive.

The

examination of the data within the subperiods allows us to deal with
possible differences in the implementation of "even keel" policy during
tight and easy money periods.
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TABLE 10
GROWTH OF THE MONEY SUPPLY1
COMPOUNDED ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE
(SEASONALLY ADJUSTED)

Periods of No
Marked and
Sustained Change
in Rates of Change

Number
Of
W eeks

Annual Rates
Of
Change

1/6 /6 0 - 5/2 5 /6 0

21

- 2.3#

6/1/60 - 12/2 7 /6 1

83

+ z M

1/3/6 2 - 8/29/62

35

+ 0. %

9/5/62 - 3/30/66

I87

+ d,5#

39

- 0 .3#

87

+ 7.3#

d/6/66 - 12/28/66
CO

\o^

CO

CO

1
0-4-

^

I
"The money supply is defined as private demand deposits plus currency
held by the public.
SOURCE:

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Money Supply and Time
Deposits, 191^-69," Review (March, 1970), p. 7.
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The Implementation of "Even Keel" Policy

In attempting to quantitatively define "even keel" policy, as
a prelude to the comparison of the alternative interpretations, it is
necessary to determine how the Federal Reserve System implements this
strategy.

The operating techniques available to the Trading Desk must

be scrutinized to see which of these techniques is used to implement
the "even keel" strategy.

Both the "support" and "neutrality" schools'

interpretations of "even keel" policy, analyzed later, are concerned
with the degree of reserve-supplying operations undertaken by the
Trading Desk during Treasury financing periods,

An examination of the

techniques employed by the System in supplying reserves is the first
step in the empirical analysis of "even keel" policy.
Two primary methods of imparting marginal ease in the money
market are available to the Trading Desk,

First, the System may

undertake outright purchases of government securities.

This method,

assuming all other reserve factors are unchanged, creates a permanent
addition to the reserve base of the banking system that can only be
extinguished by future open market sales of government securities.
The Trading Desk also has the option of supplying reserves on a tem
porary basis by entering into repurchase agreements with non-bank

2
government securities dealers," Both of these reserve-supplying tools
can be implemented at the initiative of the Trading Desk.

An examina

tion of the behavior of net open market purchases and repurchase

Ira 0. Scott, Jr., Government Securities Market (New Yorkj
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19o5}a pp0 105-106.
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agreements reveals the method by which the "even keel" strategy is
carried out.
The System has the option of making reserve injections
through outright purchases of government securities.

If the "even

keel" strategy is implemented through outright open market trans
actions, it would be expected that the level of net open market pur
chases (purchases minus sales) would be found to be substantially
higher during "even keel" weeks than during "non-even keel" weeks.
However, as Table 11 clearly shows, the System did not consistently
employ this technique to supply reserves during "even keel" periods.
The null hypothesis, that the mean levels of net open market purchases
were identical during both "even keel" and "non-even keel" periods,
cannot be rejected in light of the extremely low F-ratios computed
for all of the periods tested.

It can be concluded that the "even

keel" strategy does not entail reserve injections through the medium
of outright open market transactions.
The System probably avoided recourse to outright transactions
because of the possibility that market participants might interpret
open market purchases of government securities as indicative of a shift
in monetary policy.

As will be seen later, the System shies away from

overt policy actions indicative of a shift in monetary policy during
"even keel" periods.

The behavior of net open market purchases may

well have been influenced by a. number of other factors considered more
important than Treasury operations, thus explaining the fact that net
open market purchases were not significantly higher during "even keel"
weeks.

There is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that

TABLE 11
VARIABLEi NET OPEN MARKET PURCHASES1
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT
Optional Listing
Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

1/6/608/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

1/6/605/25/60
(-2 .3*)

Mean

Analysis of Variance
Standard
Deviation

Degrees
of
Freedom

F-Ratio

1,450

0 .3 0 0 4

1,19

0.0894

264.0940
201,7775

1,81

0.9791

63.1875
8.9474

283„1958
249.0929

i,33

0.3608

EK-97
NEK-90

37.5258
74.7333

292.2034
290,2063

1,185

0.7619

4/6/6612/28/66
(-0.3*)

EK-11
NEK-28

34.9091
73.8214

291.5542
361.2944

1,37

0,1011

1/4/67
8/28/68
(+7.3*)

EK-37
NEK-50

89.0000
129.9400

272,6890
263.3586

1,85

0.4986

$ 49.646?
63.9216

$ 2??„5168

EK-9
NEK-12

-6 5 .IHI
-40.2500

124.7511

6/l/6012/27/61
(+2. 4*)

EK-27
NEK-56

75.4815
23.6250

1/3/628/29/62
(+0 .3*)

EK-16
NEK-19

9/5/623/30/66
(+4.5*)

272.3135
223.8324

^ h e data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars
for the week ending on Wednesday.
SOURCE:

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19685 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10,

124
the "even keel" strategy entails reserve injections through the
medium of outright open market transactions.
The behavior of Federal Reserve repurchase agreements was a
key variable to be examined in analyzing how the "even keel" strategy
is implemented.

The repurchase agreement is a contract between the

System and non-bank government securities dealers that involves a sale
of securities by dealers to the System, and a simultaneous promise by
the dealers to repurchase those same securities at a later date.

The

instrument is callable by both parties for a period of up to 15 days,
the maximum legal length of the contract.

The difference in the price

at which the two transactions are completed, or rates of discount in
the case of repurchase agreements involving Treasury bills, provides
a contractual return to the System for the interval between the sale
and repurchase dates.

This return to the System or cost to the dealer

is usually equal to or slightly below the discount rate.

3

The repurchase agreement has contributed an additional degree
of flexibility to money market management.

This instrument has become

heavily relied upon by the Trading Desk during Treasury financing
periods.

4

This method of supplying reserves is especially appropriate

3
Normand Bernard, "Views of the U.S. Government Securities
Dealers," a staff study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal
Reserve Study of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington,
D.G.s Federal Reserve System, 1969)V P« 13.
4
For a- comprehensive discussion of the techniques employed by
the Trading Desk in making repurchase agreements with non-bank govern
ment securities dealers, see, in particular, Robert L. Cooper, "Tech
niques of the Federal Reserve Trading Desk in the 1960's Contrasted
with the 'Bills Preferably’ Period," a staff study of the Report of
the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the U.S. Government
Securities Market (Washington, D.C.s Federal Reserve System, 1969),
PP. 33-37.
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for a number of reasons.

First, reserves are provided only on a tem

porary basis, the reserves being automatically recaptured upon termi
nation of the contract.

This is of particular importance when the

Account Manager feels that the stance of monetary policy does not
call for additional expansion of the reserve base.

Secondly, the use

of repurchase agreements lends some precision to the allocation of
new funds.

Dealers under the heaviest pressure (i.e., those encounter

ing the most difficulty in obtaining funds from alternative sources)
may be given direct assistance through selective repurchase agreements,
whereas the utilization of outright purchases would involve the allocation of new funds indiscriminantly to all dealers.
The behavior of this money market variable was tested by the
analysis of variance program.

If "even keel" policy is implemented

through the use of repurchase agreements as the tool for supplying
reserves to the money market during Treasury financings, then it would
be expected that the levels of repurchase agreements would be signifi
cantly higher during "even keel" weeks.

The one-way analysis of

variance program run on the original data indicates differences in the
volume of repurchase agreements during "even keel" and "non-even keel"
periods.

The results of this test are shown in Table 12.
This test supports, with some qualifications, the hypothesis

that the Federal Reserve System supplies reserves to the money market
during "even keel" periods through the repurchase agreement instrument.
First, viewing the entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 interval, the null hypothesis
of equal means can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance

^Scott, Government Securities Market8 p. 106.
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TABLE 12
VARIABLE; REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS1
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT
Optional Listing
Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

Analysis of Variance

Mean

Standard
Deviation

$123.5584
9 6 .6 8 6 3

$13 6 ,1 8 0 0
128,9311

Degrees
of
Freedom

F-Ratio2

1,450

4,5964**

90.3693
71.3766

1,19

0 .1 6 8 6

77.4815
81.5893

77.7763
131.1849

1,81

0 .0 2 2 6

EK-16
NEK-19

31.4375
65.5263

55.1821
66.3763

1*33

2.6650

9/5/623/30/66
(+4.5%)

EK-97
NEK-90

134.7010
106.7222

140,8897
130.5464

1,185

2.1135

4/6/6612/28/66
(-0.%)

EK-11
NEK-28

147.6364
94.0000

111.6075
178.1371

1,37

0 .8 5 6 6

1/4/678/28/68
(+7.3%)

EK-37
NEK-50

175.8378
113.9400

165.7218
137.744?

1,85

3.6098*

1/6/6 08/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

1/6/605/25/60
(-2 .3%)

EK-9
NEK-12

6 1 .1 1 1 1
75.5833

6/1/ 6012/2 7 /6 1
(+ 2 .h% )

EK-27
NEK-5 6

1/3/628/29 /6 2
(+0.3^)

^ h e data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars
for the week ending on Wednesday.
2

A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded
the critical value at the 10 percent level, and a double asterisk ** at
the 5 percent level.

SOURCE;

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19685 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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with a computed F-ratio of 4.5964.

The mean level or volume of re

purchase agreements during "even keel" weeks, as would be expected,
was larger than during "non-even keel" weeks (123.5584 vs. 96.6863
million dollars).

The only other period where the null hypothesis

could be rejected at the 10 percent level was the 1/4/67-8/28/68
period.

The same behavior pattern, with the mean level of repurchase

agreements during "even keel" weeks exceeding the mean level during
"non-even keel" weeks (175.8378 vs. 113.9400 million dollars), was
observed.

Thus, for the entire 452-week period, as well as the 87-

week subperiod, the behavior of repurchase agreements supports the
hypothesis.

Although during only one of six subperiods was it possible to
reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 10 percent level, it
should be noted that during the 313-week interval encompassing
9/5/62-8/28/68 the mean level of repurchase agreements was larger dur
ing "even keel" weeks.

Thus, although some of the subperiods did not

display F-ratios high enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 10
percent level the magnitude of repurchase agreements conforms to the
hypothesis.^
In conclusion, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis
that the "even keel" strategy has been implemented through the
^Two additional tests seem to support the hypothesis that "even
keel" policy has been implemented through repurchase agreements. Simple
graphical time series observations reveal that the level of repurchase
agreements are related to "even keel" directives. The magnitude of
this variable was found to be substantially higher during "even keel"
weeks than during alternative periods. In addition, an analysis of the
deviations from a 9-week running average also supports this hypothesis.
During the 255 weeks not designated as "even keel" weeks, it was found
that 167 observations fell below the 9-week average. Conversely, of
the 197 "even keel" weeks, 99 observations exceeded the 9-week average.
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extensive use of repurchase agreements.

Generally, the level of re

purchase agreements has been higher during "even keel" weeks as op
posed to those weeks when such directives were not in force.

There

is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the "even keel" policy
has been implemented via outright open market purchases.

Thus, the

Trading Desk, during the major Treasury financing periods, imparts
marginal ease to the money market by extending the volume of repurchase
agreements to non-bank government securities dealers.

An Empirical Evaluation of Alternative
Definitions of "Even Keel" Policy

Three major interpretations of "even keel" policy appear in
the literature.

Two of these definitions grouped within the so-called

"support" and "neutrality" schools differ primarily in terms of the
magnitude of the reserve injections associated with the implementation
of "even keel" policy.

The "support" school interpretation views

"even keel" policy as entailing reserve-supplying operations sufficient
in volume to ease money market conditions.

One "neutrality" school

definition envisions the "even keel" strategy as consisting of reserve
injections aimed at offsetting any tendency for a tightening in the
degree of pressure in the money market during Treasury financings.
This interpretation may be carried to the point where "even keel"
policy is viewed as an attempt to stabilize money market conditions
via reserve-supplying operations.

Thus, the primary difference in

these two definitions is the purpose for which reserve injections are
undertaken.

129
The third definition, also classified within the "neutrality"
school, is somewhat independent of the behavior of open market trans
actions.

This interpretation views the "even keel" policy as entail

ing the avoidance of any overt monetary policy actions during
Treasury financing periods.

That is, "even keel" policy simply con

sists of refraining from any shift in central bank policy during
Treasury financings.

The empirical evidence which follows lends the

greatest degree of support to the "neutrality" school definition that
"even keel" policy entails the avoidance of overt policy actions.

The "Support" School

The first interpretation of the "even keel” strategy to be
discussed stresses the concept that the "even keel" policy entails
an open market operating strategy aimed at facilitating or aiding
Treasury operations.

This view of "even keel" policy explains that

policy in terms of temporary underwriting for Treasury financings.
Specifically, the Trading Desk conducts its open market operations
during Treasury financing periods with a view to facilitating the
marketing of a new issue by performing an underwriting function.
Although this interpretation does not imply the utilization of direct
support purchases, it does imply that the System would undertake
reserve-supplying operations explicitly for the purpose of enlarging
the reserve base of the banking system to allow the money markets to
digest the Treasury offering with minimal interest rate disturbance.
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Such an Interpretation views the "even keel" strategy in terms of a
one-way shift toward ease during Treasury financings.

7

This particular interpretation of "even keel" policy lends
itself readily to a number of empirical tests.

An analysis of the

behavior of a number of money market variables was undertaken in order
to test the veracity of this definition of "even keel" policy.

The

results of these tests detailed below lend little support to this in
terpretation.
The "support" school interpretation of "even keel" policy can
be broken down into two components.

The first implication is that the

"even keel" strategy consists of reserve-supplying operations during
Treasury financings.

Reference to Tables 11 and 12 indicate that the

Trading Desk does inject reserves into the money market during Treasury
operations, primarily through the use of repurchase agreements.

The

question then arises, If the "even keel" policy does entail reserve
injections, are these operations of sufficient magnitude to effect the
levels of marginal reserve measures and short-term interest rates?

If

the "support" school definition is correct, then a one-way shift toward
ease in the money market should be reflected in the behavior of free
reserves, member bank borrowings, and the Federal Funds and Treasury
bill rates.

7

This particular interpretation has appeared within the works
of a number of authors. See, for example, Stephen H, Axilrod, "An
Empirical View of 'Even Keel,’" (an unpublished manuscript, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System, April 22, 1969)* P. 2? Monthly
Economic Letter, September, 196?, p. 99? and Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even
Keel's The Reconciliation of Monetary Policy and Debt Management,"
(an unpublished manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), pp. 1112.
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The behavior of the level of free reserves was an important
variable to be considered in testing the "support" school hypothesis.

8

If the interpretation of "even keel" policy in terms of a one-way
shift toward ease is correct, then the level of free reserves should
be found to be significantly higher during "even keel" weeks than al
ternative periods when an "even keel" directive was not in force.
The evidence on free reserves, as shown in Table 13, is somewhat
ambiguous when this variable is treated as an independent, short-run
monetary policy target.
It was found for the entire 452-week period spanning 1/6/60-

8/28/68 that the null hypothesis of the equality of mean levels of
free reserves could not be rejected with an extremely low F-ratio of
0.2988.

Though free reserve levels were higher during "even keel"

The literature surrounding the so-called free reserve doctrine
is quite extensive. The level of free reserves is treated as serving
two functions, both as an indicator of money market tone as well as a
policy target of System actions. No matter what the shortcomings of
free reserves as either indicator or target, it is appropriate for
those attempting to evaluate Federal Reserve policy to pay close at
tention to this variable simply because the System does seem to employ
free reserves in its decision making process. For a brief survey of
the literature dealing with free reserves, see Karl Brunner and Allan
H. Meltzer, "Genesis and Development of the Free Reserve Conception of
Monetary Processes," in Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabil
ization Policy, ed. by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L, Teigen (Homewood,
Illinois} Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 197-210$ William G.
Devrald, "Free Reserves, Total Reserves, and Monetary Control," Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. LXXI (April, 19&3), PP« 141-153I Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, "The Significance and Limitations of Free
Reserves," Monthly Review (November, 1958), pp. 162-16?? Milton
Friedman, "Vault Cash and Free Reserves," Joumal of Political Economy,
Vol. LXIX (April, 1961), pp. 181-182? A. J. Meigs, Free Reserves and
the Money Supply (Chicago} University of Chicago Press, 1962); and
Warren L. Smith, "The Instruments of General Monetary Control," in
Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy, ed. by
Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen.(Homewood, Illinois} Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 210-237.
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TABLE 13
VARIABLE! FREE RESERVES1
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT

Optional Listing

Analysis of Variance
Degree
Standard
of
Deviation
Freedom
F-Ratio2

Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

1/6 /60 8/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

$129.7462
114.1137

$274.9512
320,4668

1/6/605/25/60
(-2.%)

EK-9
NEK-12

-318.8887
-190.0000

6/l/6012/27/61
(+2.4^)

EK-27
NEK-56

1/3/62 8/29/62
(+0.3^)

Mean

1,450

0.2988

100.5204
145.3472

1,19

5.1825**

416.4072
484.6428

184.7178
206.7010

1,81

2,1224

EK-16
NEK-19

440.1875
423.9473

78.6707
65.0114

1,33

0.4476

9/5/623/30/66
(+4.5^)

EK-97
NEK-90

108.9588
61.1222

183.7960
175.9684

1,185

3.2945*

4 /6 /66 12/28/66
(-0.3^)

EK-11
NEK-28

-343.3635
-320.4641

94.4767
117.8264

1,37

0.3302

lA/678/28/68
(+?.%)

EK-37
NEK-50

90.5946
6.8800

252.2842
263.5032

1,85

3.0163*

-

^ h e data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars
for the week ending on Wednesday,
2
A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded
the critical value at the 10 percent level, and a double asterisk ** at
the 5 percent level.
SOURCEi

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 1968j and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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weeks, the difference was not significant.

Thus, for the entire

period the behavior of free reserves does not lend any credibility to
the "support" school definition of "even keel" policy.
Looking at the six subperiods, the evidence on free reserve
behavior is contradictory.

During the rather short interval 1/6/60-

5/25 /6 0 , the null hypothesis of equal means could be rejected at the
5 percent level of significance with a computed F-ratio of 5.1825.
During this interval, contrary to the "support" school interpretation,
the level of free reserves was actually lower during "even keel" weeks
(-318.8887 vs. -190.000 million dollars).

Instead of a one-way shift

toward ease, money market condition as reflected in free reserve levels
actually tightened during Treasury financing operations.

Conversely,

the null hypothesis of the equality of means could be rejected at the

10 percent level during both the 9/5/62 -3/ 30/66 and 1/4/67-8/28/68
intervals.

In each of these cases, spanning a combined period of 274

weeks, the mean level of free reserves during "even keel" weeks was
higher than the mean during alternative weeks (108.9588 vs. 61.1222
million dollars and 90.5946 vs. -6.8000 million dollars).

During

these subperiods, the behavior of free reserves reflected an easing
of money market conditions during "even keel" periods, a finding con
sistent with the "support" school.

A number of possible resolutions

of these contradictory results are possible.
The first resolution involves the integration of "even keel"
policy with the stance of monetary policy.

During the 1/6/60-5/25/60

interval the annual growth rate of the money supply was -2.3 percent.
The historical record shows that the System chose to follow a restric
tive monetary policy with the F.O.M.C. directives consistently calling

13**
for "restraint of excessive Inflationary credit expansion" throughout
most of the period.

The Trading Desk seems to have pursued a restric

tive policy during both "even keel" and "non-even keel" weeks, giving
priority to stemming inflation over facilitating Treasury financings.
Reference to Tables 11 and 12 shows that both net open market pur
chases (-65.1111 vs. -40.2500 million dollars) and repurchase agree
ments (61.1111 vs. 75.5833 million dollars) were lower during "even
keel" weeks than alternative periods.

This would seem to indicate

that the Trading Desk, within the framework of pursuing a restrictive
monetary policy, went to great lengths during Treasury financing opera
tions to avoid the appearance of any shift toward ease in the stance
of monetary policy.

This was accomplished by avoiding the outright

purchase of government securities and minimizing the level of repurchase agreements during "even keel" periods.

9

Thus, the System in

pursuing a restrictive monetary policy erred on the side of tightness
with respect to the free reserve target during "even keel" periods to
avoid any action which might be interpreted as a shift toward an eas
ing in monetary policy.
During the 9/5/62-3/30/66 and 1/4/67-8/28/68 intervals, the
annual growth rate in the
cent, respectively.

money

supply

was 4.5 percent and 7.3 per

During both of these intervals the Trading Desk

erred on the side of ease with respect to the free reserve target dur
ing Treasury financings.
9

During the 9/5/62-3/30/66 period the

A much simpler but equally valid explanation might be offered
i.o explain the lower levels of free reserves during "even keel" weeks
found In the 1/6/60-5/25/60 period. This 21-week period is so short
that the results might be statistically invalid.
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historical record shows that the System was quite concerned with pro
moting a reduction in long-term interest rates to promote domestic
recovery and expansion of employment.

The System concentrated pri

marily on a long-term interest rate target allowing free reserve
levels (indeed, if any attention was given this target) to increase
in order to avoid the appearance of any tightening of monetary policy.
During the major portion of the 1/^/67-8/28/68 period, the
Federal Reserve System pursued an expansionary credit policy, infla
tionary pressures not being recognized until late 1967. During this
same interval, the mean level of repurchase agreements during "even
keel" weeks was significantly higher (175.8378 vs, 113.9^00 million
dollars) than during alternative periods.

Noting that the majority of

"even keel" weeks during this period fell within 1967 when the stance
of monetary policy was expansive,the System again seems to have erred
on the side of ease with respect to the free reserve target in order
to promote full employment.

Here, the System used repurchase agree

ments to facilitate Treasury operations and avoid any appearance of a
move to tighten credit policy.
Thus, generally, the evidence does not support the hypothesis
that "even keel" policy entails reserve injections which result in in
creases in the level of free reserves.

For the entire period, no

statistical evidence can be found to support this hypothesis.

Although

the levels of free reserves were significantly different during some
subperiods, the evidence seems to indicate the general stance of mone
tary policy takes precedence over the need to facilitate Treasury
operations.

With respect to the free reserve target, it was found that

during periods of restrictive credit policy the Desk erred on the side
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of tightness and during intervals of expansive monetary policy, the
System erred on the side of ease.

The "support" school interpretation

would have suggested that the Federal Reserve System, during "even
keel" periods, would consistently inject reserves to increase the level
of free reserves.

This interpretation is not supported by the observed

behavior of free reserves.
In conclusion, the different behavior of free reserves during
tight and easy money periods can be resolved by a single rule.

The

general stance of monetary policy, as dictated by the ultimate targets
of full employment and price stability, is the major determinant of
the observed behavior of free reserves.

During tight money periods

free reserve levels are substantially lower during "even keel" weeks.
Thus, the price stability target was given precedence over any desire
to facilitate Treasury financings.

During easy money periods, the

level of free reserves was significantly higher during "even keel"
weeks.

Here, the necessity of promoting full employment augmented any

increase in free reserve levels that may have been desirable in order
to promote a Treasury financing.

Thus, the "even keel" policy cannot

be interpreted, in light of the behavior of free reserves, as a one-way
shift toward ease.
The "support" school definition of "even keel" policy can also
be tested by analyzing the behavior of member bank borrowings.

The

hypothesis tested would state that during an "even keel" period the
Trading Desk would supply reserves in an amount sufficient to ease
money market conditions.

Treating member bank borrowings as an inde

pendent, short-run policy target, it would be expected that the mean
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level of member bank borrowings would be lower during "even keel"
weeks than weeks in which such a directive was not in force.
The evidence on member bank borrowing as shown in Table 14
tends to refute the "support" school definition.

During the 1/6/60-

8 /28/68 period the null hypothesis of the equality of means could not
be rejected even at the 10 percent level.

The same was the case in 5

of the 6 subperiods examined covering a total of 265 weeks.

In

general, it can be concluded that the level of member bank borrowings
is not significantly lower during "even keel" weeks as opposed to
"non-even keel" weeks.
During the 9/5/62-3/30/66 subperiod, the null hypothesis was
rejected at the 5 percent level, with a computed F-ratio of 5.2342.
In this subperiod, the level of member bank borrowings behaved as the
"support" school would have predicted.

The level of borrowings was

significantly lower during "even keel" weeks (301.5464 vs. 354.5999
million dollars).

It should be noted that during this period the

Federal Reserve System was pursuing an expansive monetary policy con
centrating upon an Interest rate target.

Thus, any easing in money

market conditions during "even keel" periods as reflected in lower
levels of member bank borrowing was consistent with the general stance
of monetary policy.
It can be concluded from the above evidence that "even keel"
policy does not entail reserve Injections of sufficient magnitude to
lower the level of member bank borrowings during Treasury financing
periods.

The empirical observations show that the behavior of marginal

reserves, both free reserves and member bank borrowings, when treated
as independent monetary policy targets do not conform to the behavior
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TABLE IN
VARIABLE! MEMBER BANK BORROWING1
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT
Optional Listing

Analysis of Variance

Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Degrees
of
Freedom

1 /6 /60 8/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

$306.9846
335.5449

$232.5753
239.6985

1,450

1.6191

1 /6 /60 6/25/60
(-2.3#)

EK-9
NEK-12

765.8887
649.1665

146.9237
169.0469

1,19

2.7334

6 /1/ 60 12 /27/61
(+2 M )

EK-27
NEK-56

163.1481
129.6786

135.8340
118.9521

1,81

1.3140

1/ 3/62 8 /29/62
(+0.3*0

EK-16
NEK-19

82.0000
98.6842

34.9552
69.9594

1,33

0.7497

9/5/623/30/66
(+4, 5/0

EK-97
NEK-90

301.5464
35^.5999

162.9079
153.4827

1,185

5.2342**

4/6/6612 /28/66
(-0 .3*0

EK-11
NEK-28

719.9089
670.5713

96.1055
120.0725

1,37

1.4768

l/N/67 8/28/68
(+7.3?O

EK-37
NEK-50

289.1079
358.9399

243.6414
251.7205

1,85

1.6815

2
F-Ratio

^ h e data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars
for the week ending on Wednesday.

2
A double asterisk ** indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceed
ed the critical value at the 5 percent level,
SOURCE:

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 1968> and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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patterns that would be required to verify the "support" school inter
pretation of "even keel" policy.
Finally, in evaluating the "support" school hypothesis which
interprets "even keel" policy as a one-way shift toward ease, it was
necessary to examine the behavior of short-term interest rates.

The

hypothesis tested would state that during an "even keel" period, the
Trading Desk would undertake reserve Injections in a volume sufficient
to ease money market conditions.

Treating both the Federal Funds rate

and the Treasury bill rate (3-month) as independent, short-run policy
targets, it would be expected that the mean level of these short-term
interest rates would be significantly lower during "even keel" weeks
than alternative weeks when such a directive was not in force.
The evidence on short-term interest rate behavior, as shown in
Tables 15 and 16, does not lend any credibility to the "support"
school interpretation of "even keel" policy.

First, in examining the

Federal Funds rate it was found that the null hypothesis of equal
means could not be rejected even at the 10 percent level in either the
entire 452-week period or any of the 6 subperiods.

It must be con

cluded that the mean level of the Federal Funds rate was not signifi
cantly different during "even keel" weeks, Implying that the reservesupplying operations of the System were not large enough to lower the
levels of this short-term interest rate during Treasury financings.
The behavior of the Treasury bill rate coincided closely with
that of the Federal Funds rate.

During the entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 inter

val and 5 of 6 subperiods, the null hypothesis of equal means could not
be rejected at the 10 percent level.

Only during the 6/1/60-12/27/61
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TABLE 15
VARIABLE! FEDERAL FUNDS RATE1
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT
Optional Listing

Analysis of Variance

Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

Mean

Standard
Deviation

1/6 /60 8/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

3.62810
3.6701

1.02210
1.2148

1*450

0.1525

1/6 /60 5/25/60
(-2.#)

EK-9
NEK-12

3.9389
3.9133

0.0715
0.1341

1.19

0.2673

6 /1/ 6 O12/27/61
(+2 .40)

EK-27
NEK-56

2.3733
2.1832

0.7180
0.7090

1,81

1.2991

1/ 3/62 8/29/62
(+0.30)

EX-16
NEK-19

2.5837
2.642

0.4063
0.3149

1,33

0.0281

9/ 5/62 3/30/66
(+4.50)
4/6/6612 /28/66
(-0.30)

EK-97
NEK-90

3.5486
3.6274

0.5039
0.5190

1,185

1.1090

EK-11
NEK-28

5.4582
5.2361

0,4409
0.4095

1,37

2.2276

EK-37
NEK-50

4.5840
4.8822

0.9196
0.7603

1,85

2.7338

1/4 /67 8/28/68
(+7.30)

Degrees
of
Freedom

F-Ratio

■The data consists of the averages of daily figures In percent per annum
for the week ending on Wednesday,
SOURCE:

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69*” Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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TABLE 16
VARIABLE! TREASURY BILL RATE, 3-MONTH1
ORIGINAL BATA INPUT
Optional Listing
Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

Mean

Analysis of Variance
Standard
Deviation

Degrees
of
Freedom

F-Ratio2

1/6/608/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

3.5900$
3.6317

0.8961$
1.0052

1,450

0.2101

1/6 /60 5/25/60
(-2.%)

EK-9
NEK-12

3.7200
3.5500

0.6125
0.4516

1,19

0.5385

6 /1/ 6 O12/27/61
(+2,4$)

EK-27
NEK-56

2.3178
2.3762

0,1166
0.1484

1,81

3.2233*

1/3/628/29/62
(+0.3$)

EK-16
NEK-19

2.7431
2.7642

0.0627
0.0983

1,33

0.1511

9/5/623/30/66
(+4.5$)

EK-97
NEK-90

3.5138
3.6009

0.5121
0.4736

1,185

1.4514

4/6/6612/28/66
(-0.3$)

EK-11
NEK-28

5.0464
4.8961

0.3414
0.3270

1,37

1.6289

1/4 /67 8/28/68
(+7.3$)

EK-37
NEK-50

4.6159
4.7350

0.5201
0.6675

1,85

0.8114

4 h e data consists of market yields in percent per annum computed from
daily closing bid prices. Bills are quoted on bank discount rate
basis.
2
A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded
the critical value at the 10 percent level,
SOURCEi

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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period, exhibiting a computed F-ratio of 3.2233, could the null hy
pothesis be rejected at the 10 percent level.

The mean level of the

Treasury bill rate was lower during "even keel" weeks than "non-even
keel weeks (2.31?8 percent vs. 2.3762 percent).

Although during this

83-week subperiod, the Treasury bill rate did behave as the "support"
school would have predicted, in light of the overall behavior exhib
ited by short-term interest rates, this observation is not interpreted
as sufficient evidence on which to verify the "support" school defini
tion.

The behavior of short-term interest rates does not conform to

the predictions of the "support" school.
The definition of "even keel" policy in terms of a one-way
shift toward ease cannot be supported by the behavior of either mar
ginal reserve measures of short-term interest rates.

Although strong

evidence exists that the "even keel" strategy is implemented through
the extension of repurchase agreements to non-bank government securi
ties dealers, there is little empirical evidence to show that these
reserve injections result in an easing of money market conditions
during "even keel" periods.

The behavior of the major money market

variables examined does not consistently conform to the behavior pat
tern that would be predicted by the "support" school.

Therefore, as

a creditable explanation of the "even keel" strategy, the "support"
school definition must be rejected.

The "Neutrality" School

A number of the different interpretations of "even keel" policy
can be classified as belonging to the "neutrality" school.

The

appropriate relationship between monetary policy and debt management
expounded by this school is the maintenance of limited degree of in
dependence between central bank and Treasury policy actions.

That is,

while System policy is such that the authorities do not feel that
their money-creating power should be employed to lend direct support
to Treasury financings, System officials do recognize that concurrent
monetary policy may well affect Treasury operations.

The money mar

ket is felt to be quite sensitive to Treasury offers due to the sheer
magnitude of the financings, the involvement of the U.S. Government's
credit, and the key role played by government securities in the
process of liquidity and portfolio adjustment."^

Bearing in mind that

there does exist a connection between monetary policy and the market's
reception of Treasury financings, many view "even keel" policy as, if
not a form of central bank support or aid to financings, at least a
conscious effort on the part of the System to undertake no actions
that would contribute to a Treasury offer encountering poor acceptance
in the government securities market.

Two rather distinct interpreta

tions of "even keel" policy, based upon this "neutrality" concept can
be identified.

Each are discussed and evaluated in the following

pages.

A.

The Money Market Condition or Stabilization Hypothesis

The first "neutrality" school interpretation of "even keel"
policy to be empirically examined has been labeled the money market
condition or stabilization hypothesis definition.

This particular

^Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.
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Interpretation is the result of a synthesis of a number of works in
conjunction with the historical review of the current economic policy
directives.

11

This interpretation views "even keel" policy as an

open market operating technique used in the implementation of shortrun monetary policy during Treasury financing periods.

The review of

the historical record clearly shows that the operating instructions
given to the Account Manager in the second paragraph of the F.O.M.C.
current economic policy directive are couched in terms of a desired
degree of pressure in money market conditions or simply money market
tone.

During "even keel" periods, the Trading Desk is invariably in

structed to maintain the existing degree of pressure in the money mar
ket.
The chain reaction of monetary policy in one official view of
the Federal Reserve System is as followst

In a number of works which were concerned with the implemen
tation of the dynamic aspects of short-run monetary policy as opposed
to the "even keel" strategy per se, various authors suggested that the
Trading Desk concentrated on a number of money market indicators as
the primary targets at which open market operations were directed.
For a discussion of the so-called intermediate targets of credit
policy, see Leonall G. Andersen, "Money Market Conditions as a Guide
for Monetary Management," in Monetary Economics Readings, ed. by Alan
D, Entine (Belmont, Calif.t Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968),
pp. 226-245? Leonall C, Andersen and Jules M. Levine, "Implementation
of Federal Reserve Open Market Policy in 1964," Review of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (June, 1965)* PP. 2-5? Leonall C. Andersen
and Jules M, Levine, "A Test of Money Market Conditions as a Means of
Short-Run Monetary Management," National Banking Review, Vol. IV
(September, 1966), pp. 41-51? Clay J, Anderson, "Money Market Indi
cators," in Monetary Economics Readings, ed. by Alan D. Entine (Belmonti
Calif.i Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 211-216? Paul
Meek, Discount Policy and Open Market Operationsi Fundamental Reap
praisal of the Discount Mechanism (Washington, D.C.i Board of Govern
ors, Federal Reserve System, 1968)? and Robert R. Wyand, II, "Money
Market Conditions— What Are They?" Monthly Review of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta (September, 1965 )* PP. 1-^.

Changes in the availability and cost of reserves
are reflected immediately in money market conditions.
Their influence spreads to bank credit and money, to
interest rates in markets for longer-term debts, and
to the entire range of spending financed by borrowed
funds. In the end, the ultimate target of policy
actions— total income and spending, total output and
employment, the general level of prices and inter^
national trade and capital flows— come to be influenced.
This view has loosely been labeled as the money market condition theory
of monetary management.

It is not a fully developed theory.

Instead,

it is a method of viewing ex post changes in individual money market
time series as indicators of changes in money market tone.

To be ac

cepted as a theory, even on the basis of a partial equilibrium analy
sis, some tenable set of relationships must be established between the
links composing the chain.
Although a complete analysis of the money market condition
theory of monetary management is outside the scope of this study, a
brief review of this theory is essential to the evaluation of this
particular interpretation of "even keel" policy.

Specifically, part

of this chain reaction of monetary policy postulated by these theorists
must be examined.
First, the Federal Reserve System, at its own initiative, can
manipulate a set of variables which can alter the cost and avail
ability of reserves to member banks.

These variables include the

familiar quantitative tools of monetary policy— open market operations,
the discount rate, and the required reserve ratio.

System manipulation

of these quantitative tools, especially open market operations, are

12

Peter M. Keir, "The Open Market Policy Process," The Federal
Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XLIX (October, 1963)* P. 1359.
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reflected in the behavior of a set of variables referred to as the
money market indicators.

These include the marginal reserve measures,

especially free reserves and member bank borrowings, as well as short
term interest rates, specifically the Federal Funds and Treasury bill
rates.
The theoretical relationship between the degree of money mar
ket pressure, as measured by the above money market indicators, and
changes in the intermediate variables, which include the rate of
growth of bank credit and the money supply and long-term interest
rates, has been questioned by a number of authors.

13

This relation

ship is the key link in the chain, the link upon which the money market condition theory of monetary management rests.

14

Finally, changes

in the intermediate guides influence the ultimate targets of credit
control policy, the levels of income, employment, and prices.
The hypothesis tested in this analysis deals with one defini
tion of the "even keel" strategy which centers around the first link
13
The works of a number of authors seem to disprove the exis
tence of this link which postulates that increased (decreased) pres
sure in the money market, other factors equal, indicates a set of
events which tends to decrease (increase) the rate of growth of bank
credit and money and to increase (decrease) long-term interest rates.
See in particular, Richard G, Davis, "Open Market Operations, Interest
Rates, and Deposit Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXIX
(August, 1965), pp. 431-454j and A. J. Meigs, Free Reserves and the
Money Supply (Chicago* University of Chicago Press, 1962).
14
This link in the chain is explained by the money market con
dition theorists by a combination of interest arbitrage operations,
securities dealers* inventory adjustments, and adjustment of the
liquidity positions of banks and financial institutions. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to test the existence of this link. Rather,
this analysis is concerned with establishing and verifying the exis
tence of the link between the manipulation of the quantitative tools
and variations in selected money market indicators.

14?
in the chain postulated by the money market condition theory.

The

historical record reveals that during the 1960-1968 period, "even
keel" directives have consistently called for ”. . . the conduct of
open market operations during the next three weeks, with a view to
maintaining about the existing degree of pressure in the money market."
Quite simply, then, the question is— does the "even keel" policy en
tail an open market operating strategy whose purpose is to maintain
stable conditions in the money market during Treasury financings?
Referring again to Tables 11 and 12, it was concluded that the
"even keel" strategy was implemented primarily through repurchase
agreements with non-bank government securities dealers.

Previous

analysis has rejected the "support" school hypothesis that System
reserve injections during financing periods resulted in easing in
money market conditions.

What now must be tested is whether System

reserve-supplying operations were undertaken in order to stabilize
money market conditions during "even keel" periods.

Has the utiliza

tion of repurchase agreements led to the stabilization of money market
conditions as measured by marginal reserves and short-term interest
rates?
The testing procedure again employed was the analysis of
variance program previously discussed.

To test for the degree of

stability exhibited by marginal reserves and short-term interest rates
first difference data expressed in absolute values was employed.

The

analysis tests the degree of fluctuation displayed by selected money
market variables during "even keel" weeks in comparison with periods
when such directives were not in force.
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The money market condition or stabilization hypothesis views
"even keel" policy as an attempt to stabilize money market conditions
during Treasury financing periods.

This hypothesis would predict that

the degree of fluctuations displayed by money market indicators, as
measured by the mean levels of the absolute first differences, would
be less during "even keel" weeks than alternative periods.

The

evidence lends little credibility to the stabilization hypothesis.
Table 17 summarizes the behavior of free reserves during the
1960-1968 period.

Treating free reserves as an independent short-run

policy target, there is little evidence that the System has succeeded
in stabilizing this indicator during "even keel" periods.

During the

entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 period, as well as 5 of 6 subperiods, the null
hypothesis of equal means could not be rejected at the 10 percent
level with extremely low computed F-ratlos.

Only during the relative

ly short 1/6/60-5/25/60 period could the null hypothesis be rejected
at the 10 percent level with an F-ratio of 4.1831.

Although during

this 21-week Interval the volume of fluctuation was significantly
lower during "even keel" weeks (61.4444 vs. 119.5833 million dollars),
as the stabilization hypothesis would predict, this fact is not inter
preted as strong evidence to support this definition of "even keel"
policy.
The overall behavior of free reserves during the 1960-1968
period shows no significant difference in the degree of fluctuation
displayed by this variable during "even keel" and "non-even keel" weeks.
The reserve injections undertaken by the Trading Desk did not result
in the stabilization of free reserve levels during Treasury financing

TABLE 17
VARIABLE* FREE RESERVES1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT
Optional Listing

Analysis of Variance

Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

Mean

Standard
Deviation

1/6/608/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

$ 86.6294
90.2235

$ 78 >931
87.6079

1/6/605/25/60
(-2.3*)

EK-9
NEK-12

61. 4444
119.5833

6/1/60-

EK-27
NEK-56

109.0370

1/3/628/29/62
(+0.3#)

Degrees
of
Freedom

F-Ratio2

1,450

0.2046

43.3621
76.2263

1,19

4.1831*

105.1673
120.4702

1,81

0.0006

109.6786

EK-16
NEK-19

75.0000
63 >737

53.6445
40.4603

1,33

0.5243

9/5/623/30/66
(+4.5#)

EK-97
NEK-90

68.6598

55.4666
41.1879

1,185

1.3922

60.1778

4/6/6612/28/66
(-0.3#)

EX-11
NEK-28

69.1818
112.5714

65.4596
106.7892

1,37

1.5684

1/4/678/28/68
(+7.3#)

EK-37
NEK-50

133.7297
113.1200

103.4747
93.9472

1,85

0.9386

12/27/60
(+2 M )

"'‘The data consists of an average of daily figures in million dollars
for the week ending on Wednesday.
2
A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded
the critical value at the 10 percent level.
SOURCEi

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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periods.

It may be concluded that the manipulation of repurchase

agreements by the Trading Desk during "even keel" weeks was either
not aimed at stabilizing free reserves or, if stabilization was the
target, the System was not successful in achieving that goal.
Another key variable to be examined in testing the stabiliza
tion hypothesis of the "even keel" strategy was member bank borrow
ings.

Treating this variable as an independent target of short-run

monetary policy, the stabilization hypothesis would postulate that
the System would minimize the degree of fluctuation in member bank
borrowing during "even keel" weeks.
Looking at Table 18, the behavior of this variable again lends
little support to the money market condition or stabilization hypothe
sis.

During the entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 period, the extremely low com

puted F-ratio of 0.0077 indicates that the amount of fluctuation in
this variable was no different during "even keel" weeks than alterna
tive periods.

During both the 1/3/62-8/29/62 and 4/6/66-12/28/66 sub

periods the null hypothesis of equal means could be rejected at the 5
percent level with F-ratios of 4.8039 and 5*1461, respectively.

The

degree of fluctuation in member bank borrowings in each instance was
significantly lower during "even keel" weeks (24.5625 vs. 61.3684 and
62.7273 vs. 112.9286 million dollars, respectively).

Thus, during both

of these intervals covering a period of 74 weeks, this variable dis
played behavior consistent with the stabilization hypothesis.

Con

sidering the relatively short time period involved in conjunction with
the overall behavior of member bank borrowings, little credence for the
stabilization hypothesis can be found.
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TABLE 18
VARIABLE! MEMBER BANK BORROWING1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT
Optional Listing

Analysis of Variance

Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

Mean

Standard
Deviation

1/6/608/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

$ 86.6193
87.3255

1/6/60-

EK-9
NEK-12

73.8889

6/1/60I2/27/6O
(+2M)

Degrees
of
Freedom

F-Ratio2

$ 91.1813
79.9938

1,450

0.0077

43.5616
104.3^57

1,19

1.0655

112.2500

EK-27
NEK-56

53.7778
50.071^

56.4836
46.6212

1,81

0.1001

1/3/628/29/62
(+h.5%)

EK-16
NEK-19

24.5625
61.3684

25.0971
62.9728

1,33

4.8039**

9/5/623/30/66

EK-97
NEK-90

109.9278
98.6222

105.1305
79. **802

1,185

0,6801

4/6/6612/28/66
(-0.%)

EK-11
NEK-28

62.7273
122.9286

39.5906
83.9124

1,37

5.1461**

1/4/67-

EK-37
NEK-50

86.5135
92.6600

90.3889
92.1376

1,85

0.0962

5/25/60
(-2 .#)

8/28/68
(+7.3*0

■The first difference data in absolute values is computed from the
averages of daily figures in million dollars for the week ending
Wednesday.

2
A double asterisk ** indicates that the actual computed F-ratio ex
ceeded the critical value at the 5 percent level.
SOURCEi

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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The behavior of marginal reserve measures, both free reserves
and member bank borrowings, during the 1960-1968 period, cannot be
Interpreted as strong evidence on which to verify the stabilization
hypothesis.

With the exception of 3 relatively short subperiods, no

significantly greater degree of stability is displayed by these mar
ginal reserve measures during "even keel" weeks in comparison with
periods when such directives were not in force.

Thus, the stabiliza

tion hypothesis which views the "even keel" policy as entailing the
stabilization of marginal reserves must be rejected.
Finally, the behavior of short-term interest rates was
examined.

Treating both the Federal Funds and Treasury bill rates as

independent targets of short-run policy, the stabilization hypothesis
would predict a smaller degree of week-to-week fluctuation during
Treasury financing periods.

The behavior of short-term interest rates

lends virtually no support to the stabilization hypothesis.
Perusal of Tables 19 and 20 clearly shows that short-term
interest rates were not stabilized during "even keel" weeks.

In only

one subperiod, 1/4/67-8/28/68, could the null hypothesis of equal
means be rejected at the 5 percent level with a computed F-ratio of
4.1338 for the behavior of the Federal Funds rate.

In this instance,

the behavior of the Federal Funds rate was contrary to the predictions
of the stabilization hypothesis, with the amount of fluctuation larger,
not smaller, during the "even keel" weeks (0.2262 percent vs. 0.1450
percent).

Generally, it was found that short-term interest rates be

haved no differently during "even keel" weeks than alternative periods
when such directives were not in force.
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TABLE 19
VARIABLE! FEDERAL FUNDS RATE1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT
Optional Listing
Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

1/6/60-

EK-197
NEK-255

0.1871#
0.2235

1/6/605/25/60

EK-9
NEK-12

Analysis of Variance
Degrees
of
Freedom

2
F-Ratio

0.2587#
0.2695

1,450

2.0973

0.0756
0.0925

0.1897
0.1129

1,19

0.1371

EK-27
NEK-56

0,4544
0.4589

0.3766
0.3268

1,81

0.0031

EK-16
NEK-19

0.3056
0.2295

0.3560
0.2358

1.33

0.5728

9/5/623/30/66
(+4.4#)

EK-97
NEK-90

0.0845

0.1362
0.1700

1,185

0.9427

4/6/6612/28/66
(-0.3#)

EK-11
NEK-28

0.2227
0.3214

0.2389

1,37

0.8941

1/4/678/28/68
(+7.3#)

EK-37
NEK-50

0.2262
O.145O

0.2207
0.1519

1,85

4.1388**

Mean

Standard
Deviation

(-2.3#)

6/1/ 6012/27/60
(+2M)

1/3/628/29/62
(+4.5#)

0.1063

0.3111

xhe first difference data in absolute values is computed from a sevenday average in percent per annum for the week ending on Wednesday.

2
A double asterisk ** indicates that the actual computed F-ratio ex
ceeded the critical value at the 5 percent level.
SOURCEi

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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TABLE 20
VARIABLEi TREASURY BILL RATE, 3-MONTH1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT
Optional Listing
Time
Period
Tested

Sample
Group
Size

1/6/608/28/68

EK-197
NEK-255

0.0538^
0.0651

1/6/60-

EK-9
NEK-12

6/ 1/ 6012/27/60
(+2 M )

Analysis of Variance
Degrees
of
Freedom

F-Ratio

0.07353$
0.0770

1,450

2.5240

0.1989
0.2433

0.1752
0.1295

1,19

0.4489

EK-27
NEK-56

0.0819
0.0754

0.0637
0.0753

1,81

0.1492

1/3/628/29/62
(+4.5*)

EK-16
NEK-19

0.0381

0.0290

1,33

0.0059

0.0374

0.0288

9/5/623/30/66
(+bM)

EK-97
NEK-90

0.0215
0.0264

0.0233
0.0340

1,185

1.3339

4/6/6612/28/66
(-0.#)

EK-11
NEK-28

0.0745
0.0889

0.0478
0.0671

1,37

0.4188

1/4/678/28/68

EK-37
NEK-50

0.0830
0.0778

0,0863
0.0658

1,85

0.1007

5/23/60
(-2 .#)

Mean

Standard
Deviation

(+7.3£)

^?he first difference data in absolute values of market yields in per
cent per annum is computed from daily closing bid prices. Bills are
quoted on bond discount rate basis.
SOURCE*

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 1968j and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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In conclusion, the money market condition or stabilization
hypothesis definition of ’’even keel" cannot be supported by the facts.
This oarticular view of the "neutrality" school which interprets
"even keel" policy as an open market strategy consisting of reserve
injections aimed at the stabilizing marginal reserves and short-term
interest rates during financing periods must be rejected.

The over

whelming evidence indicates that the major money market indicators
behave no differently in terms of the magnitude of fluctuation dis
played during "even keel" periods.
The evidence supporting the stabilization hypothesis is quite
weak.

Although the behavior of repurchase agreements might indicate

that the Federal Reserve System is attempting to stabilize money mar
ket conditions, the actual behavior of marginal reserves and short
term interest rates does not indicate that the Trading Desk enjoys any
success in achieving that goal.
somewhat.

This conclusion must be qualified

The fact that the empirical evidence does not show that

money market indicators were stabilized during "even keel" periods
does not answer the question of whether these variables would have
fluctuated more in the absence of Trading Desk operations during "even
keel" periods.

The possibility that the use of repurchase agreements

was instrumental in preventing a greater degree of fluctuation in mar
ginal reserves and short-term interest rates from being observed
during "even keel" weeks must be recognized.

However, no empirical

test would seem to exist for analyzing this possibility.

Thus, within

the framework of what behavior can be tested, the stabilization hypoth
esis must be rejected.
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B.

The Avoidance of Policy Changes

The final interpretation of "even keel" policy to be examined
in the analysis can also be classified as falling within the "neu
trality" school.

This definition of the "even keel" strategy which

has frequently appeared in the literature is that the maintenance of
an "even keel" posture in the money market during a Treasury financ
ing period calls for the avoidance of any overt System policy actions.
That is, any overt policy action that might be interpreted by money
market participants as indicative of a shift in the stance of credit
policy is to be avoided during Treasury financing periods.^

This

view is usually couched in terms of the necessity of not announcing
new policy decisions (as contained in announcements from the Board of
Governors or as specified in the second paragraph of the current
economic policy directive of the F.O.M.C.) that would impede the
orderly marketing of Treasury securities and significantly increase
risks of market disruption from sharp changes in market attitudes
during the course of the financing period.

Specifically, "even

% h i s particular view or interpretation of the "even keel"
strategy appears in a number of works. See in particular, Axilrod,
"Empirical View of ’Even Keel,"' p. lj Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even Keel'*
The Reconciliation of Monetary Policy and Debt Management," (an un
published manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), p. 1; and
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment, Growth, and Price
Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 1st
sess., 1959 (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1959)1
P. 1785.
^Discussion of "even keel" policy has usually been focused on
its relation to tightening actions. But in practice, the policy may
also influence the timing of easing actions. For example, it might
be argued that a discount rate reduction in the middle of a Treasury
financing period may be avoided by the System because it might encour
age undue speculative activity in the government securities market.
See Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.

157
keel" policy is felt to Influence the timing of central bank policy
actions, the System being confined to undertaking any overt policy
action during those intervals between Treasury financings.

It is

felt that any tightening of credit policy during the financing period
would seriously jeopardize the success of an offering through altering basic supply and demand relationships or investor expectations.

17

This interpretation of the "even keel" policy was tested by
careful review of the historical record.

The author examined the

major changes in credit control policy during the 1960-1968 period
to determine if the timing of overt policy actions was influenced by
"even keel" directives.

Special emphasis was placed on changes in

both the discount rate and the required reserve ratio, the quantita
tive tools which are usually designated as having a large psychologi
cal market impact.

In addition, the author scrutinized the Record of

Policy Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual
Report in order to determine if the maintenance of an "even keel"
policy has been a major factor or consideration which has preempted
shifts in the stance of monetary policy.

The results of this analysis

strongly support this particular definition of "even keel" policy.
Table 21 summarizes the 9 changes in the discount rate which
the System made during the 1960-1968 period.

In only one Instance did

a discount rate change occur during an "even keel" period.

The dis

count rate reduction made effective on 8/12/60 fell within the "even

17
Tilford C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management
(New Yorki The Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 265.
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TABLE 21
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUNT RATES1
(PERCENT PER ANNUM)

Effective
Date^

Level of
Discount Rate

Net Change of
Discount Rate

9/11/59

4.0$6

6/10/60

3.5

- 0.5%

8/12/60*

3.0

- 0.5

7/17/63

3.5

+ 0.5

11/24/64

4.0

+ 0.5

12/06/65

^.5

+ 0.5

V07/67

4.0

- 0.5

11/20/67

4,5

+ 0.5

3/22/68

5.0

+ 0.5

4/19/68

5.5

+ 0.5

^ h e discount rate quoted applies to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York only.

2
The asterisk * indicates an effective date which falls within an "even
keel" period.
SOURCE:

Federal Reserve System, Bulletin, January I960 - August 1968.

159
keel" period spanning the 7/26/6O-8/ 15/6O interval.

The "even keel"

directive was implemented during an 8,750 "billion dollar cash financ
ing involving a note and certificate of indebtedness.

The financing

was announced on 7/28/60 with the subscription books open during

8/I/6O-8/2/6O with the payment or settlement date designated as
8/15/60.

The F.O.M.C. meeting held on July 26, i960, called for the

maintenance of an "even keel" in the money market.

Three overt policy

actions were undertaken just after the July 26th meeting; these in
cluded a .5 percent reduction in the discount rate, a reduction in the
required reserve ratio of central reserve city banks from 18 percent
to 17.5 percent effective on 9/l/60, and a reduction in the margin
requirement from 90 percent to 70 percent on 7/28/60. These overt
policy actions were aimed, as stated at the F.O.M.C. meeting held on
August 16, i960, at "encouraging monetary expansion for the purpose
18
of fostering sustainable growth in economic activity and employment.
Thus, although the change did take place during an "even keel"
period, it should be noted that the overt policy action came at the
tail end of the financing period and represented an easing in the
stance of monetary policy.

Therefore, it may be concluded that "even

keel" policy does entail the avoidance of overt policy actions, the
only exception occurring in the final phase of a Treasury financing
period.
Table 22 summarizes the changes in the reserve requirement
ratio which have occurred during the 1960-1968 period.

A total of 8

Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Forty-Seventh
Annual Report, i960 (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 1961),
P. 130.
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TABLE 22
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS OP MEMBER BANKS
(PERCENT OP DEPOSITS)
JANUARY 1, I960 - JULY 13, 1966

Net Demand Deposits
Effective
Date *■* 2

Central Reserve
City Banks

4/24/58
9/01/60
11/24/60
12/01/60
10/25/62,*

Reserve
City Banks

Country
Banks

Time Deposits
(all classes
of banks)

16.9*
t••■
••••
••••
•t•t

11%
1
*•
12
••
••

5%
•
•
•
•

18.0*
17.5
•••»
16.5
••••

11/01/62

JULY 14, 1966 •- AUGUST 28, 1968
Net Demand Deposits
Reserve City Bank
Under
$5 million
3/02/67
3/16/67
1/11/68,
1/18/68

16.5*
....

Over
$5 million
16.5*
17.0

Country Banks
Under
$5 million

Time Deposits
(all classes
of banks)

Over
$5 million

Savings
Deposits

12*

12.0*

• •

• • • •

3.5%
3.0

• •

12.5

"when two dates are shown, the first applies to the change at central
reserve or reserve city banks and the second, to the change at country
banks.

2

The asterisk * indicates an effective date which falls within an "even
keel" period.
SOURCE*

Federal Reserve System, Bulletin, January I960 - August 1968.
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alterations were made In the various ratios applicable to different
banks and deposits.

In only one case, the 1 percent reduction in the

reserve requirement ratio made effective on 10/25/62 and ll/l/62, was
an overt policy action undertaken during an "even keel" period.

This

particular action occurred under somewhat unusual circumstances.
The "even keel" period extended from 10/22/62-ll/l7/62.

It

encompassed the Treasury financing period for a regular refunding
which was announced on 10/25/62 with the settlement date on II/15/62.
In addition to the 11,000 billion dollar exchange offer, the Cuban
missile crisis was another factor taken into consideration in imple
menting an "even keel" strategy.

The announcement by the B.O.G. of

the reduction in the reserve requirement ratio was made at the B.O.G.
meeting held on October 18, 1962.

Thus, the announcement of the overt

policy action preceded the F.O.M.C. "even keel" directive, although
the reserve requirement ratio change was to be made effective during
the "even keel" period.

Thus, it may be concluded that the "even

keel" strategy clearly entails the avoidance of both changes in the
discount rate and reserve requirement ratio during Treasury financing
periods.

The only two exceptions Involved shifts toward an easier

credit policy.
Finally, it must be determined whether or not the "even keel"
policy consistently influences the timing of shifts in the stance of
monetary policy.

It seems safe to conclude that the timing of adjust

ments in both the discount and the reserve requirement ratio are
influenced by "even keel" policy.

The F.O.M.C. can also change credit

policy through the use of open market transactions.

The Record of
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Policy Action - the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual Report
was carefully scrutinized to see if the maintenance of an "even keel"
preempted shifts in monetary policy.
The 66 "even keel" directives which were issued during the
1960-1968 period have been classified into five groups.

These Include

directives designated as preempting either any shift in policy, a
shift toward ease, or a shift toward tightness.

In addition, a small

number of "even keel" directives were identified as coinciding with
policy changes while a larger number of "even keel" directives were
issued at times when the F.O.M.C. was not considering any shift in
credit control policy.

Table 23 summarizes the results of this

analysis.
It can be seen that a total of 39 of 66 "even keel" direc
tives were designated as having preempted policy changes.

The

majority of these, 29, preempted, as would be expected, shifts toward
tightening monetary policy.

A typical example which clearly indicates

that the "even keel" strategy has influenced the timing of policy
changes is shown in the summary of the discussion leading to the current economic policy directive of April 16, 1963#

19

Thus, in approximately 59 percent of the cases, the mainte
nance of an "even keel" policy has been a major factor which has been
considered by the F.O.M.C. in ruling out changes in the stance of

19

" . . . some members who otherwise might have preferred to
move toward a slightly lesser degree of ease felt that such action
would be undesirable at this time because of the aftermath of the
Treasury bond auction and impending large refunding operations." See
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1963, pp. 76-77.

TABLE 23
"EVEN KEEL" DIRECTIVES AND SHIFTS IN MONETARY POLICY, I960 - I968

i960

"Even Keel"
Directives
Preempting
Any Shift
3/22/60

"Even Keel"
Directives
Preempting Shift
to Tightness

"Even Keel"
Directives
Preempting
Shift to Ease
1/26/60, 7/26/60

"Even Keel"
Directives
Coinciding
With Any Shift

"Even Keel"
Directives
Policy Shift
Not Considered
7/6/60, 9/13/60,
10/4/60

1961

9/12/61, 10/ 3/61,
10/24/61

6/6/61

7/11/61

1962

1/23/62, 4/17/62

7/31/62

1/9/62, 2/13/62,
8/21/62, 9/11/62,
10/23/62

1963

1/29/63, 2/12/63, 3/26/63, 4/16/63,
3/5/63
8/20/63, 9/10/63

1964

1965

11/2/65

1/8/63, 10/22/63

1/7/64, 5/5/64,
11/10/64

1/28/64, 3/24/64,
4/14/64, 6/17/64,
7/7/64, 7/28/64,
10/20/64, 12/15/64

1/12/65, 7/13/65,

4/13/65, 5/11/65,
8/10/65, 10/12/65,

9/28/65

12/14/65
1966

10/4/66

196?

1968
TOTAL
SOURCE:

1/11/66

2/8/66, 4/12/66, 5/10/66,
7/26/66, II/1/66
1/10/67

2/7/67, 5/2/67, 6/20/67,
7/18/67, 8/15/67,
10/3/67, 10/24/67

7/16/68

2/6/68
6

4

29
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1960-1968.

2

25
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monetary policy.

The "even keel" policy has usually mitigated against

a shift toward tightness.

In only two cases did an "even keel" direc

tive coincide with an actual shift in F.O.M.C. credit control policy.

Summary and Conclusion

In summarizing the empirical analysis of "even keel" policy,
a number of important conclusions stand out.

During the 1960-1968

interval, the "even keel" strategy has generally been implemented by
the extensive use of repurchase agreements with non-bank government
securities dealers.

These reserve injections have not been of suf

ficient magnitude to significantly affect the behavior of the major
money market indicators.
The "support" school interpretation of "even keel" policy has
been rejected because the empirical evidence does not reveal a con
sistent easing in money market conditions during "even keel" periods.
The "neutrality" school definition of "even keel" policy is partially
supported by the evidence.

The view that the "even keel" strategy

entails the stabilization of marginal reserves and short-term Interest
rates cannot be verified.

However, the definition that the maintenance

of an "even keel" posture in the money market during a Treasury financ
ing period calls for the avoidance of any overt System policy actions
can be supported.

In addition, strong evidence exists to indicate

that the "even keel" policy has preempted shifts in the stance of
monetary policy.
The picture of the "even keel" policy which emerges from the
examination of the 1960-1968 period is as follows.

The "even keel"
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policy entails the avoidance of any policy action during major
Treasury financings, which might be Interpreted as indicative of a
shift in the stance of credit policy.

Though there is some evidence

that the System does employ repurchase agreements to supply reserves
to the money market during "even keel" periods, there is little evi
dence to support the hypothesis that the "even keel" strategy is
aimed at easing or stabilizing money market conditions.

Finally, the

necessity of maintaining an "even keel" posture during Treasury
financings has been one factor cited as influencing the timing of
monetary policy actions.

Thus, Federal Reserve "even keel" policy

cannot be viewed as a strategy employing explicit support operations
aimed at easing or stabilizing money market conditions.

Rather, the

"even keel" policy must be interpreted in terms of an Implicit support
entailing primarily the avoidance of changes in credit policy during
Treasury financing periods.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The literature dealing with the relationship between debt
management and monetary policy since the Treasury-Federal Reserve Ac
cord has been extensive.

One aspect of this topic, the policy pursued

by the central bank during major Treasury financing operations, has
been largely ignored.

Accordingly, this study attempts to clarify a

number of facets of the so-called "even keel" policy, the central bank
operating strategy which has come to be considered the appropriate
policy to be employed by the System during Treasury financing opera
tions.

The historical and empirical analysis undertaken has revealed

a number of important findings which can now be summarized.

The Emergence and Evolution of
"Even Keel" Policy

The "even keel" policy of the Federal Reserve System has been
a pragmatic and gradual evolution of an open market operating tech
nique, a refinement emerging from an atmosphere of changing views as
to the proper integration of monetary theory and debt management
policy.

During the period preceding the Accord, the central bank was

committed to a policy of maintaining a fixed price-yield pattern on
government securities.

This program, implemented through an open
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market policy of direct support purchases, came under an increasing
degree of criticism as inflationary pressures grew.
The authorities, realizing the inconsistency of a program of
direct support purchases coupled with the need for a credit control
policy able to combat inflation, reached the now-famous TreasuryFederal Reserve Accord on March 4, 1951.

The Accord marked a major

change in the relationship between the Treasury and the central bank,
a change which gradually, during the period of the transition to free
markets, resulted in the curtailment of support purchases.
The proposals of the Graft Subcommittee were partially adopted
by the System at the F.O.M.C. meeting held on March 4-5, 1953.

At

this meeting, which marked the inauguration of the "bills only" policy,
the System adopted the guidelines for an open market policy committed
to intervention in the government securities market solely to effectu
ate the objectives of monetary and credit policy, including the cor
rection of disorderly markets as opposed to the previous policy of
maintaining a fixed price-yield pattern in the government securities
market.
At this same meeting, the F.O.M.C. adopted specific operating
guidelines to be followed by the Trading Desk during Treasury financ
ing periods.

The Trading Desk was instructed to refrain from purchas

ing any maturing issues for which an exchange is being offered, "whenissued" securities, and any outstanding issues of comparable maturity
to those being offered for exchange.

The adoption of these specific

operating instructions, governing the conduct of open market operations
during Treasury financing periods, marked the birth of the "even keel"
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strategy.

Although not christened until December 12, 1957* the

historical analysis concludes that the "even keel" strategy had been
established as an operational concept by March 4-5* 1953.
This conclusion can be defended on a number of grounds.
First, by that date direct support purchases during Treasury financ
ings had been terminated.

Secondly, the practice of extending repur

chase agreements to non-bank government securities dealers in order
to smooth the money market impact of Treasury operations had become
an established Trading Desk operating procedure.

Finally, by that

date the System had come to practice the policy of avoiding overt
shifts in monetary policy during Treasury financing periods.

Thus,

by March 4-5, 1953* those general policies and specific operating
techniques which in subsequent years have come to be associated with
the "even keel" strategy were already employed by the System,
The economic conditions which developed in the early 1960's
presented a major policy dilemma.

The monetary authorities were

faced with the dual problems of promoting internal recovery, while
correcting the external balance of payments deficit.

To cope with

this dilemma, at the F.O.M.C. meeting held on February 20, 1961, the
System adopted "operation twist" to replace the "bills only" policy.
"Operation twist" authorized the Trading Desk to conduct open market
operations in coupon issues, not to maintain any particular rate
level, but rather to influence the flow of funds in both the long and
short ends of the market.

"Operation twist" represented only a partial

abandonment of the laissez-faire doctrine associated with the "bills
only” policy.
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"Operation twist” did not represent a major innovation in
System open market policy during Treasury financing periods.

The

policy did not entail any System commitment to support Treasury
financings.

Under "operation twist,” the Trading Desk continued its

policy of refraining from the purchase of "rights” to new issues,
"when-issued" securities, and issues of comparable maturity to those
being offered for exchange.

In retrospect, the initiation of "opera

tion twist" did not substantially alter the "even keel" strategy as
it was practiced under the "bills only" guidelines.

"Even Keel" Policy and Treasury Operations

Although the Treasury is an active participant in the govern
ment securities market each month during the year, the Federal Reserve
System pursues an "even keel" strategy for only a fraction of all
Treasury financing operations.

Both the financing technique employed,

as well as the type of securities involved in the operation, were
found to be the primary determinants of System policy, that is,
whether the F.O.M.C. does or does not issue an "even keel" directive.
It has been found that the System has generally pursued an
"even keel" policy during Treasury advance refundings.
has accompanied 12 of 15 such operations.

This strategy

Neither the volume of the

offer nor the type of operation (senior, junior, or pre-refunding)
seem to influence central bank policy.

The System has also normally

issued "even keel" directives during regular refundings.

Of the 17

major regular refunding operations undertaken by the Treasury, 1^
called forth an "even keel" directive.

Thus, for both advance
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refunding and regular refunding operations, the System has usually
maintained an "even keel" posture.
The primary determinant of central bank policy during Treasury
operations involving cash can be identified as the type of security
involved in the operation.

During cash refundings involving coupon

issues, the System has issued an "even keel" directive in 10 of 13
instances.

Conversely, cash refundings involving bills were seldom

"even keeled."

Only offers involving TAB'S were accompanied by an

"even keel" and then only when the size of the offer equaled or ex
ceeded 2.500 billion dollars.

Cash offers of Treasury bills were very

seldom "even keeled" while such offers involving coupon issues, in 8
of 11 instances, called for "even keel" directives.

Thus, for both

cash refundings and cash offers Involving coupon issues, the Federal
Reserve can be expected to implement its "even keel" policy.
The yearly frequency pattern of "even keel" policy during the
1960-1968 period is best explained by the influence of money market
conditions on Treasury financing activity.

The infrequent "even keel"

years were identified as 1961 and 1968 and were characterized as
periods of stringent money market conditions.

The rising level of

interest rates, coupled with the interest rate ceiling on coupon is
sues, forced the Treasury to curtail its activity.
The monthly pattern of "even keel" directives can most readily
be explained by the cash operating balances of the Treasury.

The

frequent "even keel" months were designated as January, April, July,
and October, these particular months coinciding with the normal annual
low points in Treasury operating balances.

March, June, and December

171
were identified as the infrequent "even keel" months, a finding ex
plained by the fact that these months, along with September, are
quarterly tax receipts dates.

The fact that September was found to

be a frequent "even keel" month can be explained primarily by the
overlapping of August refundings and the three September advance
refundings during the I96I-I963 interval.
The Empirical Tests of "Even Keel" Definitions

Three distinct interpretations of "even keel" policy were
identified in the literature.

Though not truly mutually exclusive

definitions, they were deemed as sufficiently different to be catego
rized within either the "support" or "neutrality" schools.

The em

pirical evidence strongly supported only one of these interpretations.
Before reviewing the evidence on these definitions, the
analysis of the implementation of "even keel" policy must be mentioned.
Primarily through the one-way analysis of variance procedure, it was
found that the Trading Desk used repurchase agreements with non-bank
dealers as the instrument for maintaining an "even keel" posture.
The level of repurchase agreements was found to be significantly
higher during "even keel" weeks than those weeks when such a directive
was not in force.

Thus, during Treasury financing periods, the System

normally injected reserves through the extension of repurchase agree
ments to non-bank government securities dealers.
The first definition of "even keel" policy tested, the "sup
port" school interpretation, views "even keel" policy as a one-way
shift toward ease during financing periods.

The results of the
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one-way analysis of variance program run on the original data does
not support this Interpretation.

The level of both marginal reserves

and short-term interest rates did not display any significant shift
toward easing during financing periods.

Thus, the "support" school

interpretation of "even keel" strategy was rejected.
The second definition tested was classified within the
"neutrality" school.

The money market condition or stabilization

hypothesis viewed the "even keel" strategy as consisting of the main
tenance of stable money market conditions during Treasury financing
periods.

Again, the behavior of both marginal reserves and short

term interest rates did not support the stabilization hypothesis.
The results of the one-way analysis of variance test on first differ
ence data did not reveal any significant difference between the degree
of fluctuation displayed by money market indicators during "even keel"
and "non-even keel" weeks.

The stabilization hypothesis could not be

supported.
The final definition of "even keel" policy, also classified
within the "neutrality" school, was verified by the evidence.

This

interpretation viewed the "even keel" strategy as entailing the
avoidance of overt System policy actions during financing periods.
It was found that changes in both the discount rate and the required
reserve ratio were only very rarely undertaken during "even keel"
periods.

The only occasions where such policy actions were undertaken

by the System during financing periods, it was found that the shift in
credit control policy was consistently toward ease.

Finally, there

was additional evidence that the necessity of maintaining an "even
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keel" posture during Treasury operations mitigated against a shift in
monetary policy.

In 39 of 66 "even keel" directives, the necessity

of maintaining steady money market conditions in light of Treasury
financing activity, was one factor cited as having precluded a shift
in credit control policy which might have been deemed appropriate in
view of internal or external economic conditions.

Thus, the evidence

supports the view that the "even keel" policy entails the avoidance
of overt policy actions during Treasury financing periods.

The Implication of "Even Keel"
Strategy for Monetary Policy

It has been shown during the 1960-1968 period that the Federal
Reserve's "even keel" policy has been implemented in terms of holding
the posture or stance of monetary policy constant during Treasury
financing periods.

The "even keel" strategy has consisted primarily

of the avoidance of overt policy actions during financing periods.

The

System has limited the implementation of its discretionary policy
actions to the intervals between Treasury financings.
Bearing in mind that approximately ^3.7 percent of all the
F.O.M.C. current economic policy directives called for the maintenance
of an "even keel" in the money market, the major implication of the
"even keel" strategy is that it limits the degree of flexibility of
credit control policy.

During "even keel" periods, the central bank

authorities have avoided changes in the stance of monetary policy.
some cases, shifts in credit policy deemed appropriate in light of
other economic conditions have been delayed until the end of the

In
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Treasury financing period.

Thus, the maintenance of an "even keel"

policy in some cases has lengthened the inside lag of monetary policy.
Before concluding that the "even keel" strategy imposes a
serious constraint on the flexibility of monetary policy, two facts
must be considered.

First, during most of the periods when "even

keel" directives were in force, the necessity of maintaining an "even
keel” was only one of many factors cited which preempted shifts in
credit policy.

In many of these cases, it is doubtful, even in the

absence of Treasury activity, whether the members would have reached
a consensus resulting in a shift in policy.

Secondly, recognizing the

fact that the stance of monetary policy can affect the outcome of a
Treasury financing, the constraint upon credit policy imposed by the
"even keel" strategy may be a small price to pay for the orderly mar
keting of the Treasury's offer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Anderson, Clay J. A Half-Century of Federal Reserve Policy
making, 191^-19^. Philadelphia* Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, 1965.
Aschheim, Joseph. Techniques of Monetary Control. Baltimore* John
Hopkins Press, 1961.
Beard, Thomas R. U.S. Treasury Advance Refunding, June 1960-July
196*1-. Washington, D.C.* Board of Governors, Federal Reserve
System, 1966.
Burford, Roger L. Statistics* A Computer Approach. Columbus, Ohio*
Charles N. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968.
Commission on Money and Credit. Report of the Commission. Money and
Credit* Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.* Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961.
Dixon, Wilfrid J., and Massey, Frank J., Jr. Introduction to
Statistical Analysis. New York* McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1957.
Eastburn, David P. The Federal Reserve on Record* Readings on Current
Issues from Statements by Federal Reserve Officials.
Philadelphia* Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1965.
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors. The Federal Reserve
System Purposes and Functions. 5th ed. Washington,
D.C.* Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1963.
Friedman, Milton. A Program for Monetary Stability. New York*
Fordham University Press, 1960.
_________ , and Schwartz, Anna J. A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867-1960. Princeton, N.J.i Princeton University
Press, 1963.
Gaines, Tilford C, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management. New
York* The Graduate School of Business, Columbia University,
and the Free Press of Glencoe, 1962,

175

176
Horvitz, Paul M. Monetary Policy and the Financial System. 2nd ed.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.i Prentlce-Hall, Inc., 1969.
Meade, J. E. The Balance of Payments.
Press, 1956.

Londom Oxford University

Meek, Paul. Discount Policy and Open Market Operations* Fundamental
Reappraisal of the Discount Mechanism. Washington, D.C.s
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, 1968,
Meigs, A. J. Free Reserves and the Money Supply. Chicago* University
of Chicago Press, 1952.
Murphy, Henry C. The National Debt in War and Transition. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950.
Robinson, Roland I. Money and Capital Markets. New York* McGrawHill Book Company, 1954.
Roosa, Robert V, Federal Reserve Operations in the Money and Govern
ment Securities Market. New York* Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, 1956.
Scott, Ira 0., Jr. Government Securities Market. New York* McGrawHill Book Company, 1965.
Tinbergen, Jan. The Theory of Economic Policy. Amsterdam* NorthHolland Publishing Company, 1952.
U.C.L.A., School of Medice, Health Sciences Computing Facility.
Biomedical Computer Programs, Los Angeles, California*
U.C.L.A., 19Sf.
Yamane, Taro. Statistics* An Introductory Analysis. New York* Harper
and Row Publishers, 1967.
Yeager, Leland B. International Monetary Relations* Theory, History,
and Policy. New York* Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 19o6.

Articles
Andersen, Leonall C. "Money Market Conditions as a Guide for Monetary
Management." Monetary Economics Readings. Edited by Alan
D. Entine. Belmont, California* Wadsworth Publishing
Company, Inc., 1968, pp. 226-245.

177
_________ , and Levine, Jules M. "A Test of Money Market Conditions
as a Means of Short-Run Monetary Management," National
Banking Review, Vol. IV (September, 1966), pp. "41-51.
_________ . "Implementation of Federal Reserve Open Market Policy in
1964," Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(June, 1965)1 PP. 2-5.
Anderson, Clay J, "Money Market Indicators," Monetary Economic
Readings. Edited by Alan D. Entine. Belmont, California!
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968, pp. 211-216.
Axilrod, Stephen H., and Young, Ralph A. "Interest Rates and Monetary
Policy." Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XLVIII (September,
1962), pp. 1110-1137.
Bach, George L. "Federal Reserve Organization and Policymaking."
Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy.
Edited by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L, Teigen, Homewood,
Illinois* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965* pp. 238-244.
Beard, Thomas R. "Counter-Cyclical Debt Management* A Suggested
Interpretation." Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXX
(January, 1964), pp. 244-252.
_

.

"Debt Management* Its Relationship to Monetary Policy,
1951-1962," Readings in Money, National Income, and
Stabilization Policy. Edited by Warren L. Smith and
Ronald L. Teigen. Homewood, Illinois* Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1965, pp. 416-428.

Brunner, Karl, and Meltzer, Allan H. "Genesis and Development of the
Free Reserve Conception of Monetary Processes." Readings
in Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy.
Edited by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen. Homewood,
Illinois* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965* PP. 197-210.
_

.

"The Federal Reserve's Attachment to Free Reserves."
Monetary Economics Readings. Edited by Alan D, Entine.
Belmont, California* Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.,
1968, pp. 217-225.

Carson, Deane. "Federal Reserve Support of Treasury Refunding
Operations." Journal of Finance, Vol. XII (March, 1957)*
PP. 51-63.
_________ . "Recent Open Market Committee Policy and Technique."
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIX (August, 1955).
pp. 321-343.

178
Davis, Richard G. "Open Market Operation, Interest Rates, and
Deposit Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
LXXIX (August, 1965), PP. 431-454.
Dewald, William G. "Free Reserves, Total Reserves, and Monetary
Control," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXXI (April,
1963), pp. 141-153.
Fand, David I, "An Analysis of Advance Refunding." Paper presented
to the meeting of the Econometric Society, Cleveland,
Ohio, September 5» 1965.
_________ , and Scott, Ira 0., Jr. "The Federal Reserve System's
'Bills Only' Policy* A Suggested Interpretation," Journal
of Business, Vol. XXXI (January, 1958), pp. 12-18.
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. "Repurchase Agreements."
Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
(May, 1964), pp. 2-13.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. "Advance Refunding* A Technique of
Debt Management." Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (December, 1962), pp. 169-175.
_________ . "The Financing of Government Securities Dealers."
Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(June, 196*0, pp. 107-115.
_________ . "The Significance and Limitations of Free Reserves."
Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(November, 195877 PP. 162-167.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, "The Longer She Stands the Shorter
She Grows." Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond (April, 1961), pp. 7-12.
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors. "Processes and Procedures
Involved in the Formulation of Monetary Policy." Readings in
Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy. Edited by
Warren L. Smith and Ronald L, Teigen, Homewood, Illinois*
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965, PP. 184-197.
Friedman, Milton, "Vault Cash and Free Reserves," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. LXIX (April, 1961), pp. 151-182.
Gustus, Warren J. "Monetary Policy, Debt Management, and Even Keel."
Business Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
(January, 1969), pp. 1-57
Guttentag, Jack M. "Defensive and Dynamic Open Market Operations,
Discounting, and the Federal Reserve System's Crisis—
Prevention and Responsibilities." Journal of Finance, Vol.
XXIV (May, 1969), pp. 249-263.

179
_________ . "The Strategy of Open Market Operations." Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXX (February, 1966), pp. 1-30.
Johnson, Harry G. "Monetary Theory and Policy." American Economic
Review, Vol. LII (June, 1962), pp. 335-385"
Keir, Peter M. "The Open Market Policy Process." Federal Reserve
Bulletin, Vol. XLIX (October, 1963), PP. 1359-1370.
laird, William E. "The Changing Views on Debt Management," Readings
in Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy.
Edited by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen. Homewood,
Illinois! Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965, pp. 406-415,
Leach, Ralph F. "Defensive Open Market Operations and the Reserve
Settlement Periods of Member Banks," Journal of Finance,
Vol. XIX (March, 196*4-), pp. 76-93.
Luckett, Dudley G. "'Bills Only'i A Critical Appraisal." Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLII (August, 1966),
pp. 301-3057“
Martin, William McChesney, Jr. "The Transition to Free Markets."
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX (April, 1953),
PP. 330-335.
Miller, Ervin. "Monetary Policies in the United States Since 1950*
Some Impliflcations of the Retreat to Orthodoxy," Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXVII
(May, 1951).
Mundell, Robert A. "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
for Internal and External Stability." International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. IX (March, 1962), pp. 7079.
Polakoff, Murray E. "Federal Reserve Discount Policy and its Critics."
Banking and Monetary Studies. Edited by Deane Carson,
Homewood, Illinois! Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 1963, PP. 190-

212.

_________ . "Reluctance Elasticity, Least Cost, and Member-Bank
Borrowing! A Suggested Integration," Journal of Finance,
Vol. XV (March, i960), pp. 1-18.
Riefler, Winfield W. "Open Market Operations in Long-Term
Securities." Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XLIV (November,
1958), pp. 1250-127*4'.
Roosa, Robert V. "Integrating Debt Management and Open Market
Operations." American Economic Review, Vol. XLII (May,
1952), pp. 214-235.

180
Smith, Warren L. "Monetary Policy, 1957-1960* An Appraisal," Review
of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLII (August, I960),
pp. 269“272.
, "The Discount Rate as a Credit Control Weapon," Journal
Political Economy, Vol. LXVI (April, 1958), pp. 171-177.
_________ , "The Instruments of General Monetary Control." Readings
in Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy. Edited
by Warren L, Smith and Ronald L, Teigen, Homewood, Illinois*
Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 1965» pp. 210-237.
_________ . "The Maturity Structure of Interest Rates." Readings in
Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy. Edited
by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen. Homewood,
Illinois* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965* PP. 400-406.
Sproul, Allan. "The Federal Reserve— Working Partner of the National
Banking System for Half a Century," Banking and Monetary
Studies. Edited by Deane Carson. Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963, pp. 64-79.
Tobin, James. "An Essay on Principles of Debt Management." Fiscal
and Debt Management Policies. Edited by James Tobin.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.* Prentlce-Hall, Inc., 1963,
pp. 143-218.
U.S.

_

.

Treasury Department.
September, I960.

"Debt Management and Advance Refunding."

"Treasury Views on the Independence of the Federal
Reserve." Readings in Money, National Income, and
Stabilization Policy. Edited by Warren L. Smith and
Ronald L. Teigen. Homewood, Illinois* Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1965, PP. 244-246.

Weintraub, Sidney. "Monetary Policy, 1957-59i Too Tight, Too Often."
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLII (August,
1966), pp. 279-282.
_

.

"The Theory of Open Market Operations* A Comment." Review
of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLI (August, 1959), PP.

308-312
Wyand, Robert R., II. "Money Market Conditions— What Are They?"
Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(September, 19637» pp. 1-4,
Yohe, William P. "The Open Market Committee Decision Process."
Monetary Economics Readings. Edited l^y Alan D. Entine.
Belmont, California* Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.,
1968, pp. 134-147.

181
, and Gasper, Louis C. "The 'Even Keel' Decisions of the
Federal Open Market Committee," Financial Analysts
Journal (November-December, 1970), pp. 1-12,
Young, Ralph A., and Yager, Charles A, "The Economics of 'Bills
Preferably'." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
LXXIV (August, i960), pp. 341-373.
Government Documents

Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors. Annual Report, 19511968. Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System.
_________ , Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1960-September 1968.
Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System.
U.S.

Congress. House. Committee on Banking and Currency. An
Alternative Approach to the Monetary Mechanism, by Karl
Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, Subcommittee on Domestic
Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House,
88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964-. Washington, D.C.i Government
Printing Office, 1964-.

________ An Analysis of Federal Reserve Policy Making, by Karl
Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer. Subcommittee on Domestic
Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House,
88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964-, Washington, D.C.i Government
Printing Office, 1964,
_________ . Compendium on Monetary Policy Guidelines and Federal
Reserve Structure. Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of
the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 90th Cong.,
2d sess., 1968, Washington, D.C.i Government Printing
Office, 1968.
_________ . The Federal Reserve System After Fifth Years. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the Committee
on Banking and Currency, House, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964.
Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1964,
U.S.

Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Debt Management in the
United States, by Warren L. Smith. Joint Economic
Committee, Study Paper No. 19. Washington, D.C.i Govern
ment Printing Office, i960,

_________ . Employment, Growth, and Price Levels. Hearings before
the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959.
Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1959.

182

_

. Monetary PolIcyi 1955-56. Hearings before the Sub
committee on Economic Stabilization of the Joint Economic
Committee, 84th Cong,, 2d sess., 1956. Washington, D.C.i
Government Printing Office, 1956.
U.S.

Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Conflicting
Official Views on Monetary Policya April, 1956. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the
Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 2d
sess., 1956. Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office,
1956.

_

. United States Monetary Policy1 Recent Thinking and
Experience" (Flanders Report) Hearings before the Sub
committee on Economic Stabilization of the Joint Committee
on the Economic Report, 83rd Cong., 2d sess,, 1954.
Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1954.

U.S.

Treasury Department. Monthly Bulletin of the Treasury Depart
ment, January 1960-September 19687 Washington, D.C.i
Government Printing Office.

U.S.

Treasury Department and Federal Reserve System, Board of
Governors. Treasury - Federal Reserve Study of the Govern
ment Securities Market. Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve
System, 1959-1960.

_________ . Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the
U.S. Government Securities Market. William McC, Martin, Jr.,
Chairman, Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 1969.
Staff studies available on request include!
Aheam, Louise Freeman. "Government Securities Market
Performance in the Wake of Official Operations in Coupon
Issues— Day-to-Day Performance." April 16, 1965.
_________ , and Peskin, Janice. "Market Performance as
Reflected in Aggregate Indicators." December, 1967.
Banyas, Lawrence, "New Techniques in Debt Management Since
the Late 1950’s." May 31, 1967.
Bernard, Normand, "Views of the U.S. Government Securities
Dealers." March 31* 1967,
Colby, William G, "Dealer Profits and Capital Availability
in the U.S. Government Securities Industry, 1955-1965.”
May 5, 1967.
Cooper, Robert L, "Techniques of the Federal Reserve Trading
Desk in the 1960*s Contrasted with the 'Bills Preferably'
Period." March 28, 1967.

183
Davis, Felix T.f and Hoey, M. J. "Automating Government
Securities Market Operations." June, 1969.
Ettin, Edward G. "The Financial and Economic Environment
of the I960*s in Relation to the U.S. Government Securities
Market." Appendix prepared by Carl H. Stem. January, 1967,
Meek, Paul, "The Changing Structure of the Dealer Market
in Government Securities." August, 196?.
Peskin, Janice. "Federal Agency Debt and Its Secondary
Market." November 14, 1967.
Rothwell, Jack C. "Effects of Operations in Coupon Issues
on Interest Rates and Flows of Funds Over Shorter Time
Intervals." July, 1965.
Scherer, Joseph. "Institutional Investors and the U.S.
Government Securities Market." March 30, 196?.
Wendel, Helmut, "The Position of Nonbank Dealers When
Treasury Securities Are Issued with Payment Permitted in
Tax and Loan Accounts." May 22, 1967.

Unpublished Materials

Axilrod, Stephen H, "An Empirical View of 'Even Keel'." Unpublished
manuscript, Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors,
April 22, 1969. (Mimeographed.)
_________ , and Burns, Joseph E, "The Behavior of Interest Rates,
Bank Credit, and Marginal Reserve Measures During 'Even
Keel,' 1965-mid-1967," Unpublished confidential
memorandum, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
(Mimeographed.)
Bowsher, Norman N, "’Even Keel’ as a Restraint on Monetary Action."
Unpublished manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
November 6, 1967. (Mimeographed.)
Thunberg, Rudolph. '"Even Keel'i The Reconciliation of Monetary
Policy and Debt Management." Unpublished manuscript,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (Mimeographed.)
Yohe, William P., and Gaspar, Louis C. "The 'Even Keel* Decisions of
the Federal Open Market Committee," Unpublished manuscript
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 1969.
(Mimeographed,)

VITA

Thomas J. Lengyel, son of John F. and Margaret D. Lengyel,
was b o m in Waterbury, Connecticut, on April 12, 1944.

He graduated

from Cheshire High School in Cheshire, Connecticut, in 1962, and
received a Bachelor of Arts degree, majoring in Economics, from the
University of Connecticut in Storrs, Connecticut, in June, 1966.
From September, 1966, through June, 1967* he pursued the
degree of Master of Arts in Economics at the University of Connecticut.
He was awarded the M.A. degree in June, 1967.
He was a graduate teaching assistant in the Department of
Economics at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
from September, 1967# to May, 1970.

From June, 1970, through May,

1971» he held an L.S.U. Graduate School Dissertation-Year Fellowship.
He is now a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the
December, 1971* commencement.

184

EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate:

Thomas J. Lengyel

Major Field:

Economics

Title of Thesis:

Federal Reserve "Even Keel" Policy:
Analysis

An Historical and Empirical

Approved:

r Professor and Chair

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

ip

klA.

Date of Examination:

October 13, 1971

ckj£

